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I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, Carl Consumer decided to buy a used car. After
reading the classified advertisements in his local newspaper, he
called Dave Debtor who had advertised a late model car for sale.
Carl inspected the car, and they reached an agreement on price.
Carl knew that his state's certificate of title legislation governed
the sale of the car,1 and therefore, prior to tendering his certified
check for the purchase price of the car, Carl insisted that he in-
spect Dave's title to see whether any liens or other title defects
were noted. Dave produced a clean certificate and signed his name
1. See, e.g., Uniform Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title and Anti-Theft Act § 1, 11
U.S.C. § 421 (1974, Supp. 1983); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 /2, §§ 3-100 to 210 (1981).
POSTPETITION TRANSFERS IN BANKRUPTCY
on the back, thereby authorizing the appropriate state official to
issue Carl a new certificate of title. Carl did not know, however,
that no less than one day prior to the sale Dave had filed a volun-
tary petition in bankruptcy.
In a dispute between Dave's trustee in bankruptcy and Carl
over title to and possession of the car, the trustee likely will pre-
vail.2 This will be true even though Carl was unaware of Dave's
bankruptcy and even though Dave himself honestly believed that
he had authority to sell the car. Bankruptcy law will not recognize
a clean certificate of title as the sole defense to a trustee's claim.3
Curiously, however, if Carl in turn sells the vehicle to another bona
fide purchaser, that purchaser will likely prevail in a dispute with
the trustee."
The 1966 Supreme Court decision in Bank of Marin v. Eng-
land,' a case that engendered considerable commentary,6 had a sig-
nificant impact on Congress and its treatment of this problem. In
Marin, a drawer drew some checks on its account with the drawee
bank in favor of a payee. Subsequent to the drawing of the checks,
but before payment by the bank, the drawer filed a voluntary peti-
tion in bankruptcy pursuant to the bankruptcy act of 1938 (herein-
after "Chandler Act" 7). The bank, not knowing of the drawer's
bankruptcy, honored the checks in the ordinary course of its busi-
ness. Subsequently, the drawer's trustee in bankruptcy initiated
proceedings against both the drawee and the payee to recover the
funds debited from the account. The payee conceded the merit of
the trustee's argument, deposited the total amount of the checks
2. See 11 U.S.C. § 549(a)(1)(B) (1982) (amended 1984).
3. Id. For further discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 241-46.
4. 11 U.S.C. § 550(b)(2) (1982). For further discussion, see infra text accompanying
notes 473-82.
5. 385 U.S. 99 (1966).
6. See, e.g., Bateman, Post-Bankruptcy Transfers: An Old Problem In Need Of A New
Solution, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 280 (1968); Boshkoff, Section 70(d) of The Bankruptcy Act:
The Need for Amendment, 43 IND. L.J. 755 (1968); Note, Bankruptcy: Bank Which In Good
Faith and Without Notice Honors Client's Check After He Is Adjudicated Bankrupt Not
Liable To Trustee For Depletion of the Bankrupt's Estate, 1967 DUKE L.J. 1023; Note,
Bankruptcy: Where Bank Acted Without Actual Knowledge of Depositor's Bankruptcy, It
Will Not Be Liable for Cashing Checks Drawn by Depositor Before Bankruptcy and
Cashed by Payee Thereafter, 18 SYRACUSE L. REV. 853 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Where Bank Acted Without Actual Knowledge]; Note, Bankruptcy: Trustee's Title to
Bankrupt's Property-Drawee Bank is Liable to the Trustee for Honoring Pre-Bankruptcy
Checks After Adjudication Even Though the Bank Acted Without Any Knowledge of the
Bankruptcy Proceeding, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 430 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Note, Trustee's
Title].
7. Chandler Act, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (1938).
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into court, and requested contribution from the drawee bank.
The trustee's analysis of the Chandler Act persuaded the
Ninth Circuit.8 The Chandler Act provided that the trustee was
"vested by operation of law with the title of the bankrupt ... [of]
property ... which prior to the filing of the petition he could by
any means have transferred ..... "I The expressed exception to this
provision protected transfers occurring only "before adjudica-
tion."10 Under an amendment to the Chandler Act, the filing of a
voluntary petition in bankruptcy operated as an automatic adjudi-
cation of bankruptcy." In addition, for postadjudication transfers
the statute expressly stated that "no transfer by or in behalf of the
bankrupt after the date of bankruptcy [is] valid against the trus-
tee." 2 Therefore, under the statute, only the trustee had title to
the account; the bank had no authority to honor the checks.
Justice Harlan sought to affirm the Ninth Circuit." Because
the Chandler Act provided that the trustee had title to the bank-
rupt's property "as of the date of the filing of the petition,"' 4 and
because there was no other protection to be found in the Act,'8
Harlan argued that the trustee must prevail despite the conceded
equities of the bank's case.
Justice Douglas wrote the majority opinion. He agreed with
the Ninth Circuit's decision imposing liability against the payee.
The payee was a creditor of the estate. By forcing the payee to pay
the money back, the Court was merely depriving the payee "pref-
erential treatment."' 6 As to the bank, however, he opined that the
8. Bank of Marin v. England, 352 F.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1965).
9. Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 70a(5), 52 Stat. 840, 879-80 (1938).
10. Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 70d, 52 Stat. 840, 881-82 (1938).
11. Act of June 23, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-64, § 1, 73 Stat. 109.
12. Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 70d(5), 52 Stat. 840, 882 (1938).
13. Matin, 385 U.S. at 103 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
14. Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 70a, 52 Stat. 840, 879 (1938).
15. Chandler Act section 70d(2) expressly protected persons "holding property of the
bankrupt" who paid in "good faith" upon the order of bankruptcy. Chandler Act, ch. 575, §
70d(2), 52 Stat. 840, 881 (1938). This protection, however, was given only for transfers oc-
curring before adjudication. Thus, Justice Harlan concluded that Congress's failure to in-
clude protection for postadjudication transfers was highly significant. Marin, 385 U.S. at
103. For further discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 131-34.
16. 385 U.S. at 103. The opinion does not address cases in which the payee is not a
creditor, for example, where the check is given in payment for goods. The opinion also stops
short of holding that the payees had benefitted from a preference which was therefore void-
able under section 60b of the Chandler Act. Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 60a,b, 52 Stat. 840,
869-70 (1938). If the payees received payment after the petition, it seems clear that an es-
sential preference element, that the transfer occur "within four months before the filing . ..
of the petition," would be missing. Id. (emphasis added). For further discussion, see infra
note 226.
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statute must not be read "with the ease of a computer ...[and]
[t]here is an overriding consideration that equitable principles gov-
ern the exercise of bankruptcy jurisdiction."' 7 Moreover, the trus-
tee's position conflicted with the principle announced by the Court
in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,"8 which held
that one should not be deprived of his property without notice,
that was "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action ..... "19
In order for the majority to reach this decision,20 it was neces-
sary to resort to principles of "equity."21 In addition, the Court's
prior opinions indicated that the postpetition transferee should not
have been protected. Dictum in the frequently cited case of Muel-
ler v. Nugent22 states that the filing of the petition in bankruptcy
is "a caveat to all the world"2 that the trustee upon adjudication
in bankruptcy has the sole authority to deal with the property of
the estate. Subsequent decisions converted the Mueller dictum
into actual case law, 2' and Congress, in passing the Chandler Act,
relied on these opinions. Congress severely limited the instances in
which relief was accorded to innocent parties who dealt with the
bankrupt after adjudication.25
The drafters of the 1978 bankruptcy code were also aware of
the result in the Marin case and codified it to insulate banks from
17. Marin, 385 U.S. at 103.
18. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
19. Id. at 314.
20. The Supreme Court is not the only court to engage in questionable legal gymnastics
to reach a result relieving a transferee of the effect of an unauthorized postpetition transfer.
Recently, the First Circuit relied on Marin to immunize a transferee from conversion liabil-
ity where the transfer was voidable under section 549. 11 U.S.C. § 549(a)(1)(B) (1982)
(amended 1984). See infra text accompanying notes 241-46; see also In re Yellow Cab Co., 4
BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 582 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. July 13, 1978), discussed infra at note 133.
21. Cf. Countryman, Justice Douglas: Expositor of the Bankruptcy Law, 51 AM. BANK.
L.J. 127, 148 (1977) ("With the hope that this is a matter on which reasonable men may
differ, this writer feels obliged to say that he considers the decision wrong both in its inter-
pretation of the Act and in its consideration of 'equity.' "). Professor Countryman suggested
that the decision in Marin may unfairly distort the statutory scheme so as to lead to inequi-
table results in the future.
22. 184 U.S. 1 (1902).
23. Id. at 14.
24. See Andrews v. Patridge, 228 U.S. 479 (1913); Everett v. Judson, 228 U.S. 474
(1913); Acme Harvester Co. v. Beekman Lumber Co., 222 U.S. 300 (1911); see also Bateman,
supra note 6, at 284-86.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 93-107; see also S. REP. No. 1916, 75th Cong., 3d
Sess. 18 (1937); H.R. REP. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1937); Bateman, supra note 6,
at 289 n.52.
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future lawsuits by bankruptcy trustees. 26 Nevertheless, Congress
did not extend protection to other parties dealing with estate prop-
erty who were unaware of the bankruptcy.
Both the Uniform Commercial Code 27 and case law involving
personal property28 provide that purchasers usually assume the
risk that their seller does not have authority to transfer title to the
property sold. Moreover, the Mueller dictum has firm historical
support.29
Numerous exceptions to this general rule have been created by
case law30 and by statute.3 1 Given the fact that there are numerous
26. 11 U.S.C. § 542(c) (1982). "This subsection codifies the result of Bank of Marin v.
England .... " H. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 369 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6325; S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 84 (1978),
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5870. This provision is discussed infra
at text accompanying notes 321-29.
The drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code anticipated a Marin-type case and pro-
vided that the bank should not be liable unless notice of "legal process is received or served
and a reasonable time for the bank to act thereon expires" before the check is paid. See
U.C.C. § 4-303(1) (1978). Section 4-303, however, could not have been used to protect the
bank because it conflicted with controlling federal bankruptcy statutes. See, e.g., Jahn v.
First Tennessee Bank of Chattanooga (In re Burnette), 14 Bankr. 795 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1981) (holding that the bankruptcy code's definition of a "transfer," as set forth in section
11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(A) (1982), controls over provisions in the Uniform Commercial Code
that are designed to insulate a "floating lien" on inventory from the trustee's preferential
transfer attack); U.C.C. § 9-108 (1978) (providing that a "security interest in the after-ac-
quired collateral shall be deemed to be taken for new value and not as security for an ante-
cedent debt. ... ). The drafters were quite candid in stating the need for section 9-108:
"This rule is of importance principally in insolvency proceedings under the federal Bank-
ruptcy Act. ... U.C.C. § 9-108 comment 1 (1978). This provision, however, did not deter
the court in Burnette.
27. "A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or had power to
transfer. ... U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (1978); see Marvin v. Connelly, 272 S.C. 425, 252 S.E. 2d
562 (1979). In the Marvin case, the seller of a trailer acquired possession after he had pur-
chased the trailer at his own mechanic's lien sale. He then sold the trailer to the eventual
buyer. The trailer had been stolen, and the court held that buyer had bought nothing be-
cause his seller did not have title.
28. "[O]rdinarily one who buys from a vendor who has no title obtains none, no matter
how much he may pay or how honestly he may buy." James Talcott, Inc. v. Associates
Discount Corp., 302 F.2d 443, 447 (8th Cir. 1962); see also Fosco Leasing Co. v. Cohen (In re
Racquet Times, Inc.), 8 Bankr. 558, 560 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1981) ("One who has no title to
goods cannot pass title to even a bona fide purchaser."); BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL
PROPERTY § 67 (2d ed. 1955) ("A seller cannot transfer better title to a chattel than it
possesses.").
29. T.F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 452 (5th ed. 1956); 2 F.
POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 164 (2d ed. 1959).
30. As early as the fifteenth century an exception was recognized for sales in market
overt. Case of Market Overt, 77 Eng. Rep. 180, 5 Coke 83b (1569); T.F.T. PLUCKNETT, supra
note 29, at 665; see Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133
(1931); see also 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 449 (Dawsons of Pall Mall ed. 1966).
Other exceptions were granted when title was merely "voidable" as opposed to "void."
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exceptions to the caveat emptor doctrine outside of bankruptcy, it
is curious that more exceptions are not recognized within bank-
ruptcy. There is no persuasive reason why the Bank of Marin
should have been insulated from liability while a purchaser, like
Carl Consumer relying on a clean certificate of title, is not. A cen-
tral concern of this article is that other parties dealing with estate
property after a filing of bankruptcy are as deserving of protection
as was the Bank of Main.
With these objectives in mind, a summary of what is to follow
is offered: Part II of this article will analyze the scope of any Con-
stitutional restraints on Congress's authority to force innocent
transferees to absorb the loss in postpetition transfer cases. The
use of the Mullane decision by the Supreme Court in Marin has
caused some student writers to infer that the Court intended to
base its decision on the due process clause of the Constitution.2
BROWN, supra note 28, at § 70; see also Jones v. Linebaugh, 34 Mich. App. 305, 311, 191
N.W.2d 142, 145 (1971) ("[A] person with a voidable title . . . has power to transfer good
title to a good faith purchaser .... "); Central Nat. Bank of Matoon v. Worden-Martin,
Inc., 90 Ill. App. 3d 601, 604, 413 N.E.2d 539, 542 (1980) ("Even one with a voidable title
possesses power to transfer it as good.").
Still another exception was recognized when the true owner was estopped to deny the
title of the purchase. BROWN, supra note 28, at § 70; see also Dresher v. Roy Wilmeth Co.,
118 Ind. App. 542, 82 N.E.2d 260, 262 (1948) ("[W]here a person by his own acts makes it
possible for a vendee of personal property to sell the property to a bona fide purchaser for
value without notice, the original owner and seller may not recover the property from such
bona fide purchaser."); Guckeen Farmers Elevator Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 269 Minn. 127, 134,
130 N.W.2d 69, 74 (1964) ("[Wlhere a seller has been guilty of laches or conduct injurious to
an innocent third party purchasing the goods from his vendee, he will be estopped from
recovering them or their value as against such third party.").
31. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, §§ 3-100 to 210 (1981) (certificate of title legisla-
tion); U.C.C. § 3-305 (holder in due course of negotiable instrument); U.C.C. §§ 2-403, 9-
307(1) (buyer in ordinary course of business).
32. "The move accomplished by Marin, was that not only is notice by publication in-
sufficient when the intended recipient is known, but constructive notice resulting from an
act, unknown to the intended notice recipient, is inconsistent with the concept of due pro-
cess." Note, Bankruptcy-Notice Required-Bank's Liability on Checks Presented Subse-
quent to Depositor's Filing of Voluntary Bankruptcy Petition, 16 AM. U.L. REv. 409, 415
(1967). "Moreover, since the constitutional mandate is to provide reasonable notice and
since a trustee could normally notify a bankrupt's banks much more easily than he could all
creditors and with much less risk of omission, it might be argued that personal notice is
required." Note, Bankruptcy-Transfer of Funds-Drawee Bank Liable to Drawer's Bank-
ruptcy Trustee for Good Faith Payment of Checks After Drawer Files Voluntary Bank-
ruptcy Petition Despite Lack of Notice of Filing, 52 VA. L. REv. 528, 536-37 (1966); see also
Note, Bankruptcy-Transfers-Drawee Bank Not Liable for Payment of Depositor's
Check After His Voluntary Petition in Bankruptcy Where Notice Is Not Given to Bank, 20
VAND. L. REV. 1152, 1156 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Note, Drawee Bank Not Liable], (sug-
gesting that a substantial risk of double liability entitles the bank to reasonable notice).
Arguing that the trustee could give notice fails to account for the fact that a trustee or
other custodian usually is not appointed for several days after the filing of the petition. See
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Part III presents a discussion of the law prior to the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978. This historical overview is offered because
some of the 1978 bankruptcy code's treatment of postpetition
transfers is merely a recodification of the prior treatment. In those
instances where prior treatment was rejected, an understanding of
the rejected doctrine will be useful in analyzing present law. Part
IV describes the current status of the law. Part V discusses the
policy justifications for favoring either the trustee or the innocent
third party, and an approach will be offered for resolving these
questions. Numerous exceptions to the general rule of caveat
emptor, which have been recognized by case law and by state stat-
utes, will be discussed to determine whether or not Congress
should codify these exceptions into future legislation on postpeti-
tion transfers.
II. THE .CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO NOTICE
Prior to the result in Marin, there was no indication in either
the literature or case law that suggested that a congressional stat-
ute, that imposed liability on an innocent party due to that party's
ignorance of the bankruptcy filing, was unconstitutional. Justice
Douglas's reliance on the Mullane decision in deciding Marin
caused some student commentators to infer that the decision may
have constitutional underpinnings.83 The entire excerpt in question
reads as follows:
The Court of Appeals held that the bankruptcy of a drawer op-
erates without more as a revocation of the drawee's author-
ity. . . . But that doctrine is a harsh one that runs against the
grain of our decisions requiring notice before a person is de-
prived of property ... a principle that has been recognized and
implied in proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act . . . . The
kind of notice required is one "reasonably calculated under all
the circumstances, to apprise the interested parties of the pen-
dency of the action. . . ." We cannot say that the act of filing a
voluntary petition in bankruptcy per se is reasonably calculated
11 U.S.C. § 701 (1982) (providing for the appointment of an interim trustee in liquidation
cases "[p]romptly" after the "order [of] relief..."). The filing of a voluntary petition im-
mediately "constitutes an order for relief ... 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1982). Thus, even if an
interim trustee is appointed "promptly," it will be several days before the trustee would be
in a position to notify creditors and banks of a bankruptcy. Such notice would have come
too late for the Bank of Marin. The bankruptcy court does have the power to appoint an
interim trustee at the time of the filing of the petition, 11 U.S.C. § 105(b) (1982), but such
appointments are unusual.
33. See supra note 32.
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to put the bank on notice.3 4
Marin does not expressly hold that placing liability on the
drawee bank would be unconstitutional, but one cannot simply ig-
nore the above language. The reference to cases requiring notice as
a constitutional right was more than a throw-in. Therefore, this
section explores the constitutional limitations on the scope of Con-
gress's constitutional power to establish bankruptcy laws.
The notice cases cited by the Supreme Court in Marin were
not fifth amendment cases. Those cases discussed the fourteenth
amendment's limitation against the states' attempt to take prop-
erty without due process of law. 5 In the bankruptcy setting, only
the due process clause of the fifth amendment can limit the federal
government. Nevertheless, the cases citing the two due process
clauses of the Constitution do so on an interchangeable basis." No
objection should be lodged against the Court for citing these four-
teenth amendment cases while interpreting the fifth amendment.
It is not surprising that the Court's opinions that discuss the
fifth amendment limitation on the bankruptcy power37 concern the
rights of creditors in bankruptcy. Although one should not
overgeneralize in this area, any student of the cases cannot help
but conclude that the Court has been willing to permit sweeping
curtailments of creditors' rights. Landlords' claims may be statuto-
rily limited to a fraction of their potential value under nonban-
kruptcy law.3 a Even secured creditors' rights can be statutorily
34. Marin, 385 U.S. at 102.
35. Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962), discussed infra text accompa-
nying notes 43-45; Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956).
36. See Miller v. Howe Sound Min. Co., 77 F. Supp. 540, 547 (E.D. Wash. 1948) ("The
language of numerous decisions of the Supreme Court and the way in which the Court, in
considering constitutional questions, pertaining to property rights, has indiscriminately
cited as sustaining authority cases involving Federal and State statutes clearly indicates that
so far as substantive due process is concerned, the principles which apply to the Fourteenth
Amendment are applicable also to the Fifth Amendment.") (citing Carroll v. Greenwich Ins.,
199 U.S. 401 (1905); Federal Power Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575
(1942); Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins., 304 U.S. 502 (1938); West Coast.Hotel Co. v. Par-
rish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934)).
37. "The Congress shall have Power... [t]o establish. . . uniform laws on the subject
of Bankruptcies throughout the United States. ... U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 4.
38. Kuehner v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U.S. 445 (1937), upholding the constitutionality of
a statute limiting to a three-year period a landlord's claim for damages. The present treat-
ment of the landlord's claim is remarkably similar to the statutory formula found constitu-
tional in Kuehner. In general, the landlord's claim is limited to "rent reserved . . . for the
greater of one year, or 15 percent, not to exceed three years, of the remaining term of such
lease, following the earlier of (i) the date of the filing of the petition; and (ii) the date on
which such lessor repossessed, or the lessee surrendered, the leased property." 11 U.S.C. §
19841
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modified. 39 The only limit on Congress's power appears to be that
the secured creditor must eventually be paid the reasonable value
of his or her property.4 With unsecured creditors, on the other
hand, it has never been seriously questioned that Congress has the
power to simply eviscerate, by means of a discharge, the entire
claim. 1 In view of this sweeping power, if our analysis of the notice
issue reveals that the fourteenth amendment's due process clause
does not require notice in cases such as Marin, then clearly the
fifth amendment does not require it either.
We now turn to the issue of whether the Constitution requires
notice before a party acts in such a way to make it liable? In insist-
ing that the bank receive notice, the Court in Marin cited Mul-
lane, Walker v. City of Hutchinson,42 and Schroeder v. City of
New York. 43 All three cases discuss the right of a party in a law
suit to be apprised of the pendency of a proceeding where the
rights or property of the litigant are subject to adjudication.44 All
502(a)(7) (1982); see, e.g., International Coins & Currency, Inc. v. Barmar Corp. (In re Inter-
national Coins & Currency, Inc.), 18 Bankr. 335 (Bankr. D. Ut. 1982).
39. See Wright v. Union Central Life Insurance Co., 304 U.S. 502 (1937) (allowing
debtor, whose property was sold at judicial sale, to keep it beyond state statute's redemp-
tion period); Wright v. Vinton Branch Bank, 300 U.S. 440 (1937) (allowing debtor the use of
the secured creditor's collateral for a three-year period while attempting to reorganize). See
generally Comment, Constitutional Limitations on the Bankruptcy Power: Chapter XII
Real Property Arrangements, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 362, 383-93 (1977).
40. See United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982) (giving prospective
application only, so as to avoid constitutional questions, to a statute voiding nonpurchase
money security interests on debtor's exempt property); 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1982).
41. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (1982); cf. Rogers, The Impairment of Secured Credi-
tors' Rights In Reorganization: A Study of the Relationship Between the Fifth Amend-
ment and the Bankruptcy Clause, 96 HARV. L. REV. 973, 998-1012 (1983) (questioning the
different constitutional treatment given secured vis-a-vis unsecured creditors).
42. 352 U.S. 112 (1956).
43. 371 U.S. 208 (1962). Even reliance on Mullane assumes the implied overruling of
Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181 (1902). Moyses held that creditors in bank-
ruptcy were not constitutionally entitled to more than a ten day notice by mail. The Court
held that the notice was constitutional given the fact that the bankruptcy proceeding was
basically an in rem action. Prior to Mullane, it was felt that personal service was only re-
quired in in personam actions. 186 U.S. at 192. The Mullane case, however, held that the
constitutional sufficiency of notice could not depend on whether the proceeding was charac-
terized as in rem or in personam. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 311-13. Although Mullane may have
overruled the analysis of Moyses, it is by no means clear that the result would have changed
in light of Mullane. The Mullane Court held that in some instances mailed notice was suffi-
cient given the nature of the proceeding and the large number of parties required to be
notified. Id. at 317-18. This, of course, is typical in a bankruptcy case. In addition, it could
be argued that the creditors are within the continuing jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court.
See, e.g., Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U.S. 346 (1913); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CON-
FLICT OF LAWS, § 26 (1971).
44. Mullane concerned a state proceeding to aggregate certain trust accounts under
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three cases held that there was a constitutional right to receive no-
tice prior to the adjudication of one's rights.
These cases should not be cited to support the proposition
that a party is entitled to notice prior to the act that may subject
that party to civil liability. The Bank of Marin was not held liable
without being given notice and a hearing. No complaint was made
about the procedures that were used prior to holding the bank lia-
ble. Presumably a complaint was filed, notice was given, and the
bank was given an opportunity to defend itself at every stage of
the proceeding. Moreover, the filing of the petition and adjudica-
tion of bankruptcy of the depositor did not make the Bank of Ma-
rin liable. Liability arose when the Bank honored the checks and
debited the bankrupt's account. Only at this point was the Bank
subject to suit. The constitutional issue in Marin was whether or
not the Bank could be held liable without prior notice that its ac-
tion in honoring the check made it subject to liability.
One could argue that the automatic adjudication, that fol-
lowed from the filing of the petition, was a judicial proceeding that
would have entitled the Bank to notice. But this argument is un-
sound. If Mullane was apposite to adjudications in bankruptcy,
then the notice would be required before the adjudication. But the
Bank of Marin did not complain that it failed to receive notice
before the filing. It wanted notice before honoring the checks. In
Mullane, the Supreme Court required that notice be given to those
parties whose claims and defenses would have been resolved by an
adjudication of the issues in the proceeding.15 In bankruptcy, how-
ever, creditors lack standing to prevent debtors from filing a peti-
tion. Debtors are permitted to file bankruptcy despite the some-
times strenuous objections of their creditors."' Because a debtor's
New York law. 339 U.S. at 307-09. In the process of doing so, the beneficiaries' claims
against the trustees for possible negligence or breach of fiduciary duty would have been lost.
Both Walker and Schroeder were condemnation proceedings. In all three cases, the Court
held that notice calculated to apprise the defendant of the pending proceedings must, as a
matter of due process, be provided. See Schroeder, 371 U.S. at 208-09; Walker, 352 U.S. at
112-13; Note, Drawee Bank Not Liable, supra note 32, at 1156.
The doctrine has been extended, to a limited extent, to prejudgment judicial proceed-
ings. See North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc. 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v. W.
T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); see also Countryman, The Bill of Rights and the Bill
Collector, 15 ARIz. L. REV. 521 (1973); Kennedy, Due Process Limitations on Creditors'
Remedies: Some Reflections on Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 19 AM. UL. REV. 158
(1970).
45. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313-14.
46. See 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1982); In re Professional Success Seminars Int'l, Inc., 18
Bankr. 75 (Bankr. S.D. Fla 1982). In Success Seminars, the.creditor moved to dismiss
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creditors have no standing to object to the filing of a petition, they
are not entitled to notice."'
There appears to be no decision in the area of civil law that
requires, as a constitutional matter, that pre-act notice be given to
defendants before civil liability can be imposed. Notice of possible
civil liability before one acts has not been recognized as a pro-
tected constitutional right. Distributors of defective products are
routinely held strictly liable for any damages caused by the prod-
uct even though the distributor did not manufacture the product
and had no notice of its defective nature. The distributor is liable
if he dealt with the product in the regular course of business."' Few
credible constitutional objections have ever been raised to the con-
stitutionality of this doctrine. 9 The distributor is required, usually
for insurance purposes, to factor these damages into the cost of
doing business.50 Similarly, the Bank of Marin could have been re-
quired, as a cost of doing business, to assume the financial risk of
the bankruptcy of its customers.51
Even more compelling civil-liability-without-fault-cases
than Marin have occurred without any consideration of constitu-
tional ramifications. A law in Oregon permitted a guardian to be
appointed over the business affairs of a spendthrift. 52 The guardian
was even able to avoid transactions that occurred outside of Ore-
gon to the considerable financial embarrassment of those parties
debtor's chapter seven petition on grounds challenging the form of the petition, the author-
ity of the officer signing the petition, and lack of corporate authority for the filing of the
petition. Without reaching the merits of the claims, the court dismissed the motion on the
ground that the creditors lacked standing to oppose the petition. Id. at 76; cf. In re Verraz-
zano Towers, Inc., 10 Bankr. 387 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981).
47. In In re Southern Arizona Smelting Co., 231 F. 87 (9th Cir. 1916), the court stated
that "[iut is only after adjudication that the law requires that notice be given by publication
and by mail of the first meeting of creditors and of each of the various subsequent steps in
administration." Id. at 90. The petition establishes the facts of a decree of bankruptcy. No-
tice to creditors is unnecessary until dismissal is sought. See generally Dunham, Post Judg-
ment Seizures: Does Due Process Require Notice and Hearing, 21 S.D. L. REV. 78, 92-94
(1976) for an analogous discussion.
48. "[Strict liability] therefore applies to any manufacturer of such a product, to any
wholesale or retail dealer or distributor, and to the operator of a restaurant." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment f (1964); see also 2 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § 16A(4)(b)(i) (1984).
49. Cf. Neely & Hines, The Unconstitutionality of The Doctrine of Strict Liability, 46
INS. COUNSEL J. 289 (1979).
50. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63-64, 377 P.2d 897, 900-01,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700-01 (1962).
51. For further discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 518-23.
52. OR. REV. STAT. § 126.280 (1961) (repealed 1973); Olshen v. Kaufman, 235 Or. 423,
385 P.2d 161 (1963); see also Reeves v. Hunter, 185 Iowa 958, 171 N.W. 567 (1919).
[Vol. 39:1
POSTPETITION TRANSFERS IN BANKRUPTCY
who were unaware of the spendthrift status of the individual with
whom they dealt.53
The doctrine that the death of a principal automatically re-
vokes the authority of the agent can be analogized to the Marin
case. Both the agent and the party he is dealing with may be una-
ware of the principal's death, but the agent still lacks authority to
bind his principal.5 4 The American Law Institute has sharply criti-
cized this result 55 but not on constitutional grounds.
Having decided that reliance on Mullane and other decisions
is misplaced, we may look to the Court's treatment of non-culpable
criminal defendants. It has been frequently assumed, but not af-
firmatively held, that the due process clauses permit the federal
government and the states to impose liability without notice.
The Court's citation of criminal law cases does not provide a
definitive answer to the question of whether a criminal defendant
is entitled to notice. Some matters are reasonably clear, however.
For example, the Supreme Court requires that any statute that im-
poses criminal liability be clear and unambiguous so that any de-
fendant charged under the statute can be apprised of what specific
conduct is subject to criminal sanction. Moreover, as a general
constitutional principle, the legislature may impose criminal sanc-
tions on a defendant even though he is either unaware that his
actions are criminal or where he is innocently mistaken as to the
facts.
For example, it has long been held that a defendant can be
convicted of statutory rape even though he honestly believed that
53. Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 239 Or. 1, 395 P.2d 543 (1964).
54. E.g., Ashley v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 1319 (E.D. Wis. 1980); RESTATEMENT OF
AGENCY § 120 (1933).
55. See Proceedings of the American Law Institute, 11 A.L.I. PROC. 85-87, 90, 94 (1933).
Professor Seavey stated that the rule that the principal's death terminates the agency is "a
very shocking result." Id. at 85. Mr. Rose was even more bold calling the rule "a relic of
remote barbarism." Id. at 90.
56. In Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284 (1963), the defendants were charged with breach
of the peace for peacefully playing basketball in a city park. The Court held that because
the breach of peace statute did not give notice that playing basketball in a city park was a
violation of the law, the defendants could not be convicted under the statute. See also Con-
nally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926) (penal statute prescribing that workmen be
paid at the "current rate" is unconstitutionally vague); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451
(1939) (gang statute held unconstitutionally vague); cf. United States v. National Dairy
Products Corp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963) (anti-trust statute imposing criminal liability for selling
products at "unreasonably low prices" is not unconstitutionally vague). For a useful treat-
ment of the area of criminal liability without fault, see Saltzman, Strict Criminal Liability
and the United States Constitution: Substantive Criminal Law Due Process, 24 WAYNE L.
REV. 1571, 1592-1614 (1978).
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the victim was over the age of consent.57 Moreover, as a general
principle, the government need only prove that the defendant in-
tended his actions. The government need not prove that the defen-
dant was aware that his acts were in violation of the law or that he
was not innocently mistaken as to the facts. 8
The Court's decision in United States v. Balint59 illustrates
these principles. In Balint, the defendant was charged with the
criminal sale of a narcotic drug. Defendant demurred to the indict-
ment on the grounds that it did not allege that the defendant knew
that the sale of the drug was illegal. The Supreme Court held that
the defendant was not entitled to protection under the Constitu-
tion. Inquiry was limited to whether or not Congress intended to
impose criminal liability without fault. A similar result was
reached when a defendant was charged with the sale of adulterated
cosmetics.10 Where a defendant was found to be living in a biga-
mous state of cohabitation, no constitutional protection was af-
forded even though he reasonably believed that he had been previ-
ously divorced."1 In criminal cases where the Court has indicated
that the defendant should be in some way culpable" or negligent, 3
57. See Anderson v. State, 384 P.2d 669 (Alaska 1963); Heath v. State, 173 Ind. 296, 90
N.E. 310 (1910); Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 1100 (1966).
58. See, e.g., United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971) (holding that a defendant can
be criminally charged for the sale of unregistered grenades without an allegation in the in-
dictment that the defendant knew the grenades were unregistered).
59. 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
60. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
61. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
62. In Morrisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952), the defendant was charged with
the theft of government property under such circumstances that a reasonable person would
have believed that the property had been abandoned. Although the Court theorized on the
universally accepted principle that the defendant should not be punished unless in some
way blameworthy, the narrow issue in Morrisette was whether or not Congress intended to
make defendants, who honestly believed that they were at liberty to take the property in
question, liable. The Court answered the question by reading an intent standard into the
statute. The Court unabashedly made no attempt to distinguish Balint. The more recent
case of United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975) involved a corporation president who was
charged with selling adulterated food. At issue was whether or not a corporate executive
could be held to be vicariously liable for a criminal action. Again, the Court interpreted the
statute in such a way so that the defendant could only be held liable if he was in some way
responsible for and had authority to deal with the fact situation in question. Thus, like
Morrisette, the narrow question in Park was one of statutory interpretation.
63. United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1971). In
International Minerals, the defendant was charged with the sale of unregistered chemicals
(sulfuric and hydrofluosilicic acid). Defendant claimed that it was unaware of a duty to
register. The Court declined to hold the defendant strictly liable, id. at 563, and also refused
to allow the defendant to plead that his ignorance of the law was an excuse. Id. But the
Court, per Justice Douglas, did employ language suggesting a negligence standard: "But
[Vol. 39:1
POSTPETITION TRANSFERS IN BANKRUPTCY
the narrow issue is one of statutory construction."
The case of Lambert v. California65 cannot be so easily distin-
guished. In Lambert, however, the defendant was charged with the
violation of a statute that required persons with prior felony con-
victions to register with the police. The defendant defended on the
ground that she had no knowledge of this duty to register. She was
nevertheless convicted and appealed to the Supreme Court. The
majority opinion, written by Justice Douglas, indicated that the
Court was aware of the general maxim that ignorance of the law is
no excuse, but nevertheless felt compelled on the grounds of due
process,6 6 to hold that the defendant could not be convicted unless
she was aware of her duty to register.
In addition to Lambert, Justice Douglas made statements in
other cases that suggested the existence of a constitutional right to
notice. In his majority opinion in United States v. International
Minerals Corp.,"7 he distinguished the Balint line of cases as ones
dealing with drugs, weapons, and dangerous chemicals. "Pencils,
dental floss, [and] paper clips may also be regulated. But they may
be the type of products which might raise substantial due process
questions if Congress did not require . . . 'mens rea' as to each
ingredient of the offense."6 Is not regulating bankruptcy a non-
dangerous enterprise? Does it follow that some level of culpability
must exist as a condition precedent to civil liability?
On balance, however, it seems that Justice Douglas's opinions
in Lambert and International Minerals are of little value in a case
involving civil liability such as Marin. Justice Douglas implicitly
recognized this when he chose not to cite Lambert in the Marin
opinion. The criminal cases discussed above also demonstrate that
where . . . dangerous or deleterious devices or products or obnoxious waste materials are
involved, the probability of regulation is so great that anyone who is aware that he is in
possession of them or dealing with them must be presumed to be aware of the regulation."
Id. at 565; see Saltzman, supra note 56, at 1609-10.
64. See supra note 62.
65. 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
66. "Where a person did not know of the duty to register and where there was no proof
of the probability of such knowledge, he may not be convicted consistently with due pro-
cess." Id. at 229-30; see Sundstrom v. U.S., 419 U.S. 934 (1974). In Sundstrom, the defen-
dant did not report for his draft physical when a mailed notice failed to reach him, and his
draft board ordered him to report for immediate induction into the armed services. He
wrote his draft board and stated that there must be an error because he had not even had a
physical. His board ignored his letter and sent a second order. He was convicted for failure
to report for induction. The Supreme Court dismissed his petition for certiorari without
opinion. Justice Douglas dissented from the dismissal, citing both Lambert and Mullane.
67. 402 U.S. 558 (1971).
68. Id. at 564-65.
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Justice Douglas could not consistently hold a majority when it
came to his belief that criminal liability should not be imposed
without notice. The Court resolved most of the cases on the basis
of statutory construction. In the civil area, Justice Douglas was
never able to command a majority for even one holding.
Lambert was a criminal case. Although the sanction imposed
in Lambert was relatively light,69 the mere stigma of a criminal
record was a sufficient distinction by itself. Courts should not ex-
tend Lambert to civil cases.
Thus, the reader should not infer that there is a constitutional
basis to the decision reached in Marin. Certainly, Mullane and the
other cases cited in Marin do not stand for the proposition that, as
a constitutional matter, notice of potential liability must be given
before one acts. Justice Douglas's use of Mullane should be consid-
ered to lend support only to his "equitable" construction of the
statute. Certainly Congress, in drafting the 1978 code, did not see
any constitutional significance in the case. Except for the very nar-
rowly drafted exceptions for the banking70 and insurance indus-
tries,7 1 the general proposition of caveat emptor continues.72
Lambert poses problems for those who argue that the state is
constitutionally unfettered in its ability to define crime and that
the Constitution merely limits the procedure of arrest and trial.
But Lambert appears to run contrary to the grain of the Court's
criminal law opinions. Any judge should feel uncomfortable having
to rely on that decision to constitutionally prohibit civil liability
for similarly non-culpable and innocent parties. Justice Frank-
furter dissented in Lambert, labeling the opinion "an isolated
deviation from the strong current of precedent-a derelict on the
waters of law."'73 Similarly, if Justice Douglas intended that there
be a constitutional basis for the opinion in Marin, there was no
authority to support his view.
The remainder of this article operates on the assumption that
it is for Congress and Congress alone to decide who should bear
the loss for a bankrupt's unauthorized sale and transfer of his as-
69. Defendant was fined $250.00 and given probation. Lambert, 355 U.S. at 227.
70. See 11 U.S.C. § 542(c) (1982), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 321-29.
71, See 11 U.S.C. § 542(d) (1982), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 330-71.
72 11 U.S.C. § 549(a)(1) (1982) (amended 1984). Other exceptions are available for
parties relying upon real estate records, 11 U.S.C. § 549(c) (1982) (amended 1984), and for
individuals dealing with a debtor while an involuntary petition in bankruptcy is pending. 11
U.S.C. § 549(b) (1982). These exceptions were available under the Chandler Act. See Chan-
dler Act, ch. 575, §§ 21g, 70d(1), (2); 52 Stat. 840, 853, 881.
73. Lambert, 355 U.S. at 232 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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sets. Until cases such as Lambert begin to surface and extend into
the civil law, we must assume that Marin is merely a case of statu-
tory construction.
III. EVOLUTION OF THE LAW THROUGH THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM
ACT OF 1978
This part of the article discusses the interpretation of prior
case law and congressional treatment of postpetition transfers. It
was not until 1938 that Congress saw the need to provide any com-
prehensive solution in this area. By enacting the Chandler Act in
1938, Congress decided that postpetition transfers should receive
the same treatment under statutory law as they had under prior
case law. Part IV, which discusses the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, reveals that this basic treatment of merely codifying prior
case law has been left in tact. It is true that certain new provisions
provide relief to a limited number of postbankruptcy transferees,
but generally, the basic system remains. It is expected that present
courts, when interpreting the 1978 bankruptcy code, will apply
prior case law decisions in their analysis. Consequently, a familiar-
ity with prior case law is necessary for a complete understanding of
the present treatment of postpetition transfers under the new
code.
A. Pre-Chandler Act Caselaw-General Principles
1. PERSONAL PROPERTY
At the time that the Supreme Court of the United States an-
nounced in dictum in Mueller, that a filing of a petition is a caveat
to the world of the trustee's claim to the bankrupt's assets, there
was only one provision in the bankruptcy act that was arguably
applicable to postpetition transfer questions. That provision
merely provided that the trustee had title to all of the bankrupt's
property as of the time of the "adjudication. ' 74 Congress had made
no attempt to specifically govern postpetition transfer issues, and
consequently, the issue was often left to the courts.
In view of the hiatus between filing and adjudication, espe-
cially in involuntary cases, case law quickly developed to define the
rights of the transferee during this interim period. Courts began to
74. Act of July 11, 1898, ch. 541, § 70a, 30 Stat. 544, 565-66 (codified as revised at 11
U.S.C. §§ 522 (d)(7), (8), 541(a), (b) (1982)); see Price v. Louisiana Rural Rehabilitation
Corp., 134 F.2d 548 (5th Cir. 1933).
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resort to the fiction that upon adjudication, the trustee's rights re-
lated back to the filing of the petition.7 5 The trustee invalidated
certain transfers in the interim period. This was especially true in
cases where the transfer was preferential in effect.r e Technically,
they were not preferences because the payments came after the
petition." The effect, however, was the same when the prepetition
debts were satisfied. On the other hand, many earlier cases vali-
dated postpetition transactions that were made in the usual course
of business and were not payments for prepetition debts.s
In voluntary petition cases, where an adjudication in bank-
ruptcy usually followed the filing of the petition 7 and in involun-
tary cases where the transfers occurred after adjudication, courts
usually followed the principle enunciated in Mueller and set the
transfers aside.80 It should be emphasized, however, that the courts
have given relief for some transfers involving special circum-
stances. Thus, the Court validated postpetition sales of perisha-
bles s' and gave relief to the good faith purchasers at public sales.8 2
The most significant of these cases was Frederick v. Fidelity
Mutual Life Insurance Co.,"8 a 1921 Supreme Court decision. The
facts of the case were similar to those that followed forty years
later in Marin. In Frederick, a creditor filed an involuntary peti-
tion in bankruptcy against a debtor and adjudication followed
within the month. Under the provisions of the bankruptcy statute,
the trustee was entitled to recover the cash surrender value of an
insurance policy. 4 Subsequently, the bankrupt died and the insur-
ance company paid the face value of the policy to the named bene-
ficiary. At the time of the payment, the insurance company was
without notice of the bankruptcy or the trustee's claim. 5 The
Court refused to order the insurance company to pay the cash sur-
75. E.g., In re Knight, 125 F. 35 (W.D. Ky. 1903); see Bateman, supra note 6, at 283-86.
76. Grand Rapids Dry Goods Co. v. Ostendorf, 6 F.2d 506 (6th Cir. 1925); Reed v. Bar-
nett Nat'l Bank, 250 F. 983 (5th Cir. 1918); In re R. & W. Skirt Co., 222 F. 256 (2d Cir.
1915).
77. See infra note 226.
78. E.g., In re Retail Stores Delivery Corp., 11 F. Supp. 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1935); In re
Latex Drilling Co., 11 F.2d 373 (W.D. La. 1926).
79. See S. REP. No. 320, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); Bateman, supra note 6, at 294-95.
80. E.g., Rodgers v. A & B Pipe & Supply Co., Inc., 162 So. 445 (La. Ct. App. 1935).
81. Jones v. Springer, 226 U.S. 148 (1912).
82. Bryan v. Bernheimer, 181 U.S. 188 (1901) (purchaser not given title but lower court
instructed to accord "equitable" relief).
83. 256 U.S. 395 (1921).
84. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 70a, 30 Stat. 544, 565-66 (1898).
85. Frederick, 256 U.S. at 397.
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render value to the trustee.
The Court, under these facts, refused to apply the Mueller
doctrine:
It is not enough to sustain the trustee's claim to say that the
filing of the petition in bankruptcy was a caveat to all the world,
and in effect an attachment and injunction, and that on adjudi-
cation title to the bankrupt's property became vested -in the
trustee . . . . [T]he Bankruptcy Act cannot be construed to give
the trustee in bankruptcy a right as against the company to de-
mand that the surrender value be made assets of the estate, as
by a change in beneficiary, without timely notice to the company
of a demand for such a change .... "I
The Court's equitable construction of the statute immunized the
insurance company from liability.
2. REAL PROPERTY
The applicable principle in cases involving personal property
was that the filing of a petition in bankruptcy operated as a lis
pendens lien upon all of the bankrupt's assets. Thus, good faith
purchasers of personal property were usually not protected. The
law governing real estate transactions evolved differently, with the
good faith purchaser routinely protected.8 7
Early bankruptcy statutes placed a duty upon the trustee to
appropriately record notice of bankruptcy within a given time after
adjudication. Failure to comply with the statute usually meant
that parties who relied upon these real estate records were pro-
tected.18 The time of adjudication was largely ignored because the
primary concern focused on whether or not the transferee had con-
structive notice. The 1898 congressional treatment did provide for
a method of notifying third parties:
A certified copy of the order approving the bond of a trustee
shall constitute conclusive evidence of the vesting in him of the
title to the property of the bankrupt, [and if recorded shall im-
part the same notice that a deed] from the bankrupt to the trus-
tee if recorded would have imparted had not bankruptcy pro-
86. Id. at 398.
87. E.g., Beach v. Faust, 2 Cal. 2d 290, 40 P.2d 822 (1955); Vombrack v. Faust, 331 Il.
508, 163 N.E. 340 (1928); Derryberry v. Matteson, 193 La. 624, 192 So. 78 (1939); see also
Taylor v. Irwin, 20 F. 615 (N.D. Iowa 1884) (a case protecting the bona fide purchaser under
a statute which imposed a duty to record within six months of bankruptcy).
88. See authorities cited supra note 87.
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ceedings intervened."
This provision simply provided that in recording the order ap-
proving bond, all interested parties were to be given notice of the
trustee's title. The statute did not address the question of whether
or not a bona fide purchaser, who purchased the property prior to
the trustee's filing, would prevail against the trustee. The statute
clearly required a ruling in favor of the trustee in cases where he
filed the order before the transfer to the real property purchaser,
but the statute was silent where there had been no such filing.
Nevertheless, several cases inferred that Congress intended that
the bona fide purchaser should be protected.90
One case declined to make this inference. In Hull v. Burr,9'
the Supreme Court of Florida ruled in favor of the trustee even
though the trustee had not complied with the statute at the time
of the transfer. In Hull, the bankrupt was named as the defendant
in an action for ejectment brought after the filing of bankruptcy.
The plaintiff in the ejectment action, unaware of the defendant's
bankruptcy, did not name the trustee as a party to the suit. The
court, in the ejectment action, ruled in favor of the plaintiff who,
after winning the ejectment suit, sold the property to a bona fide
purchaser. The plaintiff then sold the property to yet another bona
fide purchaser. When the trustee learned about this transaction, he
successfully brought suit to reclaim the property. The court con-
ceded that no notice had been recorded as required by the statute,
but declared that the statute was "directory only and does not af-
fect the principle that the bankrupt's title passes by operation of
law to the trustees in bankruptcy .. .upon .. .adjudication."92
B. The 1938 Amendments-The Chandler Act
1. DESCRIPTION OF THE CHANDLER ACT
Against this background of spotty case law, Congress amended
the Bankruptcy Act in 1938. Congress amended the "title" section
to give the trustee title as of the date of the filing of the petition93
89. 9 U.S. COMP. STAT. 1916 Ann. 11299, § 21(e); 11 U.S.C. § 44 (1938), amended by 11
U.S.C. §§ 343, 549(c) (1978). Section of 47(c) of the same statute also required that a certi-
fied copy of the decree of adjudication be filed within 30 days after adjudication. 11 U.S.C. §
47(c) (repealed 1978).
90. See authorities cited supra note 87.
91. 61 Fla. 625, 55 So. 852 (1911).
92. Id. at 629, 55 So. at 854.
93. S. REP. No. 1916, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 18 (1938); H.R. REP. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st
Sess. 34 (1937).
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in order to remedy a "serious defect." '94 As was true of the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978, the National Bankruptcy Conference, 95
a prestigious body of bankruptcy experts, proposed and introduced
into the House the initial legislation. Because they proposed that
the trustee's claim to title would date from the filing of a petition,
the Conference also recognized a need to specifically validate cer-
tain postpetition transfers. The Conference's proposal read very
much like the provision ultimately adopted. 7 The Conference
draft affirmatively provided that "no transfer by or on behalf of
the bankrupt after the bankruptcy shall be valid against the trus-
tee."98 This language became law. The same section also expressly
exempted three types of transactions-real estate transactions,99
transactions involving negotiable instruments, 10 and transactions
made after filing but before the adjudication "to a bona fide pur-
chaser for a present fair equivalent value." 101
An adjudication in bankruptcy routinely followed the filing of
a voluntary petition, 02 and a subsequent amendment to the Bank-
94. HousE COMMIrEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., ANALYSIS OF HR. 12889,
229-31 (Comm. Print 1936) [hereinafter cited as ANALYSIS OF H.R. 12889].
95. The Conference was created in 1932 upon the suggestion of Robert A.B. Cook. It
was comprised of leading bankruptcy experts from the American Bar Association, Commer-
cial Law League, National Association of Credit Men, and the American Banker's Associa-
tion. This body was responsible for what is now referred to as the Chandler Act. Symposium
on the Chandler Act, 43 CoM. L.J. 326 (1938).
96. Professor McLaughlin was the principal proponent of the legislation. See McLaugh-
lin, Amendment of the Bankruptcy Act, 40 HARV. L. REv. 583, 615-16 (1927) (suggesting an
amendment regulating postpetition transfers); see also, Bateman supra note 6, at 289 n.52
(discussing the historical background of section 70d of the Chandler Act).
97. The Conference Proposal read:
d. The title acquired by the trustee under this Act shall not invalidate a transfer
by or in behalf of the bankrupt, made in the ordinary course of business after
the bankruptcy and before the adjudication to a bona fide purchaser for a pre-
sent fair equivalent value. A person who in good faith pays less than present fair
equivalent value for such a transfer shall have a lien upon the property so trans-
ferred to the extent of the consideration so actually paid. The party asserting
the validity of a transfer under this subdivision shall have the burden of proof.
Except as otherwise provided in this subdivision and in subdivision g of section
21 of this Act, no transfer by or in behalf of the bankrupt after the bankruptcy
shall be valid against the trustee: Provided, however, That nothing in this Act
shall impair the negotiability of currency or negotiable instruments.
ANALYSIS OF H.R. 12889, supra note 94, at 229.
98. Id.
99. See infra text accompanying notes 148-55.
100. ANALYSIS OF H.R. 12889, supra note 94, at 229. The text of this provision is set out
infra note 108. See infra text accompanying notes 135-47.
101. ANALYSIS OF H.R. 12889, supra note 94, at 229; see infra text accompanying notes
120-30.
102. See generally text accompanying notes 120-30 (discussing section 70d(1) of the
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ruptcy Act provided that the filing of a voluntary petition was an
"automatic adjudication. '"103 Therefore, the exception for transfers
before adjudication had limited application. It protected only
those parties dealing with involuntary bankrupts prior to their ad-
judication. Thus, authorities studying the Chandler Act and its
legislative history concluded that Congress specifically intended to
invalidate all postadjudication transfers except those involving real
estate."o4
It is curious that the drafters of the Conference proposal of-
fered such an arbitrary solution. The Conference, in urging adop-
tion of its proposal, relied on the Frederick case as an example of a
situation where a court had "protected bona fide payments. '10 5
The Conference evidently favored retaining the Frederick rule. Re-
call, however, that Frederick was a postadjudication transfer. The
transaction described in that case would have been invalidated
under the Conference's proposal, and Congress ultimately adopted
that proposal with only minor modifications.
Professor McLaughlin in the Conference notes,0 6 and in an
earlier law review article stated the only justification for the rather
stringent rule adopted by Congress in the Chandler Act: "[N]o
consistent theory of protected transactions has been developed.
The present situation is conducive to confusion and uncertainty,
with potentialities for argument, 'bluffing', litigation, expense and
delay that have not been fully realized. '1 0 7
Thus, although the Conference and Congress were aware of
the need to protect bona fide transactions, they decided to limit
protection to involuntary bankruptcy cases. Regardless of the bona
fides of a transaction, the trustee could invalidate postpetition
transfers if the transfer occurred after adjudication. Exceptions
Chandler Act).
103. Act of June 23, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-64, § 1, 73 Stat. 109 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1
(1976) (repealed 1978)).
104. E.g., Bateman, supra note 6, at 288-94; Boshkoff, supra note 6, at 755-56. Justice
Harlan, in a dissenting opinion in Marin, reached the same conclusion. 385 U.S. 99, 103
(1966); see also Utte v. Manufacturers Hanover Commercial Corp. (In re Texlon Corp.), 596
F.2d 1092 (2d Cir. 1979) (Friendly, J.) (striking down a "cross-collateral" agreement as vio-
lative of the Chandler Act). The bankruptcy court had approved an agreement between the
debtor-in-possession and his bank to the effect that the bank's prepetition debts were to be
secured by postpetition estate assets. It was asserted that the bank would not have made
the loan necessary for debtor's reorganization effort without making its prepetition debts
secure. Id. at 1101.
105. ANALYSIS OF H.R. 12889, supra note 94, at 230.
106. Id.
107. Id. McLaughlin, supra note 96, at 615.
[Vol. 39:1
POSTPETITION TRANSFERS IN BANKRUPTCY
were limited to real estate.
2. POSTADJUDICATION TRANSFERS
Congress expanded the Conference proposal by enacting sec-
tion 70d of the Chandler Act,1°8 but the general caveat emptor
principle remained. Unless a statutory exception could be found,
"no transfer by or in behalf of the bankrupt after the date of bank-
ruptcy [was to] be valid against the trustee."'19 The lower courts
routinely followed the literal language of the statute. For example,
trustees were successful in recovering goods, or their value, which a
disgruntled seller had obtained via self-help after the buyer's auto-
matic adjudication in bankruptcy."0 The Sixth Circuit held that a
former director of the bankrupt corporation could not bring a law-
suit on behalf of the corporate bankrupt which was owned by the
corporation but not scheduled at the time of the filing of a peti-
tion."' The corporation, having filed bankruptcy, no longer owned
the claim. Where a bankrupt failed to schedule certain stock in his
petition, a district court held that the trustee could recover the
stock dividend from the bankrupt's wife after the bankrupt had
108. d. After bankruptcy and either before adjudication or before a receiver
takes possession of the property of the bankrupt, whichever first occurs- (1) A
transfer of any of the property of the bankrupt, other than real estate, made to a
person acting in good faith shall be valid against the trustee if made for a pre-
sent fair equivalent value or, if not made for a present fair equivalent value, then
to the extent of the present consideration actually paid therefor, for which
amount the transferee shall have a lien upon the property so transferred; (2) A
person indebted to the bankrupt or holding property of the bankrupt may, if
acting in good faith, pay such indebtedness or deliver such property, or any part
thereof, to the bankrupt or upon his order, with the same effect as if the bank-
ruptcy were not pending; (3) A person having actual knowledge of such pending
bankruptcy shall be deemed not to act in good faith unless he has reasonable
cause to believe that the petition in bankruptcy is not well founded; (4) The
provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subdivision shall not apply where a
receiver or trustee appointed by a United States or State court is in possession
of all or the greater portion of the nonexempt property of the bankrupt; (5) A
person asserting the validity of a transfer under this subdivision shall have the
burden of proof. Except as otherwise provided in this subdivision and in subdivi-
sion g of section 21 of this Act, no transfer by or in behalf of the bankrupt after
the date of bankruptcy shall be valid- against the trustee: Provided, however,
That nothing in this Act shall impair the negotiability of currency or negotiable
instruments.
Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 70d, 52 Stat. 840, 881-82 (1938).
109. Id. § 70d(5), at 882.
110. Gruner v. Abbott & Cobb, Inc. (In re P & Z Island Farms, Inc.), 478 F. Supp. 529
(S.D.N.Y. 1979).
111. Scharmer v. Carrollton Mfg. Co., 525 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1975).
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assigned the dividend to her." 2
3. PREADJUDICATION TRANSFERS
a. Preadjudication Receivers
Congress set forth conditions under which a postpetition
transfer of personal property would be valid. The introductory lan-
guage to section 70d indicated, under stated conditions, that cer-
tain transfers made "either before adjudication or before a receiver
takes possession of the property of the bankrupt"11 3 may be valid.
Subsection (4) of section 70d created confusion by stating that
even if the transferee met the conditions set forth in section 70d
for a protected transfer, protection was not to be given "where a
receiver or a trustee appointed by a United States or state court
is in possession of all or the greater portion"" 4 of the bankrupt's
property at the time of transfer. The use of similar, but not identi-
cal wording in the introduction and in subsection (4) created a se-
rious problem of interpretation. What kind of receivers did these
provisions apply to? What if a receiver did not take possession of
estate property and instead the property was transferred after the
petition?
One literal explanation of the introductory language and of
subsection (4) was available. The introductory language applied to
cases where a bankruptcy receiver secured possession of all of the
bankrupt's property, whereas subsection (4) applied when a
nonbankruptcy appointed receiver, appointed either before the
petition or before adjudication, acquired possession of all or the
greater portion of the bankrupt's property. Thus, the introductory
language described those receivers appointed by the bankruptcy
court who took possession of all of the bankrupt's property. Sub-
section (4) described receivers appointed by other courts who man-
aged to secure possession of only the greater portion of the bank-
rupt's assets. Note that the introductory language merely describes
a receiver taking "possession of the property of the bankrupt."
Given the fact that subsection (4) governs receivers who secure
"possession of ... a greater portion" of the property, a distinction
112. In re Gursey, 224 F. Supp. 1008 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); see also In re Maddux, 94 F.
Supp. 134 (E.D. Tenn. 1949) (holding that the bankrupt could be held in contempt for
conveying her dower rights in certain real estate to her daughter where the trustee had
obtained an order permitting him to sell the dower interest as an asset of the estate).
113. Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 70d, 52 Stat. 840, 881 (1938). For a complete text of the
section, see supra note 108.
114. Id.
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may have been intended. In addition, subsection (4) described
"United States or state court" receivers. Arguably a receiver ap-
pointed by a bankruptcy court is not one appointed by a United
States court-a federal district court instead having been in-
tended. Thus, the introductory language applied to bankruptcy re-
ceivers, who must take possession of all property, and subsection
(4) applied to nonbankruptcy receivers, who needed to take posses-
sion of only "a greater portion of" the property.
Professor Boshkoff, argued on this basis, that a receiver ap-
pointed by a bankruptcy court, who had not secured possession of
all of the bankrupt's property, could not set aside a preadjudica-
tion postpetition transfer of property which the receiver had not
seized. 115 The estate should have lost because less than all of the
property was seized. Subsection (4) did not operate to prevent the
transferee from seeking protection under section 70d because the
bankruptcy court had appointed the receiver. Subsection (4) ap-
plied only to receivers appointed outside of bankruptcy.
Professor Bateman argued that the two sections should be
read to mean that Congress intended to invalidate all preadjudica-
tion transactions made subsequent to the appointment of a re-
ceiver who had taken possession of the greater portion of the bank-
rupt's property.
The intended relationship between the two references to
possession by a receiver is unclear, but four facts support the
conclusion that, read together, these provisions terminate the
protected interval whenever any receiver is in possession of the
greater portion of the bankrupt's nonexempt property. First,
since the provisions serve only to define the end of the protected
interval, only the event that will necessarily occur first is mate-
rial. Second, before a receiver can possess all of the bankrupt's
property, he must necessarily possess the greater portion of it.
Third, since possession by a receiver of all of the property would
prevent a postbankruptcy transfer, only possession of the
greater portion of the property is relevant to section 70d. Fi-
nally, in the absence of any definition in the act of the term
"receiver," it should be construed to include both bankruptcy
and nonbankruptcy receivers both in the opening phrase of sec-
tion 70d and in clause (4).1' "
115. Boshkoff, supra note 6, at 756-61.
116. Bateman, supra note 6, at 290-91; see also In re Texlon Corp., 596 F.2d 1092, 1097
(1979). (suggesting that a debtor in possession in a Chapter XI could be considered a "re-
ceiver" under section 70d(4)).
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The Fourth Circuit's decision in Lake v. New York Life Insur-
ance Co." 7 inspired the controversy between Professors Bateman
and Boshkoff. In Lake, an insurance company lent the insured-
bankrupt money on his insurance policies while an involuntary pe-
tition was pending and after the bankruptcy court had appointed
a receiver. Although the receiver was able to seize most of the
bankrupt's assets, he had no knowledge of the insurance contract.
The bankrupt promptly put the funds in his wife's account. She
then proceeded to preferentially pay off numerous creditors. By
the time of the bankrupt's adjudication, most of the funds were
gone. It was not until the examination of the debtor, which oc-
curred after his adjudication, that the receiver learned about the
insurance policies. The bankruptcy trustee brought suit against the
insurance company and recovered the funds.
The Fourth Circuit noted that section 70(d)(5) generally pro-
vided that "no transfer by or in behalf of the bankrupt after the
date of bankruptcy shall be valid against the trustee.""' None of
the other exceptions found in section 70(d) could apply because
subsection (4) specifically stated that protection would not be ac-
corded in cases "where a receiver... appointed by a United States
... court is in possession of all or a greater portion of the nonex-
empt property of the bankrupt." Believing that a bankruptcy court
appointed receiver fell within the section, the court reluctantly
ruled in favor of the trustee.
Professor Boshkoff labeled this construction of the statute
"tortured." He reasoned that the purpose behind subsection (4)
was to invalidate transactions in which a nonbankruptcy receiver
was appointed. Not only is "the danger of an ill founded petition
• . . less . . . but, in any event, even if the petition is dismissed,
control of [the bankrupt's] affairs will be returned to the super-
seded proceeding.' ' 1 9
Regardless of what Congress specifically intended by providing
that transfers were to be made after receivers were appointed, the
Fourth Circuit in Lake held that no distinction should be made as
to the type of receiver involved, whether the receiver be appointed
by the bankruptcy court, state court, or the United States District
Courts outside of bankruptcy. Thus, many transfers occurring
before the bankrupt's adjudication could have been invalidated
117. 218 F.2d 394 (4th Cir. 1955).
118. Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 70d(5), 52 Stat. 840, 882 (1938), discussed supra at text
accompanying notes 93-107.
119. Boshkoff, supra note 6, at 759.
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where a receiver had been appointed.
b. Non-receiver Cases
i. Section 70d(1)
Section 70(d)(1) set forth a circumstance in which a postpeti-
tion, but preadjudication, transfer would be valid. It provided:
(1) A transfer of any of the property of the bankrupt, other
than real estate, made to a person acting in good faith shall be
valid against the trustee if made for a present fair equivalent
value or, if not made for a present fair equivalent value, then to
the extent of the present consideration actually paid therefore,
for which amount the transferee shall have a lien upon the prop-
erty so transferred.12
Under this section, the transferee was given a defense to the trus-
tee's attempt to set aside transfers occurring both before adjudica-
tion and before a receiver could take possession of the property if
the transferee was: (1) acting in "good faith," and (2) paid a "pre-
sent fair equivalent value." If he had not paid a "present fair
equivalent value," then he was given a lien to the extent of his
consideration, provided, of course, that he was acting in "good
faith."
Most of the cases that have discussed the transferee's defense
under subsection (1) have attempted to define "present fair
equivalent value." Of those, many courts drew a sharp distinction
between those creditors whose claims arose before the filing of an
involuntary petition and those whose claims surfaced between the
interval of the filing of the petition and the adjudication.
In Lehman v. Quigley,'21 a debtor paid off a judgment in the
interval. A New York trial court ruled that section 70(d)(1) did not
accord protection to the judgment creditor. Although conceding
the creditor's "good faith," the court ruled that "present fair
equivalent value" had not been given. As the court analyzed the
authorities that have interpreted this section, it further went on to
conclude that the transfer must result in "an increase or exchange
of [debtor's] assets" and "not a reduction [in its] liabilities." '122
Thus, the mere act of paying an antecedent indebtedness that
arose before the filing of the petition did not amount to present
120. Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 70(d)(1), 52 Stat. 840, 881 (1938).
121. 118 N.Y.S.2d 579 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1952).
122. Id. at 852.
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fair equivalent value.
The Second Circuit in Kass v. Doyle 2 ' rejected the "increase
in assets" standard offered in Lehman. In that case the bankrupt
paid his lawyer a fee for services that were primarily rendered in
the interval between the filing of the petition for reorganization
and the adjudication. The Second Circuit specifically declined to
embrace the Lehman court's interpretation of "present fair
equivalent value."'24 The court realized that in rendering legal ser-
vices the attorney may have performed a valuable service to the
bankrupt. It was unlikely that those services resulted in an actual
increase in the assets of the debtor. 2 5 Nevertheless, the payment
of the fee was sustained.
The Chandler Act's definition of "good faith" leads to harsh
results. Subsection (3) of 70(d) stated that "a person having actual
knowledge of such pending bankruptcy shall be deemed not to act
in good faith unless he has reasonable cause to believe that the
petition in bankruptcy is not well founded.' 2 6
There have been cases interpreting "reasonable cause to be-
lieve that the petition in bankruptcy is not well founded." The
Second Circuit construed this language narrowly and set aside a
transfer made in the interval. In Kohn v. Myers, 27 the transferee
paid virtually full value for all of the accounts receivable of the
debtor. Counsel for the transferee was aware of the pending peti-
tion but indicated that he did not believe that the petition was
well founded. He had reviewed the court file and found that the
petitioning creditors had agreed to amend their petition when con-
fronted with the debtor's apparently meritorious motion to dis-
miss. Thus, believing that the petition was defective, the transferee
argued that its agent had a good faith belief that the petition was
not well founded. Further, the transferee stated that at the time of
the transfer, it was unaware of the fact that a second amended
petition had been filed.
Nevertheless, the Second Circuit voided the assignment.
"Once they knew, as they admit they did, that the petition had
been filed, they will not be heard to argue that any amendments
123. 275 F.2d 258 (2d Cir. 1960).
124. Interpretation followed in In re Autocue Sales & Distrib. Corp., 167 F. Supp. 672
(S.D.N.Y. 1958); Lehman v. Cameron, 124 N.Y.S.2d 490 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1953); see also In re
Scranton Knitting Mills, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 227 (M.D. Pa. 1937).
125. Kass, 275 F.2d at 262.
126. Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 70d(3), 52 Stat. 840, 881 (1938) (emphasis added). For a
complete text of section 70d, see supra note 108.
127. 266 F.2d 353 (2d Cir. 1959).
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thereto raised any doubt about the petition being well founded."' 28
In Kohn, a transferee paid full value, 1 9 but because of its knowl-
edge that an involuntary petition was pending, the transferee was
deemed not to have been acting in "good faith." Notice of chal-
lenges to the petition were not sufficient grounds for believing that
the petition lacked merit. One other court reached this same result
under very similar facts.130 Unfortunately, neither of these courts
provided any clue as to what grounds would be considered accept-
able when determining whether a petition was well founded.
ii. Section 70d(2)
Section 70d(2) of the Chandler Act provided:
d. After bankruptcy and either before adjudication or before a
receiver takes possession of the property of the bankrupt, which-
ever first occurs-
(2) A person indebted to the bankrupt or holding property of
the bankrupt may, if acting in good faith, pay such indebtedness
or deliver such property, or any part thereof, to the bankrupt or
upon his order, with the same effect as if the bankruptcy were
not pending . 31
It appears that this section codified the Frederick case. 132 Re-
call, that in Frederick the Supreme Court held that an insurance
company that paid the cash surrender value on a life insurance
policy after a bankruptcy petition had been filed was not liable to
the trustee. The introductory language of the section, however,
specifically limited section 70d. Thus, only those good faith pay-
ments made after the petition was filed that occurred "before adju-
dication or before a receiver takes possession of the property" of
the bankruptcy estate were protected. If it were not for this limita-
tion on the scope of section 70d(2), the section could have provided
the Marin court with a simple solution to the problem before it.
The facts of Marin fit subsection (2) like a hand in a glove. 133
128. Id. at 357.
129. He paid $16,817.94 for accounts having a face value of $16,987.54. Id. at 355.
130. In re Autocue Sales & Distrib. Corp., 167 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
131. Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 70d(2), 52 Stat. 840, 881 (1938). For a complete text of the
section, see supra note 108.
132. Frederick v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co., 256 U.S. 395 (1921); For further discus-
sion, see supra text accompanying notes 83-86.
133. The majority in Marin could not rely on section 70d(2). Justice Harlan's superb
dissent pointed out that subsection (2) only applied to preadjudication cases. Thus, he ar-
gued that given an express exception in involuntary cases and no exception for voluntary
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Section 70d(2) permitted banks, insurance companies, and
other payors and bailees who were unaware of the bankruptcy to
pay or deliver as if bankruptcy had not occurred. This would re-
main true so long as neither an adjudication had occurred nor a
receiver been appointed. Notwithstanding the courts' narrow con-
struction of "good faith,"1 34 a bank that was unaware of the filing
of the involuntary petition against its debtor could still honor
checks that were written on the debtor's account. Given section
70d(3)'s limitation to only preadjudication cases, however, the sec-
tion offered little practical protection to the banks, insurance com-
panies, and other bailees.
4. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS AND CURRENCY
Section 70d(5) of the Chandler Act provided:
(5) A person asserting the validity of a transfer under this subdi-
vision shall have the burden of proof. Except as otherwise pro-
vided in this subdivision and in subdivision g of section 21 of
this Act, no transfer by or in behalf of the bankrupt after the
date of bankruptcy shall be valid against the trustee: Provided,
however, [t]hat nothing in this Act shall impair the negotiabil-
ity of currency or negotiable instruments.'35
Clearly, Congress intended to provide for some negotiability of pa-
per notwithstanding the intervention of bankruptcy. Construction
problems arose, however, in interpreting the statute's use of the
phrase "this act" in the proviso protecting negotiable instruments
and currency.
One view expressed the idea that "act" merely referred to the
Chandler Act. Therefore, the proviso was but another exception to
the general rule voiding postpetition, preadjudication, transfers.
Recall that the Chandler Act was the first congressional statute ex-
cases, where adjudication was automatic, Congress intended that the Bank of Marin should
be liable. Marin, 385 U.S. at 103; see also Countryman, supra note 21, at 148-49 (expressing
the view that Congressional limitation of immunity to preadjudication transfers is highly
relevant). One court recently reached the bizarre conclusion that section 70d generally gov-
erned only involuntary proceedings, where there was a gap between filing adjudication. Sec-
tion 70d, therefore, had no applicability at all in a case in a voluntary Chapter 11 reorgani-
zation case. In re Yellow Cab Co., 4 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 382 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. July 13,
1978). The court apparently missed the language of section 70d(5): "Except as otherwise
provided in this subdivision . . . no transfer by or in behalf of the bankrupt after the date
of bankruptcy shall be valid against the trustee. ... See supra text accompanying notes
93-107.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 127-30.
135. Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 70d(5), 52 Stat. 840, 882 (1938) (emphasis added).
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pressly invalidating postpetition transfers. 13 The Chandler Act
validated transfers that occurred during the interim between the
filing of the petition and the debtor's adjudication of bankruptcy.
In the main, only those transfers were given any measure of pro-
tection. Thus, the first view suggested that the Chandler Act
should have been interpreted to protect only purchasers and trans-
ferees of negotiable instruments during the critical gap.
The second view defined "act" more expansively. Nothing in
the entire bankruptcy statutes should have been construed to in-
fringe on the transferees, holders, and assignees of negotiable pa-
per. The issue, put simply, was did "this act" refer, merely to the
Chandler Act or instead to the entire bankruptcy act?
Unfortunately, but predictably, the legislative history of the
Chandler Act provided no clue as to which view Congress actually
intended. 3 Section 70d(5) specifically refered to section 21 of
"this act." That section was placed in the Chandler bill to protect
real estate transferees.138 Thus, reference to section 21 supports
the first view. By referring to section 21 of "this act," Congress
may have intended only the Chandler Act.
Prior to 1938, a number of cases held that a drawee bank
would not be liable for honoring checks after the filing of a petition
in bankruptcy.'39 Moreover, one aged opinion from the Supreme
Court of Maine protected an entity other than a drawee bank. In
Hersey v. Elliott,' °0 the bankrupt, Wyman, was the payee on a
draft. Wyman endorsed the draft over to Hersey after a petition
had been filed against Wyman. The draft was endorsed in order to
satisfy consideration given Wyman by Hersey before the petition.
The court ruled that the endorsement gave Hersey good title even
though it occurred after the filing of the petition.
The first definitive judicial interpretation of the Chandler Act
136. See supra text accompanying notes 93-101.
137. ANALYSIS OF H.R. 12889, supra note 94, at 229. The Committee draft on the negoti-
ability provision was adopted without change. The Committee notes do not address the
reason for inserting the negotiability language. Id.
138. This provision is discussed infra at text accompanying notes 148-55.
139. See In re Zotti, 186 F. 84 (2d Cir. 1911), cert. denied, 223 U.S. 718 (1911); Citi-
zens' Union Nat'l Bank v. Johnson (In re Kentucky Automotive Co.), 286 F. 527 (6th Cir.
1923); In re Retail Stores Delivery Corp., 11 F. Supp. 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1935); Stevens v. Bank
of Manhattan Trust Co., 11 F. Supp. 409 (S.D.N.Y. 1931) (holding that a bank that had
notice of an involuntary petition could honor checks before adjudication and did not have to
assume that an adjudication would follow.). See supra text accompanying notes 120-30, for a
discussion of the involuntary case under the Chandler Act.
140. 67 Me. 526 (1878). For a similar result, see Smoot & Easton v. Moorehouse, 8 Ala.
370 (1845).
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was given in Rosenthal v. Guaranty Bank and Trust Co.' The
facts in Rosenthal and Marin were virtually the same. In Rosen-
thal, a number of checks were issued before the debtor filed a vol-
untary petition for reorganization. Subsequent to the filing of the
petition, the bank honored checks drawn on the account in an
amount over $6,500. Although there was a factual dispute as to
whether or not the bank had actual knowledge of the filing of the
bankruptcy, which would have deprived the bank of its right to
rely on the exceptions listed in section 70d of the Chandler Act,
that issue was resolved in favor of the bank. Nevertheless, the trus-
tee asserted that the bank's lack of notice and good faith in paying
the checks were not proper defenses to its claim. He argued that
only checks honored during the gap between the filing of the peti-
tion and the debtor's adjudication should be subject to protection.
The court implicitly adopted the more expansive interpretation of
the negotiability proviso and gave judgment to the bank. In doing
so, the court was impressed by a number of cases, which, prior to
the Chandler Act, had ruled in favor of the banks.'42 Thus, the
court concluded that Congress had codified these cases in the
Chandler Act.
The Supreme Court decision in Marin only briefly mentions
the possible application of the negotiability proviso. The Ninth
Circuit opinion is more instructive." 3 Counsel for the Bank of Ma-
rin urged adoption of the Rosenthal rationale. The Ninth Circuit,
however, chose to embrace the first view and limited the applica-
tion of the negotiability proviso to instruments that were trans-
fered between the filing of a petition and adjudication in bank-
ruptcy. With voluntary petitions, there was no interval between
filing and adjudication. Thus, the negotiability proviso was inappo-
site to the Marin case. The precedents that the court in Rosenthal
relied upon for its holdings were dismissed as cases that "all in-
volved payments made after filing of the bankruptcy petition but
141. 139 F. Supp. 730 (W.D. La. 1956). The Second Circuit also looked at the proviso in
Feldman v. Capitol Piece Dye Works, Inc., 293 F.2d 889 (2d Cir. 1961). The rather compli-
cated facts of the case reveal that a former officer of the bankrupt created a bank account in
his own name from the debtor's funds and drew checks on the account. The bank chose to
debit the bankrupt's account rather than the officer's account. The Second Circuit reasoned
that the proviso could not aid the bank because the checks "had no valid inception since
they lack the signature of an authorized officer." Id. at 892.
142. Rosenthal, 139 F. Supp. at 734. The court cited Stevens v. Bank of Manhattan
Trust Co., 11 F. Supp. 409 (S.D.N.Y. 1931); Citizens' Union Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 286 F.
527 (6th Cir. 1923); Cunningham v. Lexington Trust Co., 259 Mass. 181, 156 N.E. 1 (1927).
143. Bank of Marin v. England, 352 F.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1965).
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prior to adjudication."1 44 Thus, the precedential value of Rosenthal
was also dismissed.
As a second ground for concluding that the negotiability pro-
viso failed to protect the Bank of Marin, the court observed that
the "presentation of a check to the drawee for payment, and the
payment thereof, is not a negotiation of a check."145 "Negotiation"
as the Uniform Commercial Code and its predecessor, the "Negoti-
able Instrument's Law," technically define it, involves the taking of
a negotiable instrument so that one becomes the "holder"
thereof.146 A "holder" in turn is able to enforce payment of the
instrument. 147 Because the drawee bank merely pays the instru-
ment, as opposed to receiving payment for it, the transaction was
not a negotiation in the strict sense of the term.
The Supreme Court's position on these points is vague. The
Ninth Circuit's rationales are neither rejected nor accepted. The
Supreme Court could have also embraced the reasoning of the Ro-
senthal case by holding that the imposition of liability on the bank
would have impaired the negotiability of negotiable instruments.
This action would have violated section 70d(5)'s negotiability pro-
viso. In refusing to embrace this argument, the Court implicitly
rejected Rosenthal. Having chosen to ignore the negotiability pro-
viso, the Court did not have to address the argument that a trans-
fer to a drawer bank is not a "negotiation."
5. REAL ESTATE
The Chandler Act's treatment of real estate transfers148 was a
144. Id. at 189 n.3.
145. Id. at 189.
146. "Negotiation is the transfer of an instrument in such form that the transferee be-
comes a holder." U.C.C. § 3-202(1) (1978).
147. U.C.C. § 3-301; see also Countryman, supra note 21, at 151 (discussing the protec-
tion afforded a holder who acquires checks of another from the bankrupt without notice of
the bankruptcy proceeding).
148. Section 21g of the Chandler Act reads:
A certified copy of the petition with the schedules omitted, of the decree of adju-
dication or of the order approving the trustee's bond may be recorded at any
time in the office where conveyances of real property are recorded, in every
county where the bankrupt owns or has an interest in real property. Such certi-
fied copy may be recorded by the bankrupt, trustee, receiver, custodian, referee,
or any creditor, and the cost of such recording shall be paid out of the estate of
the bankrupt as part of the expenses of administration. Unless a certified copy
of the petition, decree, or order has been recorded in such office, in any county
wherein the bankrupt owns or has an interest in real property in any State
whose laws authorize such recording, the commencement of a proceeding under
this Act shall not be constructive notice to or affect the title of any subsequent
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decided improvement over the prior statute.14 9 The earlier provi-
sion merely gave the trustee authority to file a copy of the order
approving bond that the courts interpreted as necessary to defeat a
bona fide purchaser of realty. The Chandler Act also permitted a
creditor to record the petition as well as the trustee's bond.1 50 This
allowed a creditor to give notice of bankruptcy in involuntary cases
upon the filing of the petition. The prior act, on the other hand,
provided that only the order approving the trustee's bond could be
recorded. Usually, however, a trustee was not appointed until after
adjudication, which, in involuntary cases could take several
months."'
The Chandler Act also codified the weight of prior case law by
stating that "unless a certified copy of the petition, decree, or or-
der of the bona fide purchaser has been recorded . . . commence-
ment of a proceeding under this Act shall not be constructive no-
tice to or affect the title of any subsequent bona fide purchaser or
owner of real property."1 52 Accordingly, cases construing the Chan-
dler Act reached the intended result of protecting the bona fide
purchaser whenever notice was not filed.51 s
Finally, an exception to the filing requirement was inserted for
real estate located in the county where the petition in bankruptcy
was filed: "Provided, however, [t]hat this subdivision shall not ap-
ply to the county in which is kept the record of original proceed-
bona-fide purchaser or lienor of real property in such county for a present fair
equivalent value and without actual notice of the pendency of such proceeding:
Provided, however, That where such purchaser or lienor has given less than such
value, he shall nevertheless have a lien upon such property, but only to the ex-
tent of the consideration actually given by him. The exercise by any court of the
United States or of any State of jurisdiction to authorize or effect a judicial sale
of real property of the bankrupt within any county in any State whose laws au-
thorize the recording aforesaid shall not be impaired by the pendency of such
proceeding unless such copy he recorded in such county, as aforesaid, prior to
the consummation of such judicial sale: Provided, however, That this subdivision
shall not apply to the county in which is kept the record of the original proceed-
ings under this Act.
Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 21g, 52 Stat. 840, 853 (1938).
149. 9 U.S. CoMP. STAT. 1916 Ann. p. 11299, § 21(e); 11 U.S.C. § 44, discussed supra text
accompanying notes 89-92.
150. See supra note 148 for the text of the statute.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 120-30.
152. Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 21g, 52 Stat. 840, 853 (1938). For the text of the section,
see supra note 148.
153. E.g., Roach v. Terry, 263 Ark. 778, 567 S.W.2d 286 (1978); Viersen v. Boettcher,
387 P.2d 133 (Okl. 1963); cf. Price v. Louisiana Rural Rehabilitation Corp., 38 F. Supp. 196
(W.D. La. 1941) (holding that the bankrupt may not enforce a postbankruptcy lease
agreement).
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ings under this Act.' 1 54 Although this proviso is not offered as a
model of clarity, one. court held for the trustee when the real estate
was located in the county where the petition was filed. '
6. IMPLIED REVOCATION OF AUTHORITY
It seems clear that the drafters of the Chandler Act had con-
sidered and resolved most cases that dealt with outright transfers
of real or personal property. In some cases, however, agents were
involved.
Thus far we have assumed that in cases involving agency rela-
tionships, perhaps without justification, the principal's bankruptcy
automatically revoked the authority of the agent. For example, in
Marin, a deposit contract gave the bank authorization to debit the
bankrupt's account.156 The Chandler Act did not expressly revoke
the bank's authority to honor checks, and the court could have de-
cided the case on that basis. The Supreme Court, however, re-
solved the case in the bank's favor on another ground.'
The Ninth Circuit'58 discussed in detail this issue that the Su-
preme Court in Marin' only briefly mentioned. In an amicus
brief, the California Banker's Association suggested that the filing
of bankruptcy should not in and of itself operate as a revocation of
the bank's authority to act.' 60 At the time the depositor filed bank-
ruptcy, he had authorized the Bank of Matin to honor checks
which had been drawn on the depositor's account. The trustee ar-
gued that the filing of the petition revoked the bank's author-
ity-an argument accepted by the Ninth Circuit. 61 No statutory
provision, however, specifically stated that the filing of a petition
in bankruptcy served to revoke the authority of agents to act on
the principal's instructions. Indeed, cases decided prior to the
Chandler Act validated certain transactions that were made pursu-
154. Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 21g, 52 Stat. 840, 853 (1938). For a complete text of the
section, see supra note 148.
155. In re Kabbage, 93 F. Supp. 515 (N.D. Ohio 1950).
156. Marin, 352 F.2d at 191.
157. Marin, 385 U.S. at 99.
158. 352 F.2d at 191.
159. 385 U.S. at 101.
160. Id.
161. Id. The court relied on Harrison State Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 116 Neb. 456, 218
N.W. 92 (1928), Guthrie Nat'l Bank v. Gill, 6 Okl. 560, 54 P. 434 (1898), and BAILEY, BRADY
ON BANK CHECKS 25 (3rd ed. 1962) for its holding. The court did not discuss existing author-
ity, infra note 162, which indicates that the agent's ability to act for his principal continues.
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ant to contractual authority." 2
Former section 70(b) 63 of the Chandler .Act empowered the
trustee to revoke "executory contracts." It seems clear that the
contract between the depositor and the bank was executory.
16 4
Generally, automatic rejection of the contract did not occur until
several days after the filing of the petition. 65 If the trustee decided
to reject such a contract, did it then follow that all activities en-
tered into during the interim period before the rejection were void
and invalid? The language which adopted the rejection of execu-
tory contracts did not specifically provide that all actions prior to
the rejection were void. 66
In a desire to reach an equitable result the Supreme Court in
Marin may have overlooked a decisive argument in support of its
result. There was nothing in the Bankruptcy Act specifically stat-
ing that the filing of a petition in bankruptcy automatically re-
voked an agent's contractual authority. The act could have been
interpreted to require the continuation of the agent's authority un-
til notice of bankruptcy.
C. Title and Related Concepts
Recall that the dictum in Mueller v. Nugent,67 along with
subsequent cases,'68 generally established the rule that upon the
filing of a petition, the trustee in bankruptcy had title to all of the
bankrupt's property. Parties dealing with the bankrupt did so at
their own peril. The Chandler Act gave the trustee in bankruptcy,
as of the filing of the petition, "title" to all of the property of the
162. "[Tlhe company, having in good faith performed the contract according to its
terms, without notice that the contract called for a condition changing the terms, cannot be
called upon to make the further payment denied by the trustee." Frederick v. Fidelity Mu-
tual Life Insurance Co., 256 U.S. 395, 399 (1921); see also In re Zotti, 186 F. 84 (2d Cir.
1911); In re Mertens, 144 F. 818 (2d Cir. 1906); In re Retail Stores Delivery Corp., 11 F.
Supp. 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1935); Stevens v. Bank of Manhattan Trust Co., 11 F. Supp. 409
(S.D.N.Y. 1931).
163. Chandler Act, ch. 575 § 70, 52 Stat. 840, 880-81 (1938).
164. An executory contract was defined as one "on which performance remains due to
some extent on both sides." See infra text accompanying notes 214-15. The obligation of the
bank to honor checks is a continuing one as long as the depositor writes checks.
165. Section 70b in general provided that the trustee shall have 60 days after adjudica-
tion or 30 days after qualification to assume the contract. "Any such contract or lease not
assumed or rejected within such time ... shall be deemed to be rejected." Chandler Act, ch.
575, § 70b, 52 Stat. 840, 880-81 (1938). BANKR. RULE PROc. 607 modified the time for auto-
matic rejection by eliminating the 60-day period after adjudication.
166. Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 70b, 52 Stat. 840, 880-81 (1938).
167. 184 U.S. 1 (1902).
168. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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estdte.169 As seen above, only a limited class of postpetition trans-
ferees (principally those relying on real estate records and parties
who dealt with a debtor who was defending an involuntary petition
in bankruptcy) were protected.70 Postpetition transferees, having
no hope of avoiding the rigid application of postpetition transfer
rules, sought new theories to avoid the harsh results.
The most common defense offered by such transferees was to
argue that at the time of the bankruptcy filing, "title" had already
passed. The case of Congleton v. Schreihofer,1 7 1 provides an exam-
ple of a transferee's ability to resist the trustee's claim of title. In
that case a petition in bankruptcy was filed against the debtor on
August 17th, and an adjudication followed a month later on Sep-
tember 17th. On October 10th, the bankrupt's sister was given a
deed to real property as repayment for an old $500 debt. Under
the controlling bankruptcy statute, the trustee took title of all
property as of the date of the adjudication.1 7 2 Therefore, the trus-
tee argued that the postadjudication transfer should be set aside
under the Mueller dictum. The sister nevertheless prevailed on the
theory that she had taken title to the property more than a month
before the adjudication. The bankrupt had executed the deed to
his sister on August 8th and later recorded it on August 9th. The
court reasoned that, in order for title to pass, actual delivery of the
deed to the grantee on October 10th was not necessary under state
law.
In Congleton, the transferee prevailed because title had passed
prior to the filing of the petition. Passage of title was a complete
defense to the trustee's postpetition transfer claim. A discussion of
the concept of passage of title and related issues therefore is neces-
sary to a complete understanding of postpetition transfer
questions.
1. TITLE RULES
Under prior law, the third party claimant was usually a buyer
of property who had advanced partial payment to the seller-bank-
rupt. In order to avoid the unenviable position of being treated as
169. "The trustee . . . shall . . . be vested by operation of law with the title of the
bankrupt as of the date of the filing of the petition . Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 70a, 52
Stat. 840, 879 (1938).
170. See supra text accompanying notes 120-30 and 152-55.
171. 54 A. 144 (N.J. Ch. 1903).
172. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 70a, 30 Stat. 544, 565-66 (1898); see Bateman, supra
note 6, at 283-87; McLaughlin, supra note 96, at 612-14.
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a mere general creditor of the bankrupt's estate, the buyer sought
to reclaim the goods on the grounds that he held title. If bank-
ruptcy had not intervened, the buyer stood an excellent chance of
succeeding under state law. If the claimant could establish that the
title did pass to the goods, even though as of the time of the filing
of the petition the bankrupt still had possession of them, then he
would have made significant progress in avoiding unsecured status.
The cases in this area generally approach the question of title
as one of intention between the parties. It was therefore held that
title cannot pass regardless of surrounding circumstances if the
parties did not intend title to pass as part of their contract. 173
Where there was no clear evidence of the parties' actual intention,
courts have generally looked to surrounding circumstances in order
to ascertain the parties' intent. This analysis proved to be highly
fictional because the courts were attempting to ascertain the par-
ties' intentions when the parties had never given it much thought.
Unfortunately, rather elaborate rules developed in order to deter-
mine when title passed. It was believed that these rules would help
ascertain the parties' "intent.' 1 74
As a general rule it appears that partial payment of the
purchase price was not sufficient to award title to the purchaser. 175
Appropriation of the property to the contract, however, usually by
segregating it,"7 6 tagging it,177 or specifically identifying it was held
to be sufficient.
173. In re Autler, 27 F. Supp. 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); In re National Boat & Engine Co.
(In re Fisher), 198 F. 407 (D. Me. 1912).
174. See, e.g., In re Clairfield Lumber Co., 194 F. 181 (E.D. Ky. 1911). In Clairfield the
court described at least four different classes of cases giving rise to various presumptions of
the parties' intent.
175. Id. at 189.
176. Hiller v. Cornille & De Blonde, 228 F. 670 (5th Cir. 1915) (title had passed to
cottonbales, which had been weighed, marked and set aside in the name of the buyer); Wil-
liamson v. Richardson, 205 F. 245 (9th Cir. 1913) (title had passed to bales of hops, which
had been inspected, marked and accepted by the buyer); In re Union Hill Preserving Co., 1
F.2d 415 (W.D.N.Y. 1924) (title had passed to fruit, which had been set apart in the bank-
rupt's warehouse and marked for the claimant); cf. In re Lincoln Industries, 166 F. Supp.
240 (W.D. Va. 1958) (title could not pass until the goods had been "unconditionally appro-
priated to the purchaser"); In re Clairfield Lumber Co., 194 F. 181 (E.D. Ky. 1911) (mere
stacking of lumber without identifying it is not sufficient to pass title). See generally
Thompson v. Fairbanks, 196 U.S. 516 (1905) (Defendant was given a chattel mortgage which
described the property and was recorded. Bankrupt intended that the acquired property
should be covered by the mortgage.).
177. Allen v. Hollander, 128 F. 159 (D. Mass. 1904); cf. In re Glover Specialties Co., 18
F.2d 314 (D. Conn. 1927) (reclamation of golf clubs denied because clubs were not "tagged
or otherwise marked"); McKey v. Pinckard (In re Ricketts), 234 F. 285 (7th Cir. 1916)
(claimant of paintings had not indicated ownership on the back of the paintings).
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Certainly, if the goods had been paid for and delivered to the
buyer, the buyer stood an excellent chance of defeating the trustee
on the grounds that title had passed. With certain property, how-
ever, actual physical delivery was extremely difficult if not impossi-
ble. Thus, the courts equated certain outward manifestations of
constructive delivery with actual delivery. 78 In this regard, deliv-
ery to the purchaser's bailee was regarded as sufficient.17 9 When
goods were the subject of documents of title' 80 or equivalent paper,
delivery and possession of the document was the equivalent of ac-
tual delivery.''
On passage of title, goods that were the subject of state-en-
acted certificate of title legislation were the object of special rules.
The case of In re Lawson182 uniquely illustrates the distinction be-
tween certificate and non-certificate goods. In that case the bank-
rupt acquired an interest in a boat and trailer. The bankrupt's
transferor held a certificate of title for the trailer but did not
tender it to the bankrupt when the goods were delivered. The boat
and accessories were not subject to certificate of title legislation.
The bankrupt then borrowed $3,500 from Ferguson who in turn
borrowed $3,500 from Dilliard. When Ferguson and Dilliard be-
178. In re McCartney, 218 F. 717 (D. Idaho 1914). In McCartney, the bankrupt sold
lumber to the claimant, but bankruptcy intervened before logging began. The court held
that the purchase and erection of a sawmill on the bankrupt's land was sufficient evidence
of delivery to avoid the effect of a state statute voiding transactions made by sellers who
maintain possession and control of the property. See infra text accompanying notes 185-95.
179. Willen v. Schillicci, 285 F. 12 (5th Cir. 1922); cf. In re Wein, 13 F.2d 426 (D. Mass.
1926) (disallowing the bailee's claim to the goods). In the case of a bailee, more than posses-
sion is required to establish the bailee's title.
180. In re Will v. Connell Co., 278 F. 288 (N.D. Ala. 1921); see also Lovell v. Isidore
New & Son, 192 F. 753 (5th Cir. 1912). In Lovell, the bankrupt-seller forged a spurious bill
of lading and fraudulently secured prior payment for the goods. When bankruptcy was filed,
the bankrupt held the true bill of lading, and the goods, although in the hands of the car-
rier, had not been shipped. The court observed:
While creditors are entitled to the protecting shield of law, the rights of innocent
purchasers are guarded and protected with equal jealousy. Under some circum-
stances the bankruptcy statutes clothe the trustee with power to set aside con-
veyances, good as between the bankrupt and a purchaser. But ordinarily, in the
absence of fraud, or of a state statute declaring the conveyance void, or unless it
contravenes some provision of the bankruptcy acts, a conveyance, based upon a
valuable consideration and good as between the parties, will be permitted to
stand. As to such conveyance, . . . the trustee occupies no better position than
the bankrupt. He stands simply in the bankrupt's shoes.
192 F. at 760-61.
181. Taney v. Penn Nat'l Bank, 187 F. 689 (3rd Cir. 1911) (under applicable state law,
warehouse receipt for stored whiskey in possession of bankrupt operates as delivery of
whiskey).
182. 201 F. Supp. 710 (W.D. Va. 1962).
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came alarmed about the bankrupt's financial condition, they took
possession of the boat, its motor, and trailer and then credited the
bankrupt with $1,000 on the $3,500 loan. Although Ferguson and
Dilliard repeatedly demanded a certificate of title to the trailer,
they never received one. In the meantime, Ratcliff testified that he
and the bankrupt jointly owned the boat, motor, and trailer. He
stated that subsequent to Ferguson's taking possession of the
property, a blank certificate of title was given to him endorsed by
the bankrupt's transferor, the original owner of the trailer. This
certificate was given to a finance company that had lent Ratcliff
money against the boat, motor, and trailer.
The judge, comparing his solution to that reached by Solo-
mon,183 held that Ratcliff was entitled to the trailer and that Fer-
guson and Dilliard were entitled to the boat and motor. Because
the trailer was subject to certificate of title laws, title could only be
transferred to the trailer by acquiring a certificate. 184 Because the
boat and motor were not subject to the state's certificate of title
laws, delivery plus partial cancellation of the indebtedness were
sufficient to transfer title to them. Thus, one who is attempting to
take title to certificate of title goods should at a minimum secure
possession of the certificate endorsed by the transferor.'85
2. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES
Even if a claimant was successful in convincing a bankruptcy
judge that he held title to the goods that were in possession of the
bankrupt as of the date of the filing of the petition and adjudica-
183. Id. at 715.
184. Cf. Continental Fire Trucks, Inc. v. John Grappone, Inc. (In re Continental Fire
Trucks, Inc.), 33 Bankr. 713 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983) (holding that title passed on delivery
notwithstanding seller's retaining the certificate of origin).
185. Mann v. Belle-Bland Bank (In re Schalk), 451 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Mo. 1978); cf.
Associates Discount Corp. v. Plattenburg (In re Easy Living, Inc.), 407 F.2d 142 (6th Cir.
1969); Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Patterson (In re Law), 1 Bankr. 557 (Bankr. W.D. Va.
1979). In Law, the bankrupt, at the time of the petition, had not signed over the certificate
of title to a motor home to a purchaser. The court held for the purchaser. The court con-
ceded that "because of noncompliance with the 'mandatory' provisions of the Virginia Code
regarding transfer of title, the legal title to the mobile home remains in the Bankrupt, even
though the alleged transferee has possession and has been paying monthly installments on
the note." Id. at 559. The court reasoned that the vehicle was no longer property of the
estate where the contract for its purchase was executory and the trustee had not affirmed
the contract within the time period required by the bankruptcy act. Thus, because the con-
tract was rejected, the purchaser was entitled to the mobile home. See Chandler Act, ch.
575, § 70b, 52 Stat. 840, 880 (1938). The court's conclusion that the purchaser should keep
the goods as a result of the rejection of the contract is dubious. See infra discussion note
409.
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tion, the claimant could still be reduced to the status of an un-
secured creditor if the trustee proved that the entire transaction
was a fraudulent conveyance. The landmark Star Chamber pro-
ceeding in Twyne's caseis6 held that it was fraudulent to the
seller's creditors for the seller to sell property while at the same
time retaining possession. In that case and in subsequent cases,
creditors convinced the courts that the debtor's holding out of os-
tensible ownership of property was prejudicial to them. Thus, judi-
cial lien creditors of sellers were frequently successful in setting
aside sales as fraudulent where the seller had retained possession
of the goods." 7
Several commentators have questioned the basic premise in
Twyne's case: that the seller's creditors rely on the seller's ostensi-
ble ownership of the goods.8 8 Nevertheless, the courts and legisla-
tures in the United States have routinely followed the precedent
set in Twyne's case.
Perhaps the United States's most noteworthy extension of
Twyne's case was articulated by the Supreme Court in Benedict v.
Ratner.189 In Benedict, the debtor filed bankruptcy, and Ratner
claimed a security assignment, of all present and future accounts.
The agreement had been signed more than four months before the
debtor's bankruptcy.9 0 Both lower courts ruled that the delivery of
a written list of the accounts three days before the filing of the
petition ripened Ratner's interest into a perfected title.
The Supreme Court held that the transaction should be set
aside as an unlawful preference or alternatively, as a fraudulent
conveyance under the laws of New York.' 9' Reservation and do-
minion over the accounts by the debtor was inconsistent with the
186. 3 Co. 80b, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Chamber 1601); see Gordon, The Prepaying
Buyer: Second Class Citizenship Under Commercial Code Article 2, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 565,
n.1 (1968).
187. E.g., Huseby v. Kilgore, 32 Wash. 179, 201 P.2d 148 (1948) (judgment creditors);
Foss v. Towne, 98 Vt. 321, 127 A. 294 (1925) (attaching creditors); cf. Stayer Carriage Co. v.
Richardson, 303 Ill. App. 629 (1916) (goods replevied before judicial lien attached).
188. Gordon, supra note 186, at 576-81; see Note, Bankruptcy and Article Two of the
Uniform Commercial Code: The Right to Recover the Goods Upon Insolvency, 79 HAv. L.
REV. 598 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Note, Bankruptcy and Article Two]; Note, The Uni-
form Commercial Code and An Insolvent Seller's Possession of Goods Sold, 104 U. PA. L.
REV. 91, 97-106 (1955).
189. 268 U.S. 353 (1925).
190. Id. at 357.
191. Id. at 365; see Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 60, 30 Stat. 544, 562, amended by Act
of Feb. 5, 1903, ch. 487, § 13, 32 Stat. 797, 799-800; Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 412, § 11, 36
Stat. 838, 842.
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assertion that title had been given to Ratner. The debtor's grant of
unrestricted dominion over the goods which rendered ownership
more than ostensible troubled the Court.192 The entire transaction
was entered into without the filing of any notice and without any
effective means for third parties to learn of the arrangement be-
tween the debtor and Ratner. In reaching this conclusion, the
Court held that under New York law the transaction was conclu-
sively fraudulent. The debtor's putative reservation of dominion
over the intangible property was inconsistent with the effective
disposition or creation of a lien on it.
Although some jurisdictions hold that the presumption of
fraud is conclusive (fraud in law),9 3 under the majority position
only a rebuttable presumption of fraud (fraud in fact) exists, which
the debtor can overcome by showing a lack of fraudulent intent.'9 "
The Chandler Act gave the trustee in bankruptcy the power to
use state fraudulent conveyance law in order to attack fraudulent
transfers. State law gave lien creditors standing to assert that con-
veyances were fraudulent. 95 Under the Chandler Act, the trustee
had the power of a lien creditor who held a lien on all of the
debtor's property.196 Another section of the Chandler Act gave the
trustee the power to set aside transfers "voidable" under state law,
provided that the trustee could find an actual creditor who had
standing under state law to attack the voidable fraudulent convey-
ance. 97 Thus, even if the postpetition transferee could have estab-
lished that he held title at the time of bankruptcy, if the bankrupt
had possession of the property at the time of filing, the trustee
could have attacked the transaction as fraudulent under the ra-
tionale in Twyne's case.
192. Benedict, 268 U.S. at 360, 363. The assignment of the accounts receivable to
Ratner was made to secure an existing loan of $15,000 and to secure further advances. Yet,
the debtor was not required to reduce the loan by the amounts collected until the creditor
demanded payment.
193. E.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 3440 (West 1981) amended by CAL. CIV. CODE § 3440 (West
Supp. 1984); Callahan v. Union Trust Co., 315 Pa. 274, 172 A. 684 (1934); Hiser v. Walbaum,
129 Ill. App. 82 (1906); GA. CODE § 28-201 (1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 6 (West 1951).
194. E.g., Tousley v. First Nat'l Bank, 155 Minn. 162, 193 N.W. 38 (1923); Wooley v.
Crescent Auto. Co., 83 N.J.L. 244, 83 A. 876 (Sup. Ct. 1912); Holley v. A.W. Haile Motor
Co., 188 A.D. 798, 177 N.Y.S. 429 (1919); § 28; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 33-103 (1981); see Note,
supra note 188 at 94-97.
195. See supra note 188.
196. Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 70c, 52 Stat. 840, 881 (1938); e.g., In re Lincoln Industries,
166 F. Supp. 240 (W.D. Va. 1958) (trustee prevailed because he had the power of a lien
creditor).
197. Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 70e, 52 Stat. 840, 882 (1938); e.g., In re Ricketts, 234 F.
285 (7th Cir. 1916).
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3. THE U.C.C. APPROACH
The drafters of the U.C.C. clouded the picture by confusing
the rights held by the claimant and the trustee. The Code inno-
cently began its treatment by declaring that, as a general rule, "ti-
tle passes to the buyer at the time and place at which the seller
completes his performance with reference to physical delivery of
the goods .. ,.ss Further, Article 2 appears to significantly
change the traditional rules of fraudulent conveyances. Section 2-
402(2) provides that a creditor may treat the retention of goods by
the seller as fraudulent "under any rule of law of the state where
the goods are situated, except that retention of possession in good
faith and current course of trade by a merchant-seller for a com-
mercially reasonable time after a sale or identification is not fraud-
ulent."19 The Code does not give any indication as to what is a
"commercially reasonable time."
Article 2's grant of "special property interests" to non-possess-
ing buyers is confusing. The drafters of Article 2 correctly criti-
cized the concept of "title" as a formula for dispute resolution and
drafted instead a statute where the concept of title had only a lim-
ited influence on the rights of the parties.2 00 As seen earlier, the
process of determining title caused courts to resort to arbitrary fic-
tions that frequently had little to do with the underlying issue of
whether the seller's creditors or the buyer should prevail as to the
goods. For example, under the Code, the buyer's right to insure the
goods has nothing to do with where title rests.201 With this purpose
in mind, the drafters gave buyers "special property interests" in
goods that are in the hands of the seller where the buyer does not
have title to or possession of them. The U.C.C. gives the buyer a
right to require specific performance of the contract where "goods
are unique or in other proper circumstances. '20 2 Furthermore, a
buyer is given a right to replevy goods under stated conditions. 20 3
198. U.C.C. § 2-402(2); see Thermo-Sentinel Corp. v. Clad Metals, Inc., 426 F. Supp.
1179 (W.D. Pa. 1977); Hunter v. S.K. Austin Co. (In re Beck), 25 Bankr. 947 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1982) (title passed on delivery even though seller was not paid); Reeves v. Pillsbury
Co., 229 Kan. 423, 625 P.2d 440 (1981) (title did not pass when fungible goods were not
delivered).
199. U.C.C. § 2-402(2).
200. U.C.C. § 2-401 states that "[elach provision of this Article with regard to the
rights, obligations and remedies of the seller, the buyer, purchasers or other third parties
applies irrespective of title to the goods except where the provision refers to such title."
201. U.C.C. § 2-501.
202. U.C.C. § 2-716(1) (emphasis added); see U.C.C. § 2-716(1) comment 2.
203. U.C.C. § 2-716(3) (buyer may replevy identified goods if cover is reasonably
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Section 2-702(2), under stated conditions, permits a seller of
goods to reclaim them if the buyer is insolvent at the time the
goods are received. °4 Its validity is of considerable interest to
bankruptcy judges that are forced to decide postpetition transfer
cases where the seller has successfully "reclaimed" the goods after
the filing of the petition in bankruptcy. If the seller's section 2-
702(2) right to reclamation is enforceable against the estate, the
trustee's postpetition transfer remedy becomes moot.
U.C.C. section 2-502 gives the prepaying buyer a special prop-
erty interest in goods that are purchased from an insolvent seller.
The section provides:
(1) Subject to subsection (2) and even though the goods
have not been shipped a buyer who has paid a part or all of the
price of goods in which he has a special property [interest] ...
may on making and keeping good a tender of any unpaid por-
tion of their price recover them from the seller if the seller be-
comes insolvent within ten days after receipt of the first install-
ment on their price.
(2) If the identification creating his special property has
been made by the buyer he acquires the right to recover the
goods only if they conform to the contract for sale.205
It is doubtful that the drafters of the Code intended to impose
upon the buyer the nearly insurmountable burden of proving that
the seller became insolvent "within 10 days of receipt of the first
installment." Nevertheless, one court has held that the drafters
meant precisely what they said and denied a recovery based on the
buyer's failure to offer proof.20
unavailable).
204. U.C.C. § 2-702(2) provides:
(2) Where the seller discovers that the buyer has received goods on credit
while insolvent he may reclaim the goods upon demand made within ten days
after the receipt, but if misrepresentation of solvency has been made to the par-
ticular seller in writing within three months before delivery the ten day limita-
tion does not apply ....
See, e.g., National Ropes, Inc. v. National Diving Serv., Inc., 513 F.2d 53 (5th Cir. 1975)
(even though financial statement of buyer was misleading, the seller must still prove buyer
insolvent at the time of the written misrepresentation to reclaim goods under section 2-
702(2)); Liles Bros. & Son v. Wright, 638 S.W.2d 383 (Tenn. 1982) (seller's failure to de-
mand return of goods within ten days of receipt by insolvent buyer did not preclude a sec-
tion 2-702 remedy-postdated check was a written representation of solvency sufficient to
give rise to ten-day limitation exception); Kennett-Murray & Co. v. Pawnee Nat'l Bank, 598
P.2d 274 (Okla. Ct. App. 1979) (seller had a right to reclaim goods within ten days of receipt
by buyer when buyer ceased to pay his debts in the ordinary course of business).
205. U.C.C. § 2-502.
206. First Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Academic Archives, Inc., 10 N.C. App. 619, 179
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The difficulty of proving insolvency caused Congress in 1978
to create a rebuttable presumption of insolvency against the trans-
feree.20 7 Although it is difficult for the transferee to prove the fact
of insolvency, establishing the precise time when a seller first "be-
comes insolvent" may be impossible.
Subsection (1) of section 2-402 subordinates the claims of the
seller's unsecured creditors to the claim of a section 2-502 re-
claiming buyer.
(1) Except as provided in subsection . . . (2) . . . rights of
unsecured creditors of the seller with respect to goods which
have been identified to a contract for sale are subject to the
buyer's rights to recover the goods under this Article (Section 2-
502 .... ).208
Note that subsection (1) is made subject to the exceptions "as pro-
vided in subsection (2)." Subsection (2), recall, permitted a fraudu-
lent conveyance remedy under stated conditions.2 °0 The inference
is inescapable that the 2-502 reclaiming buyer is subject to the
seller's secured creditors and those creditors who bring suit on a
fraudulent conveyance theory.
Thus, the reclaiming buyer would have lost to the trustee for
two reasons: first, the Uniform Commercial Code, section 2-402(1),
appeared to make the reclaiming buyer's remedy subject to non-
code fraudulent conveyance law. Second, although section 2-402(1)
provided that the buyer's 2-502 remedy was superior to the rights
of unsecured creditors, the trustee's claim, given his secured credi-
tor status, should have prevailed.2 10 Thus, in the merchant case, if
a bankrupt-seller retained goods beyond a commercially reasonable
S.E.2d 850 (1971); see also Skilton, The Secured Party's Rights in a Debtor's Bank Account
under Section 9-306(4)(d) of the Uniform Commercial Code, 1978 S. ILL. U. L.J. 60, n.62.
("Literally construed, this section deserves to be placed in the category of the 'humor of the
Uniform Commercial Code.' ").
207. 11 U.S.C. § 547(f) (1982) provides that "the debtor is presumed to have been insol-
vent on and during the 90 days immediately preceding the date of the filing of the petition."
Recently, however, the Senate has proposed that reasonable cause to believe insolvency
must be found to exist in preference cases but proposed that the transferee shoulder the
burden of proof. S. 445, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. p. 12-13 (1983), text which was incorporated
into S. 1013, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983).
208. U.C.C. § 2-402(1) (emphasis added).
209. See supra text accompanying note 199; see Countryman, Buyers and Sellers of
Goods in Bankruptcy, 1 N.M.L. REV. 435, 446-47 (1971); Gordon, supra note 186, at 570-71;
Note, Bankruptcy and Article Two, supra note 188, at 602-03.
210. See supra note 194. See generally Lewis v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 364 U.S.
603 (1961) (creditor's chattel mortgage was not void against trustee because trustee becomes
lien creditor as of time of filing).
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time, the trustee could keep the goods regardless of the buyer's
section 2-502 claim.2" In non-merchant cases, any retention was
subject to a fraudulent conveyance attack. In addition, the trustee
had the claim of a lien creditor on all of the bankrupt's property. 1 2
If the buyer had taken the property after bankruptcy, the trustee
could still have recaptured it as a postpetition transfer.
The trustee had two additional theories with which to respond
to the section 2-502 claimant. First, under section 70b, the trustee
had the right to reject all existing executory contracts. 13 "Execu-
tory contract" was defined as a contract on which performance to
some extent remains due on both sides.2 1 4 In a section 2-502 case,
the buyer usually tenders part of the purchase price before the
seller-bankrupt delivers the goods. It seems that this contract
would have been executory within the meaning of the section.1 5
By simply filing a notice of rejection of the contract,1 ' the buyer's
attempts to reclaim under section 2-502 could have been extin-
guished. In this instance, federal law should supersede the Uniform
Commercial Code.
211. See In re Hardwick & Magee Co., 11 U.C.C. Rep. 1172 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1972)
(reclaiming goods to the seller's trustee when the goods were retained for an unreasonable
amount of time); cf. Martin Marietta Corp. v. New Jersey Nat'l Bank, 612 F.2d 745, 748-49
(3d Cir. 1979) (The court stated in dictum, that a buyer having a special property interest in
goods because they had been identified to the contract should defeat a secured party). The
opinion suggests that the buyer could qualify as a buyer in ordinary course of business and
defeat the secured party under U.C.C. § 9-307(1). See infra note 512 (defining a buyer in
ordinary course of business).
212. See supra note 194.
213. See supra notes 164-65.
214. Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy, Part I, 57 MINN. L. REv. 439,
460 (1973); see Crittenden v. Lines, 327 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1964); cf. Ozark-Mahoning Co. v.
American Magnesium Co. (In re American Magnesium Co.), 488 F.2d 147, 152, reh'g denied,
491 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1974) (suggesting that an executory contract is one where something
remains to be done on the part of only one party).
215. See National Sugar Ref. Co. v. C. Czarnikow, Inc. (In re National Sugar Ref. Co.),
27 Bankr. 565 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that the unpaid seller's rights under Article
2 of the U.C.C. to stop goods in transit, § 2-702(1), and to reclaim the goods, § 2-702(2), is
subject to the bankrupt's right to affirm or reject the executory contract for sale of goods);
cf. Farmer & Merchants Bank v. Law (In re Law), 1 Bankr. 557 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1979)
(holding that the trustee of a bankrupt seller was required to specifically affirm an executory
contract in order to defeat the claim of a buyer who did not have title); Note, Bankruptcy
and Article Two, supra note 188, at 604 (arguing that the buyer's 2-502 claim would not
overcome the trustee's section 70b authority).
216. Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 70b, 52 Stat. 840, 880-81 (1938); BANKR. RULE 607. Both
provisions provide that the contract would be automatically rejected without action of the
trustee. The trustee, however, should have formally rejected the contract to avoid any argu-
ments that the contract was in force until its rejection. See supra text accompanying notes
163-66.
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When for some reason the executory contract argument failed
or the trustee unwittingly assumed the contract, a serious question
remained as to whether or not the section 2-502 claim would have
been a statutory lien attackable under section 67c 217 of the Chan-
dler Act as a disguised priority in favor of creditors preferred by
the state legislatures. Section 2-502's companion section, section 2-
702(2),21s prompted considerable debate among the commentators
and in case law. 19 Those favoring the superiority of section 2-
702(2) as against the bankrupt's trustee argued that a buyer who
bought goods on credit at a time when he was insolvent was com-
mitting common law fraud against the seller. As such, section 2-
702(2) could be considered a mere codification of the old common
law rules and therefore should not have been treated as a disguised
priority or preference violative of old section 67c.110
Happily for the commentator, Congress mooted the issue by
generally codifying the seller's 2-702(2) reclamation right.21 Thus,
217. Act of July 5, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-495, §§ 3, 4, 80 Stat. 268 (1966).
218. For a complete text of the section, see supra note 204.
219. See, e.g., Braucher, Reclamation of Goods from a Fraudulent Buyer, 65 MICH. L.
REv. 1281 (1967) (an overview of the debate as to whether the seller's reclamation right
under section 2-702 was effective against the buyer's trustee in bankruptcy); Countryman,
supra note 209 (same); Kennedy, The Interest of a Reclaiming Seller Under Article 2 of
the Code, 30 Bus. LAW 833 (1975) (same). Those favoring the trustee argued that the section
2-702 right of reclamation arose by force of statute, therefore, it was invalid as a statutory
lien as proscribed by section 67c I(A) of the prior Bankruptcy Act, Pub. L. No. 89-495, §§ 3,
4, 80 Stat. 268 (1966), or that section 2-702 reclamations were disguised state priorities,
violative of the spirit of the priorities sections of the prior act. See In re Federal's, Inc., 402
F. Supp. 1357 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (holding section 2-702 reclamations ineffective as against
the trustee in bankruptcy); In re Good Deal Supermarkets, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 887 (D.N.J.
1974) (same). Those supporting the validity of section 2-702 reclamations argued that the
seller's right to reclaim was a valid state-created ownership right that had its origin in com-
mon law fraud and misrepresentation. Thus, a section 2-702 reclamation was merely a codi-
fication of common law remedies, and it did not rise solely by force of statute. Further, it
was argued that the debtor did not truly own the property but held merely a voidable title.
The property never passed to the estate upon which a priority distribution could be made.
See Alfred M. Lewis, Inc. v. Holzman (In re Telemart Enterprises, Inc.), 524 F.2d 761 (9th
Cir. 1975); In re Federal's, Inc., 553 F.2d 509 (6th Cir. 1977) (cases holding section 2-702
reclamations valid as against the trustee in bankruptcy).
220. See generally Braucher, supra note 219, at 1281-88 (common law and historical
background of U.C.C. § 2-702).
221. The conflict respecting reclamation rights which exist between U.C.C. § 2-702(2)
and the Bankruptcy Act has been substantially settled by 11 U.S.C. § 546(c) (1982) of the
new Bankruptcy Code. Section 546(c) defines the rights of a seller under § 2-702(2) in the
event of an intervening bankruptcy and subjects the trustee, under stated conditions, to the
seller's right of reclamation. 11 U.S.C. § 546(c) (1982) provides:
(C) The rights and powers of the trustee . . . are subject to any statutory right
or common-law right of a seller, in the ordinary course of such seller's business,
of goods to the debtor to reclaim such goods if the debtor has received such
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even a historical analysis of the complicated issue of whether the
reclaiming seller's claim was a statutory lien would unduly prolong
what may already be an unduly exhaustive article.
Some attention, however, should be given to whether or not
the prepaying buyer's right of reclamation is a statutory lien. If it
is to stand, a showing must be made that the seller was committing
common law fraud. The fraud theory is perhaps more debatable in
the case of insolvent sellers. There are no cases that award a buyer
the goods on the theory that an insolvent seller is committing
fraud by accepting part payment.
Even if the above arguments fail, the trustee can rely on the
comment to section 2-502, which requires compliance with the fil-
ing requirements of Article 9 in order to defeat the rights of the
trustee in bankruptcy. The comment states:
The question of whether the buyer also acquires a security inter-
est in identified goods and his rights to the goods when insol-
vency takes place after the ten day period provided in this sec-
tion depends upon compliance with the provisions of the Article
on Secured Transactions (Article 9).222
In In re Tennecomp Systems, Inc.,223 the bankruptcy judge used
this comment to strike the claimant's section 2-502 claim and to
set a transfer of the property aside as preferential. Tennecomp was
decided after the promulgation of the new Bankruptcy Code but
relied on the trustee's power to set aside preferences, a power that
also existed before 1978.
In Tennecomp, the bankrupt seller agreed to build a computer
for the buyer at a contract price of approximately $235,000. At the
time that the petition was filed, approximately 90% of the
purchase price had been paid pursuant to the terms of the con-
tract. One day before the voluntary petition in bankruptcy was
filed, the computer was shipped to the buyer. The buyer, however,
did not receive the computer until three days after the petition.
goods while insolvent, but-
(1) such seller may not reclaim any such goods unless such seller de-
mands in writing reclamation of such goods before ten days after re-
ceipt of such goods by the debtor; and (2) the court may deny recla-
mation to a seller with such a right of reclamation that has made
such a demand only if court- (A) grants the claim of such a seller
priority as an administrative expense; or(B) secures such claim by a
lien.
222. U.C.C. § 2-502 comment 2.
223. Bell v. Public Serv. Co. (In re Tennecomp Sys., Inc.), 12 Bankr. 729 (Bankr. E.D.
Tenn. 1981).
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The trustee, not knowing whether to treat the transaction as a
preference, which applies to transfers occurring before bankruptcy,
or as a postpetition transfer, wherein the transfer occurs after
bankruptcy, argued both theories to the bankruptcy court. The
buyer could not win on a theory that it had title to the property
because the provision in the contract provided that title did not
transfer until "initial operation of the equipment. 22 4 Thus, the
buyer was left with its 2-502(2) argument.
The bankruptcy judge struck down the buyer's section 2-502
claim on the grounds that Article 9 had not been complied with.
He believed that the section's comment required that the buyer's
"special property" interest in the goods be perfected pursuant to
Article 9.225 Then, without indicating why he chose to do so, the
court set the transfer aside as preferential. It thought perhaps that
the bankrupt's dispossession of the goods before the petition was
filed sufficed to meet the statutory requirement that the transfer
be made within 90 days before the filing of the petition.2 8 If he
224. Id. at 732.
225. In concluding that the perfection and filing requirements of Article 9 control over
the special property interest given reclaiming buyer's under section 2-502, the bankruptcy
judge was clearly correct. U.C.C. § 2-402(3)(a) provides that "[niothing in this Article shall
be deemed to impair the rights of creditors of the seller under the provisions of the Article
on Secured Transactions (Article 9)." In addition, in cases where the debtor has possession
of the goods in question, the reclaiming buyer must comply with both the notice and perfec-
tion requirements of Article 9. U.C.C. § 9-113 provides:
A security interest arising solely under the Article on Sales (Article 2) is subject
to the provisions of this Article except that to the extent that and so long as
the debtor does not have or does not lawfully obtain possession of the goods
(a) no security agreement is necessary to make the security interest
enforceable; and (b) no filing is required to perfect the security inter-
est; and (c) the rights of the secured party on default by the debtor
are governed by the Article on Sales (Article 2) (emphasis added).
See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Arizona v. Carbajal, 132 Ariz. 263, 645 P.2d 778 (1982), subor-
dinating the unpaid cash seller's Article 2 special property claim because of failure to com-
ply with Article 9. The question addressed was whether or not the trustee in bankruptcy,
who was not an Article 9 secured creditor, but rather had the power of a lien creditor, see
supra note 198, was in the same position as the secured creditor. U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (1972
version) was somewhat helpful in that it provided that "an unperfected security interest is
subordinate to the rights of . . .a person who becomes a lien creditor before the security
interest is perfected." It is not clear whether the drafters intended to subordinate only Arti-
cle 9 security interests or whether section 9-301(1)(b) was intended to subordinate Article 2
security interests as well. Research revealed one case holding that an unperfected Article 2
special property claim was subordinate to the trustee's lien creditor power. Imperial Chem.
Indus. Ltd. v. Slaner (In re Duplan Corp.), 455 F. Supp. 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
226. Judge Bare's opinion in Tennecomp is not the only opinion that struggled with the
distinction between postpetition transfers and preferences. Judge Doyle's opinion in Zestee
Foods, Inc. v. Phillips Foods Corp., 536 F.2d 334 (10th Cir. 1976), demonstrates the kind of
precision other opinions frequently lack. In Zestee, Zestee caused garnishee summons to be
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had instead chosen to emphasize the time of the transferee's re-
ceipt of the goods, the transaction could have been attacked as a
postpetition transfer.227
In summary, despite the efforts of the drafters of the Uniform
Commercial Code, most buyers were left with only title arguments
to defend against the trustee's claim that a postbankruptcy taking
of the goods should be set aside as a postpetition transfer. Even
assuming that the buyers could establish that they had title to the
goods, if the bankrupt-seller retained the goods beyond a com-
merciably reasonable time, the trustee would have a fraudulent
conveyance remedy under state law which would have defeated the
buyer's claim. If the seller was not a merchant, any retention made
the buyer's claim vulnerable. If title had not passed to the buyer,
section 2-502(2) was of little value to the buyer in bankruptcy. Ar-
guments based on section 2-502(2) would almost certainly have
failed on the alternative grounds that the burden of proof was in-
surmountable, that a section 2-502 claim was subordinate to the
trustee's right to foreclose a judicial lien, that the trustee could
reject the contract as being executory, that the entire section con-
stituted a voidable statutory lien, or that the buyer had not com-
plied with Article 9.
IV. THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978
A. Introduction
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (hereinafter "bankruptcy
served on Jewett and Sherman who were indebted to the debtor. The summons was served
subsequent to the filing of an involuntary petition but before bankrupt's adjudication. Jew-
ett and Sherman admitted indebtedness and requested an order telling them whom to pay.
Although the parties felt the issue was whether or not service of summons created a prefer-
ence, Judge Doyle thought otherwise. A necessary element to setting aside a transfer as
being preferential is that the transfer occur within the specified period before the filing of
the petition. Because the transfer occurred after the petition, it could not be preferential.
The court said, "We are not saying that there could never be a transfer as a result of a
garnishee summons. We are saying that there was not a preferential transfer here. Since the
purported transfer occurred after the filing of the petition it was abortive." 536 F.2d at 336;
see also Carlson v. United Mo. Bank (In re Newcomb), 32 Bankr. 96 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1983) (where monies were paid into escrow to be transfered upon the United States being
affirmed in district court of a judgment creditor, because affirmance came within 90 days
preceding bankruptcy, the transfer was preferential); In re Perpall, 271 F. 466 (2d Cir. 1921)
(where the court analyzed a transfer occurring after the petition under the bankruptcy act's
preference statute).
227. In a latter part of this article it is argued that the transferee's interest in estate
property should be vulnerable to the trustee's avoidance power as a condition precedent to
setting aside a transfer as a postpetition transfer. See infra text accompanying notes 247-59.
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code") constitutes the second major statutory treatment of postpe-
tition transfer problems. The 1978 code codifies the result in Ma-
rin2 s and includes the old rules that allow the trustee to set aside
postpetition transfers. 29
Section B looks at the 1978 code's treatment of these areas.
Section C briefly returns to the title problem. The language
changes in the code's title section as well as the changes made in
codification of the reclaiming seller's section 2-702(2) rights neces-
sitate a brief return to those questions. Finally, Section D looks at
the unusual, new section 550.0 That section limits the trustee's
ability to recover from subsequent postpetition transferees.
B. Postpetition Transfers Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act
1. INTRODUCTION
The following treatment of the postpetition transfer issue par-
228. 11 U.S.C. § 542(c) (1982); see infra text accompanying notes 311-29.
229. 11 U.S.C. § 549 (1982) (footnote omitted) provided:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) and (c) of this section, the trustee may
avoid a transfer of property of the estate-
(1) that occurs after the commencement of the case; and
(2) (A) that is authorized under section 303(f) or 542(c) of this title; or
(B) that is not authorized under this title or by the court.
(b) In an involuntary case, a transfer that occurs after the commencement of
such case but before the order for relief is valid against the trustee to the extent
of any value, including services, but not including satisfaction or securing of a
debt that arose before the commencement of the case, given after the com-
mencement of the case in exchange for such transfer, not withstanding any no-
tice or knowledge of the case that the transferee has.
(c) The trustee may not avoid under subsection (a) of this section a transfer, to a
good faith purchaser without knowledge of the commencement of the case and
for present fair equivalent value or to a purchaser at a judicial sale, of real prop-
erty located other than in the county in which the case is commenced, unless a
copy of the petition was filed in the office where conveyances of real property in
such county are recorded before such transfer was so far perfected that a bona
fide purchaser of such property against whom applicable law permits such trans-
fer to be perfected cannot acquire an interest that is superior to the interest of
such good faith or judicial sale purchaser. A good faith purchaser, without
knowledge of the commencement of the case and for less than present fair
equivalent value, of real property located other than in the county in which the
case is commenced, under a transfer that the trustee may avoid under this sec-
tion, has a lien on the property transferred to the extent of any present value
given, unless copy of the petition was so filed before such transfer was so
perfected.
(d) An action or proceeding under this section may not be commenced after the
earlier of -
(1) Two years after the date of the transfer sought to be avoided; and
(2) the time the case is closed or dismissed.
230. 11 U.S.C. § 550 (1982); see infra text accompanying notes 425-93.
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allels the earlier discussion of the Chandler Act. Issues are ad-
dressed in this section in the same sequence as in the Chandler
Act. In some cases, the new code resolves old issues in the same
manner, while in other instances novel solutions are offered. Part
two of this section discusses the cases that are labeled "general
rule cases." Part three looks at transfers occurring between filing
of involuntary petitions and "adjudication." 3 ' Part four looks at a
salient omission-namely the failure to protect transferees of both
negotiable instruments and currency. Part five investigates new
code sections 542(c)2 32 and 542(d) 2 3-that codify the result in Ma-
rin. Part six looks at the new code's treatment of real estate trans-
fers. Part seven briefly discusses the revocation of authority argu-
ment mentioned in Marin and relied on by other cases.
2. CAVEAT EMPTOR
Throughout this discussion the "general rule" of caveat
emptor, that a transferee of personal property takes only that in-
terest held by his transferor 23  has been continually restated.
Transferor's bankruptcy disables the transferor from giving title to
estate property. Section 541(a)(1) provides that the debtor's estate
acquires "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property
... ,3. The principle of caveat emptor was ultimately retained
in personal property cases. Moreover, in retaining the caveat
emptor doctrine, Congress rejected a less stringent doctrine sug-
gested by the Bankruptcy Commission that would have given
postpetition transferees limited protection.
a. The Commission Proposal
As was true with the amendments to the Chandler Bill over 35
years earlier, the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 was the progeny of a
Bankruptcy Commission.2 36 The Commission was made up of a
231. Recall that under the old bankruptcy act that a debtor could be involuntarily "ad-
judicated" a bankrupt. Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 4(b), 52 Stat. 840, 845 (1938); see supra text
accompanying notes 120-30. New code section 303(h) speaks in terms of "ordering relief" in
an involuntary case. "[T]he court shall order relief against the debtor in an involuntary case
.11 U.S.C. § 303(h) (1982).
232. 11 U.S.C. § 542(c) (1982); see infra text accompanying notes 306-24.
233. 11 U.S.C. § 542(d) (1982); see infra text accompanying notes 330-38.
234. See infra text accompanying notes 392-428.
235. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1978); see infra text accompanying notes 388-400.
236. The Commission on the Bankruptcy Law of the United States was established by
Public Law 91-354 on July 24, 1970. Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468
(1970). The Commission was formed to study, analyze, evaluate, and recommend changes
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panel of bankruptcy lawyers, academicians, and judges. A report
was issued in 1973237 and a bill was later introduced.3 s Although a
group of bankruptcy judges offered their own bill, 39 the "judges"
bill and the Commission bill did not significantly differ in areas
germane to this article.
The Commission recommended that the transferee be insu-
lated from liability if he could establish three crucial facts. First,
the transfer was prior to the filing of a notice in the local records
which gave notice of real estate and personal property transac-
tions. Second, the transferee did not know of the filing of the peti-
tion. And third, the transferee gave "a reasonably equivalent
value., 24 0
both in the substance and administration of bankruptcy.
Public Law 91-354 created a Commission consisting of nine members. Those members
were Harold Marsh, Chairman, Wilson Newman, Charles Seligson, Senator Quentin Bur-
dick, Senator Marlow Cook, Representative Don Edwards, Representative Charles Wiggins,
Judge Edward Weinfeld, and Judge Hubert Will. The Commission staff consisted of, among
others, an Executive Director, a Deputy Director, a research specialist and an administrative
officer. Frank R. Kennedy, a prominent professor from the University of Michigan Law
School, and a reporter for the Rules Committee of the Judicial Committee was appointed as
Executive Director.
Public Law 91-354 as enacted provided for a two year life for the Commission. The
Commission did not formally commence its operations until May of 1971, nearly 10 months
after it was established. Therefore, Congress extended the life of the Commission by Public
Law 93-56 through July of 1973. Act of July 1, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-56, 87 Stat. 140 (1973).
After conducting four public hearings and forty-four days of Commission deliberation, a two
part report was submitted to Congress on July 30, 1973. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE
BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
Part I consisted of an evaluation of bankruptcy administration with recommendations for
change. Part II embodied a proposed bankruptcy statue with explanatory notes. The Com-
mission's statutory proposal was introduced as a bill in the House of Representatives in
1973. H.R. 10792, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). A comparable bill was introduced in the Sen-
ate at that time. S. 4026, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). In 1974, a competing bill, proposed by
the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges was also introduced into the House. H.R.
16643, 93d. Cong., 2d. Sess. (1974). Scant legislative action was taken during the 93d Con-
gress with respect to the proposed bankruptcy bills. However, an intense study of the pro-
posed bankruptcy legislation occurred during the 94th Congress. The Commission's proposal
was reintroduced during that session. H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). The competing
bill by the bankruptcy judges was also reintroduced. H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). In
the Senate, the Commission's bill was also resubmitted, S. 236, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975),
as was the bankruptcy judges' proposal, S. 235, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). For further
discussion on the history of the Commission, see Klee, Legislative History of the New
Bankruptcy Law 28 DE PAUL L. REV. 941, 942-43 (1979) reprinted in, 54 AM. BANKR. L.J.
275, 276-78 (1980).
237. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, HR.
Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
238. H.R. 31, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
239. H.R. 32, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
240. Proposed section 4-605(a) reads:
Postpetition Transfers. Except as provided in section 4-208(c), a trustee may
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The Commission recommended that the rule of caveat emptor
be abandoned in bankruptcy. Parties dealing with the debtor in
good faith and who paid good value must be given constructive no-
tice of the bankruptcy in order for the trustee to defeat postpeti-
tion transfers. The Chandler Act exception for bona fide purchas-
ers of real estate was to be extended to all good faith transferees.
b. The 1978 Code
Congress rejected the Commission's recommendation. The fi-
nal bill subjected the transferee to liability even though he may
not have had actual or constructive notice of the transferor's bank-
ruptcy. Code section 549(a)(1) simply stated that "the trustee may
avoid a transfer of property24' of the estate . ..that occurs after
the commencement of the case; and .. . that is not authorized
under this title or by the court."242 Caveat emptor supremis. Ex-
ceptions to the general rule are dealt with below. Although Con-
gress did allow some exceptions, most of the cases construing sec-
tion 549 have held that the estate could recover postpetition
transfers under this section.4 3 One court adhered to this result
recover property of the estate transferred after the filing of a petition unless (1)
the transfer was prior to the filing of notice pursuant to subdivision (c), (2) the
transferee did not know of the filing of the petition, and (3) the transferee gave a
reasonably equivalent present value. If the transferee would be protected under
this subdivision but for the fact that he gave less than a reasonably equivalent
value, he shall nevertheless be reimbursed for the present value given.
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note
237, at 162. The Commission's opinion to protect a transferee paying "reasonably equivalent
present value" was not intended to mark a substantive change from the Chandler Act's
protection for preadjudication parties paying "present fair equivalent value." The report
said: "The use of 'reasonably equivalent' for 'fair equivalent' is intended as a clarification
and not a change of substance. Undoubtedly the courts will reach the same result, but 'rea-
sonably equivalent' seems a more accurate and realistic term than 'fair equivalent.'" Id. at
163.
241. If estate property is not transferred, section 549(a) is not violated. See Westing-
house Credit Corp. v. Page (In re Page), 6 COLLIER BANKR. CASES 776 (D.D.C. 1982). The
debtor should not be able to avoid section 549(a) by simply notifying its creditors to pay the
postpetition transferee instead of paying the debtor. Cohen v. Kern (In re Kennesaw Mint,
Inc.), 32 Bankr. 799, 802 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1983).
242. 11 U.S.C. § 549(a)(1) (1982) (amended 1984).
243. E.g., McLemore v. Citizens Bank (In re Tom McCormick Enter., Inc.), 26 Bankr.
437 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1983) (bank's unilateral withdrawal of funds from a special "going
out of business sale" account to satisfy prepetition debt invalid under section 549(a)(1));
Brown v. Swartz, (In re Swartz) 18 Bankr. 454 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982) (trustee recovers
excess of debtor's postpetition loan against the loan value of eight life insurance policies);
Doane v. Appalachian Power Co. (In re Doane), 19 Bankr. 1007 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1982)
(postpetition payment to utility of prepetition debt invalid); Bulk Trans., Inc. v. United
States (In re Bulk Trans., Inc.), 23 Bankr. 538 (Bankr. E.D. La. 1981) (postpetition payment
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even though the holding may have practically terminated the
debtor's attempts to reorganize.2"
In In re Jepsco Building Materials, Inc.,245 a Chapter 11
debtor-in-possession was able to recover a postpetition payment
for goods sold and delivered to the debtor before the filing of the
bankruptcy. In that case, a supplier received a $19,000 payment
after filing a Chapter 11 petition for materials delivered before
bankruptcy. The supplier claimed that it did not know that the
certified check that it was given came from estate funds. In fact,
the supplier previously had difficulties in receiving payment for
supplies and had insisted that the debtor's chief officer and share-
holder pay for all future supplies. At the time of the postpetition
payment, the supplier had no knowledge that the paid funds came
from the estate. The check itself had not been drawn on the
debtor's account but rather had been drawn on the officer's ac-
count. The estate had deposited the necessary funds into the of-
ficer's account.2 46
The court applied section 549(a) and entered judgment
against the supplier in the amount of $19,000. The supplier's lack
of notice and good faith were simply irrelevant.
In applying section 549, courts should recognize that Congress
did not give the trustee the power of a lien creditor, the power to
set aside preferences, or the like. Trustees, debtors, and debtors-
in-possession should look to other sections of the code to recapture
transfers which have postpetition elements.
In re Laird24 7 is an example of the misapplication of section
549. In Laird, the debtor's attorney, Gifford, recovered a $6,700
arbitration award on behalf of the debtor against Crinitis before
the filing of the petition. Crinitis paid $6,700 into court in order to
to I.R.S. of prepetition tax liability invalid).
244. B & W Enters., Inc. v. Goodman Oil Co. (In re B & W Enters., Inc.), 713 F.2d 534
(9th Cir. 1983), rejected various arguments that sought to permit postpetition payments for
prepetition debts to a trade creditor vital to debtor's reorganization. See also Otte v. Manu-
facturers Hanover Commercial Corp. (In re Texlon Corp.), 596 F.2d 1092 (2d Cir. 1979)
(rejecting a similar effort for a bank); cf. In re VanGuard Diversified, Inc., 31 Bankr. 364
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983) (approving, under stated conditions, a "cross-collateralization" loan
to cover prepetition debts in favor of a bank).
245. Jepsco Bldg. Materials, Inc. v. Bostwick Steel Lath Co. (In re Jepsco), 15 Bankr.
122 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981).
246. The transferee may have had a valid defense as a "subsequent transferee" under
section 550(b), but the court did not address the argument. See infra text accompanying
notes 473-82.
247. Krupp, Meyers and Hoffman v. Doyle (In re Laird), 6 Bankr. 273 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1980).
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satisfy the award. The payment, however, was made after the
debtor filed for bankruptcy. Gifford had an attorney's lien on the
funds received, but under the controlling state law no lien accrued
until the fund came into existence. The court ruled that funds did
not come into existence until the $6,700 was paid into court, mak-
ing the money part of the bankruptcy estate.248 Because the lien
could not have existed until the fund existed, the lien was vulnera-
ble to attack under section 549.249
The estate's claim to property should be subject to all equities
recognized under state law.2 50 Nothing in the legislative history of
section 549 suggests that the section gave trustees an avoidance
power enabling them to cut off existing claims to, or equities in,
the transferred property. If the debtor himself had no ability to
defeat Gifford's claim for fees at the time the petition was filed,
the estate should equally be without the power under section 549.
For example, perhaps under Pennsylvania law, a lien creditor,
who acquired a lien upon filing of the petition, could have served a
writ of garnishment upon Crinitis thereby defeating Gifford's
claim. If so, then the trustee would have been able to prevail under
section 544(a), which accords the trustee at the time of the filing of
the petition the rights of a lien creditor on all the debtor's prop-
erty.2 51 The point is that the estate cannot use section 549 as the
court in Laird did. Under section 549, the estate has no avoidance
power, unlike other sections such as 544,252 544(b),2 53 547254 and
548.255
248. Id. at 277.
249. Id.
250. See infra text accompanying notes 403-05.
251. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (1982) provides:
(a) The trustee shall have, as of the commencement of the case, and without
regard to any knowledge of the trustee or of any creditor, the rights and powers
of, or may avoid any transfer of property of the debtor or any obligation in-
curred by the debtor that is voidable by-
(1) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of the
commencement of the case, and that obtains, at such time and with
respect to such credit, a judicial lien on all property on which a cred-
itor on a simple contract could have obtained a judicial lien, whether
or not such a creditor exists.
252. Id.
253. Section 544(b) generally provides that the trustee may avoid transfers made by the
debtor which are "voidable under applicable law by a creditor holding an unsecured claim."
11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (1982).
254. Section 547 generally permits the estate to set aside preferential transfers. 11
U.S.C. § 547 (1982).
255. Section 548 permits the estate to set aside fraudulent conveyances made within
one year of the filing of the petition. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1982).
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The case of In re Florida Consumer's Furniture Warehouse,
Inc.,"' represents a correct application of section 549. The defen-
dant sold and delivered oriental rugs to the debtor on consign-
ment. Defendant did not file a notice as required by the Florida
Uniform Commercial Code25 which would have perfected his claim
to the rugs without becoming subject to defeasance by a lien credi-
tor. When defendant learned of the debtor's bankruptcy, he re-
moved the unsold rugs from the debtor's store. Bankruptcy Judge
Brittion first ruled that the trustee could defeat the defendant's
claim under section 544(a)(1)2 58 which, recall, gives the estate the
power of a lien creditor. Then, after having removed the defen-
dant's claim to the rugs, he ordered them returned to the estate as
a postpetition transfer under section 549.
Although the above approach may appear to be hypertechni-
cal, it is far from clear that Gifford should have lost in the Laird
case. Gifford's claim to the arbitration award may have been supe-
rior under state law to that of a garnishing creditor's, who served a
writ on the garnishees before they paid the funds into court. If so,
Gifford should have prevailed. If the estate could not defeat Gif-
ford's claim under its power as a lien creditor or under other sec-
tions, it certainly could not under section 549.25'
256. Gennet v. Oriental Rug Agency, Inc., (In re Florida Consumer's Furniture Ware-
house, Inc.), 9 Bankr. '7 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981).
257. See FLA. STAT. §§ 672.326(2), (3) (1981) (the rugs being delivered primarily for
resale are deemed to be "on sale or return").
258. Gennet, 9 Bankr. at 9. For text of Section 544(a)(1), see supra note 251.
259. See also A & S Sales & Leasing, Inc. v. Belize Airways Ltd. (In re Belize Airways
Ltd.), 7 Bankr. 601 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980); Steinberg v. National Bank & Trust Co., (In re
Independence Land Title Corp.), 9 Bankr. 394 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1981); Goldstein v. Beeler
(In re Rose), 25 Bankr. 744 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1982). In Belize Airways, a conditional seller
did not comply with filing requirements to give the creditors of the conditional buyer notice.
Although the seller's interest almost certainly could have been invalidated under section
544(a)(1), the opinion seemed to imply that the seller's claim was invalid under section 549
due to the fact that the seller took possession of the property being sold after the filing of
bankruptcy.
In Independence Land Title, the debtor borrowed funds from a bank so that it could
buy a motor vehicle from Wade, the president of debtor-corporation, on March 18, 1980.
Debtor gave Wade the loan proceeds and Wade gave debtor the car and certificate of title.
Bankruptcy was filed subsequently on March 27, 1980. The Bank was not successful in get-
ting its lien validated on the certificate of title under the applicable Illinois Certificate of
Title law, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 951/2 § 3-202(b) (1979), until May 15, 1980. While the decision
initially discussed the belated notation on the certificate as a possible preference, the opin-
ion, again, implies that the notation was invalid under section 549.
The broad language in Independence is deceptive when it implies that all postpetition
attempts to perfect a security interest are invalid under section 549. Section 546(b) permits
secured parties to file a notice after bankruptcy if something remains to "accomplish such
perfection" under applicable law. 11 U.S.C. § 546(b) (1982). The 1978 code's preference
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3. INVOLUNTARY CASES
a. A Brief Review of the Chandler Act
Under former section 70d(1),2e° creditors and transferees deal-
ing with the debtor in the "gap" between filing of the involuntary
petition and adjudication were protected as long as they were act-
ing in "good faith" and paid "fair equivalent value. '261 "Good
faith" permitted the transferee to know about the involuntary pe-
tition as long as he had "reasonable cause to believe that the peti-
tion in bankruptcy [was] not well founded . . 62 Under cases
such as Kohn v. Myers,2 63 a party who inspected the bankruptcy
file was charged with knowledge of subsequent additions to it.
section generally allows a secured party ten days to perfect a security interest in collateral
after the interest is granted in order to immunize it from a section 547 preferential transfer
attack. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(A) (1982), providing that a "transfer is made . . . at the
time such transfer takes effect between the transferor and transferee, if such transfer is
perfected at, or within ten days after, such time." In the Independence case, the security
interest was given on March 18th and bankruptcy followed on March 27th. If the bank had
been able to note its lien by giving the section 546(b) notice on March 28th, which is within
the ten day period specified under section 547(e)(2)(A), then the trustee should not have
been able to set aside the bank's interest. Language in the Independence case suggested
that all attempts to perfect a lien after the filing of a petition were void under section 549,
which directly conflicts with the provisions of section 546(b).
The Rose case illustrates a similar problem. In that case the transferee obtained a pre-
judgment garnishment on the cash proceeds from the sale of real estate. Bankruptcy inter-
vened within the crucial 90 day period following the garnishment thereby making the trans-
feree's lien susceptible to attack as a preferential transfer under section 547. 11 U.S.C. §
547(b) (1982). The transferee, upon stipulation of the parties, successfully got the state
court to release the funds to him. The bankruptcy judge set aside the transfer as a prefer-
ence. The district judge affirmed but did so on the grounds that the transaction violated
section 549 as a postpetition transfer. Again, the opinion seemed to imply that any transfer
of funds occurring after the filing of bankruptcy was void under section 549. If, however, the
transferee had been able to get his prejudgement lien before the crucial 90 day preference
period, the transferee ultimately should have prevailed. See, e.g., Sid Kumines, Inc. v. Wolf
(In re Wolf), 13 Bankr. 167 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981), (holding that an attachment lien ac-
quired before the beginning of the 90 day period was immune from the trustee's preference
attack); Barr v. National Aircraft Servs., Inc., (In re Cosmopolitan Aviation Corp.), 34
Bankr. 592 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983) (receipt of the funds after bankruptcy filing should not
change the result).
In the Rose case, the transferee's actions were in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982)
which generally provides that all attempts to enforce creditors' claims are automatically
stayed. Transferees that violate the automatic stay may be subject to various contempt of
court sanctions. Violation of the automatic stay, however, should not defeat the transferee's
claim to the funds.
260. See supra note 120.
261. For the text of the section and further discussion, see supra text accompanying
notes 120-30.
262. Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 70d(3), 52 Stat. 840, 881 (1938); see supra text accompa-
nying notes 126-30.
263. 266 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1959); see supra text accompanying notes 127-30.
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Even if the transferee was acting in good faith, Chandler Act
courts held that satisfaction of prepetition debts did not constitute
the payment of "fair equivalent value."
Under the Chandler Act, there was confusion concerning the
correct interpretation of section 70d(4) language which withdrew
protection in cases where a "United States or State court" receiver
had been appointed. Section 70d(4) appeared to conflict with the
introductory language to section 70d which protected only those
transfers occurring "before a receiver takes possession of the prop-
erty of the bankrupt." 64 One commentator suggested that the in-
troduction should apply only to bankruptcy court receivers, with
section 70d(4) applying to nonbankruptcy receivers appointed by
federal and state courts.2 65
b. The Commission Bill
The proposed Commission section 4-208(c)(1), entitled
"Transactions Prior to Granting Relief," provided:
(c) After the filing of an involuntary petition and before entry of
an order granting relief...
(1) persons selling to or buying from the debtor in the ordi-
nary course of his business, notwithstanding their knowledge of
the petition, shall be allowed to retain the money or other prop-
erty acquired and shall have allowable claims for the value of
the bargained for exchange to the extent not received at the
time of the entry of an order granting relief....26
The Commission proposal was a significant departure because
it mandated that transfers of estate property be in the "ordinary
course of business" of the debtor. Thus, under the Commission
proposal, a bulk transferee would likely be subject to suit by the
trustee.2 67 The Commission also recommended that the transferee's
knowledge be considered irrelevant. Even if the transferee thought
264. For text of the section, see supra note 108; see supra text accompanying notes
113-19.
265. Boshkoff, supra note 6, at 756-61; see also Bateman, supra, note 6 at 290-91 (dis-
cussion of introductory language of section 70d compared with language of section 70d(4)).
266. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R.
Doc. No. 93-137 Part II, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 78 (1973).
267. U.C.C. § 6-102(1) defines "bulk transfer" as "any transfer in bulk and not in the
ordinary course of the transferor's business of a major part of the materials, supplies, mer-
chandise or other inventory ... of an enterprise subject to this Article." (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Murdock v. Plymouth Enters., Inc. (In re Curtina Int'l, Inc.), 23 Bankr. 969
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982), holding that a "close-out" sale of all of the debtor's inventory was
not in the ordinary course of business.
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that the petition had merit, he would have been protected if he
otherwise met the requirements of the section. 268 Finally, although
the section did mention "selling" and "buying," there was no ex-
press provision that required the transferee to pay "value."
Whether the failure to require the transferee to pay value
(much less "fair equivalent value") was intentional, or an over-
sight, is unclear. It certainly could be argued that a sale at a frac-
tion of the true value is not in the "ordinary course" of business.
Commission section 4-605, the general provision governing
postpetition transfers, expressly excepted section 4-208(c) from its
provisions."' Thus, in cases where the transferee paid less than
full value for the debtor's property, there was no other section that
supervened section 4-208(c).27
c. The 1978 Code
The drafters of the 1978 code did not totally adopt the Com-
mission recommendations for involuntary cases. Section 549(a) ex-
pressly excepted from the trustees' power to avoid postpetition
transfers those cases provided for in subsection (b).27 Section
549(b) provides:
(b) In an involuntary case, a transfer that occurs after the com-
mencement of such case but before the order for relief is valid
against the trustee to the extent of any value, including services,
but not including satisfaction or securing of a debt that arose
before the commencement of the case, given after the com-
mencement of the case in exchange for such transfer, notwith-
268. Cf. Kohn v. Meyers, 266 F.2d 353 (2d Cir. 1959); see supra text accompanying
notes 126-30.
269. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R.
Doc. No. 93-137 Part II, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4, 162 (1973). For a complete text of section
4-605(a), see supra note 240.
270. Commission section 4-605(a) indicated that transferees, who paid "reasonably
equivalent present value," would be protected under stated conditions if they received a
postpetition transfer. The Commission proposal then stated: "If the transferee would be
protected under this subdivision but for the fact that he gave less than a reasonably
equivalent value, he shall nevertheless be reimbursed for the present value given." (empha-
sis added). To see the text of this section, see supra note 240. Note, however, that section 4-
605(a) "excepted" out of its provisions section 4-208(c). Id. Given the fact that Commission
section 4-605 permitted the trustee to recover property from transferees who paid less than
full value, failure to provide similar relief under section 4-208(c) in the involuntary case is
further evidence that the Commission intended that the transferees who paid less than full
value should he protected.
271. "Except as provided in subsection (b) .... the trustee may avoid a transfer of
property of the estate. ... 11 U.S.C. § 549(a) (1982) (amended 1984) (emphasis added).
For a complete text of section 549, see supra note 229.
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standing any notice or knowledge of the case that the transferee
has.2 72
The reader should note that the 1978 code speaks in terms of "or-
der for relief" while the Chandler Act provided for an "adjudica-
tion. ' 273 For the purposes of this article, the terms are syno-
nomous. Under the 1978 code, when an "order for relief" is
entered, the debtor's assets are within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the bankruptcy court.2 7'
The intention of the drafters in employing the word "value"
seems clear. The section expressly provides that transferees who
receive estate property in exchange for "services" are protected.275
Moreover, the statute omits the requirement that there be a "con-
temporaneous exchange." Doubtless, the drafters were aware of the
preferential transfer sections under both the old act 278 and the
1978 code,277 but they chose not to set aside preferential transac-
tions where the debt arose after 278 the filing of an involuntary
petition.
For example, assume that an involuntary petition was filed on
January 1st and that the entry of order for relief followed on
March 1st. In the meantime, on January 15th, Red Painter began
painting Debtor's house and completed the job on February 1st. If
Debtor paid Red on February 20th, the trustees could not set aside
that payment. Red had given "value," which the section defines as
"services," and he gave his services after the filing of the petition.
The fact that the February 20 payment was for an antecedent debt
was irrelevant.
Note also, in the above example, that Red was protected to
the "extent" of his value. Thus, if Red's bill was $5,000, but in
satisfaction of the debt, Debtor gave Red title and possession to
his $15,000 Mercedes, the trustee might be able to take back the
272. 11 U.S.C. § 549(b) (1982).
273. See supra note 108 for text of former section 70d.
274. Involuntary cases are commenced under section 303 of the 1978 code. See 11
U.S.C. § 303 (1982). Section 541(a) provides that "[Tihe commencement of a case under
section ...303 of this title creates an estate." 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1982).
275. Thus, the case of Kass v. Doyle, 275 F.2d 258 (2d Cir. 1960), discussed supra text
accompanying notes 123-25 was affirmed.
276. See Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 60, 52 Stat. 840, 869-71 (1938) (entitled "Preferred
Creditors").
277. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1982) (permitting the trustee to set aside payments made
on account of an "antecedent debt" made within 90 days of the filing of a petition).
278. Several courts have analyzed postpetition transfers as preferences. See supra note
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Mercedes, while Red should have a lien to the extent of $5,000.
The 1978 code also drops the requirement of "good faith."
With the abolition of "good faith" as a vehicle for deciding these
cases, the courts are no longer required to construe the old act's
statutory definition of "good faith" as "reasonable cause to believe
that the petition is not well founded." In addition, given the prior
courts' tortured definition of "reasonable cause, 27 9 creditors deal-
ing with debtors who are resisting involuntary petitions should feel
more secure about the validity of their transactions with the
debtor.
The 1978 code does retain the old requirement that the "value
given" must not be satisfaction of an old, prepetition debt.280 The
Chandler Act decisions have interpreted "present fair equivalent
value" as requiring a postpetition debt. This interpretation of case
law has been placed into the 1978 code. The drafters provided
double insurance against the debtor's satisfaction of a prepetition
debt by requiring that the "value" given by the transferee not in-
clude "satisfaction or securing of a debt that arose before the com-
mencement of the case," and that the "value" be "given after the
commencement of the case."
In re International Teldata Corp.281 (the only reported case to
date construing section 549(b)) was decided on the ground that
section 549(b) permitted the trustee to set aside transfers that oc-
curred after the satisfaction of prepetition debts. In Teldata, a sin-
gle creditor attempted to force the debtor into involuntary bank-
ruptcy. The debtor pointed out that the 1978 code required at
least three creditors to join in the petition if the debtor had twelve
or more creditors.2 82 The code generally provided that creditors
whose claims could be avoided under the avoidance provisions of
the bankruptcy code should not be included in the determination
of the twelve creditors.2 3 Specifically, the section provided that
creditors whose transfer was "voidable under section . . . 549"
should not be included as part of the twelve.28
The debtor argued that he had numerous creditors-far more
than twelve. The petitioning creditor successfully countered
279. See supra text accompanying notes 126-30.
280. See supra text accompanying notes 121-25.
281. 12 Bankr. 879 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1981).
282. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b) (1982). Subsection (1) provides that there should be three credi-
tors joining in the petition. Subsection (2) provides, however, that only one creditor is
needed if the debtor has less than twelve creditors.
283. Id.
284. Id.
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debtor's argument, pointing out that none of the debtor's other
creditors could be counted because the debtor had made postpeti-
tion payments to all of them in payment for prepetition indebted-
ness. The court ruled that all of those creditors would be excluded
because the payments made to them were voidable under section
549(b).
d. Comment
By discarding the "good faith" requirement, the drafters
struck a balance between the rights of transferees who deal with
the debtor and the debtor's creditors. Prior law was slanted too
much in favor of the trustee. Until the order for relief is entered,
the bankruptcy courts should not assume that the involuntary pe-
tition has merit. Under the Chandler Act, courts second-guessed
the transferees' intent as to whether or not the transferees thought
the petition had merit.285 If, indeed, a court determines that the
petition has merit, it may appoint a receiver. Until that time, a
debtor should be able to operate his business with a minimum of
interference.
The 1978 code did not follow the policy of the Chandler Act,
which enabled the trustee to set aside transfers that occurred
before adjudication but after a general receiver had been ap-
pointed. Undoubtedly, problems of interpretation with respect to
provisions that refer to receivers under the Chandler Act influ-
enced the decision to protect postpetition transferees, when an in-
voluntary petition was filed and a receiver appointed2 8  Those
problems, however, were the result of ambiguous language and not
the result of enunciated policy.287 As a practical matter, these cases
can only occur if the receiver is unsuccessful in collecting all of the
debtor's property. (If the receiver has all of the property, debtor
has nothing to transfer). If a transferee is without notice of the
appointment of a receiver, his lack of notice is an equity in his
favor. But this reason alone is insufficient to justify protection.
Those parties who deal, after the filing of a voluntary petition,
with bankrupt debtors will be subject to the trustee's right to set
285. See supra text accompanying notes 126-30.
286. A general receiver is one appointed by a court of chancery under its equitable
powers, independent of statute, to take possession of and preserve the funds or property in
litigation. Naslund v. Moon Car Co., 345 Mo. 465, 467-68, 134 S.W.2d 102, 105 (1939).
287. The Chandler Act Was unclear as to whether the appointment of receivers by the
bankruptcy court alone, or by other courts as well, cut off protection for good faith postpeti-
tion transferees in involuntary cases. See supra text accompanying notes 113-19.
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aside the transfer under section 549(a).2 88 If there is a distinction
between the two types of transferees, it is that in the section 549(a)
case, bankruptcy has occurred, while in the involuntary case only a
receiver has been appointed.
In cases where a judge believes that the debtor's affairs are in
such distress that a receiver is needed to prevent dissipation of the
estate, a recapture provision for postpetition transfers becomes
necessary. In both cases, where a voluntary petition has been filed
and where a receiver has been appointed, there has been a finding
that the debtor's assets must be gathered and administered. The
debtor should not be in a position, merely because his receiver was
unaware of the existence of assets, to fritter away some of these
assets and thereby defeat his creditors.
Similarly, the Commission proposal, which left unprotected
those transfers that were not made in the "ordinary course" of
business, deserved more consideration. The Commission's proposal
struck a balance between allowing the debtor to operate his busi-
ness, and at the same time protecting creditors' rights should the
involuntary petition have merit. Under the 1978 code, in the inter-
val between filing and the order of relief, debtors are able to liqui-
date assets and dissipate the funds by means of sales not in the
ordinary course of business. In an analogous context, bulk transfer-
ees, due to the unusual nature of the sale, are required to insure
that the transferor's creditors are given notice before the sale is
consummated.289 Similarly, in bankruptcy cases, quick liquidation-
type sales should alert the buyer of the need for inquiry.
It is true that the present code permits the estate to set aside
the transfer if less than full value has been paid, but the transferee
is given a lien to the extent of the consideration given.29 ° For ex-
288. See supra text accompanying notes 241-46.
289. U.C.C. § 6-104(1)(a) provides in part that "a bulk transfer ... is ineffective
against any creditor of the transferor unless [tihe transferee requires the transferor to fur-
nish a list of his existing creditors. ... Section 6-105 further provides that the bulk trans-
fer "is ineffective against any creditor of the transferor unless at least ten days before he
takes possession of the goods or pays for them . . . [tihe transferee gives notice of the trans-
fer . . . . "
290. Section 549(b) does not expressly give the transferee a lien. The section does pro-
vide that the transfer "is valid against the trustee to the extent of any value . . . given
.... .The section does not state how a court should resolve a case where there is a transfer
before the entry of the order for relief for only one-half of value. Since the section only
validates the transfer to the "extent of any value," it follows that the entire transfer cannot
be valid. The most plausible solution would be to give the transferee a lien on the property
to the "extent" of his value which will be satisfied upon a subsequent sale, which, hopefully,
will attract a higher price than originally paid by the transferee.
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ample, assume that Debtor transfers his $20,000 Mercedes to Tom
Transferee during the gap for $10,000. Under present section
549(b), the trustee could recover the car, but Tom would have a
$10,000 lien. If the $10,000 given to the debtor cannot be traced
and is therefore missing, there is a $10,000 loss to the estate.
Under the Commission's proposal, the sale would probably not
have been in the ordinary course of business and would have there-
fore been void.291 Tom would forfeit his $10,000 consideration, but
the fact that he was paying less than full value should have alerted
him to be wary. Under present section 549(b), Tom need not be
acting in "good faith," he may be fully aware of the filing of the
petition and still be protected.
Finally, in cases where a transfer is in the ordinary course of
business, the new definition of "value" is an improvement. The old
act protected transferees that paid "present fair equivalent
value."2 9 1978-code transferees are protected to the "extent" that
they pay "value." Thus, transferees who pay partial value in the
ordinary course of business do not forfeit their consideration be-
cause a court, in hindsight, decides that less than full value has
been paid. At a minimum, in such cases, a lien should be provided
to the extent that consideration is less than full value.
4. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS AND CURRENCY
a. Review of the Chandler Act
The drafters of the Chandler Act included language in section
70d(5), dubbed the "negotiability proviso," indicating that the
courts should accord protection to parties relying upon a negotia-
ble instrument. The Chandler Act stated "[t]hat nothing in this
Act shall impair the negotiability of currency or negotiable
instruments."2 93
The Ninth Circuit's Marin decision held that this proviso
should not insulate drawee banks from liability where the debtor-
bankrupt drew checks on an account which the drawee-bank
honored after bankruptcy. 94 This conclusion was reached in part
because the honoring of a check by a drawee bank is technically
not a "negotiation, '2 9 5 and in part because the negotiability pro-
291. See supra note 270 and accompanying text.
292. For the text of the section, see supra note 108.
293. Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 70d(5), 52 Stat. 840, 882 (1938).
294. Marin, 352 F.2d at 189 (9th Cir. 1956).
295. Id. at n.4.
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viso only protected preadjudication transfers.
Under one view of the Chandler Act, negotiations were valid
where the instrument was negotiated to an actual holder. By way
of example, assume that the debtor-bankrupt was the payee of a
note. Subsequent to his filing of a voluntary petition and adjudica-
tion he negotiated the note to "H," a holder-in-due course, i.e. H
paid value without knowledge of the filing of bankruptcy. Assume
further that H in turn negotiated the note to H-2, who again paid
value without notice of bankruptcy.
In the above example, a case could have been made to the ef-
fect that the postpetition negotiation of the note by the bankrupt
would have been valid and the bankruptcy trustee would have had
no action against H.2"6 Furthermore, if there was no action against
H, there should have been no action against H-2, who would have
taken all of his rights.297
b. The Commission Bill
Section 4-605 of the Commission Bill did not contain any ex-
press language that protected transferees of negotiable instru-
ments. 29 s Transferees receiving estate property were to be immu-
nized from liability if (1) the transfer was made prior to the filing
of a notice in those records designed to accord notice to third par-
ties;299 (2) the transferee had no knowledge of the bankruptcy; 00
and (3) the transferee paid "reasonably present equivalent
value. 30 1 If the first two conditions were satisfied but the trans-
feree had paid less than reasonably equivalent value, the transferee
was to "nevertheless be reimbursed for the present value given."
3
If, in the example above, H did not know of the bankruptcy,
then the payment of $9,000 for a note due in one year should be
considered the giving of reasonably "present equivalent value." 03
296. See supra text accompanying notes 135-44.
297. Under Article Three of the Uniform Commercial Code's "shelter principle," the
"transfer of an instrument vests in the transferee such rights as the transferor has therein
.U.C.C. § 3-201(1) (1978).
298. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R.
Doc. No. 93-137, Part IT, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 192 (1973).
299. See id. at § 4-605(a)(1). For the text of the section, see supra note 240.
300. Id. at § 4-605(a)(2). For the text of the section, see supra note 240.
301. Id. at § 4-605(a)(3). For the text of the section, see supra note 240.
302. Id.
303. Payment of present value for an obligation due in the future must contemplate a
reasonable rate of interest. See, e.g., In re Overstreet, 23 Bankr. 712, 714 (Bankr. W.D. La.
1982), where the bankruptcy court refused to confirm a Chapter 13 plan which did not meet
the section 1325 requirement that a secured creditor be paid the "value, as of the effective
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If, however, the transfer came after the filing of the constructive
notice, then the transferee would lose to the trustee. The trans-
feree could not have looked to the instrument alone but would
have had to undertake a record search as well.
H-2, a subsequent transferee, would have been protected
under Commission section 4-609.3o4 Thus, the trustee's claim would
have stopped with H, the first holder. In fact, the Commission jus-
tified its decision not to include explicit protection for those rely-
ing on negotiable instruments by alluding to the protection given
subsequent transferees under section 4-609:
The present Act has a special rule for negotiable instru-
ments and currency. The provision is very confusing and ap-
pears unnecessary. Adequate protection is given transferees of
postpetition transferees, including those that are holders of ne-
gotiable instruments, as a result of recommendations of the
Commission relating to subsequent transferees. The net effect of
the recommendations is that the first transferee who is a holder
in due course may retain the instrument if he gave a reasonably
equivalent present value; if he gives less, he is protected pro
tanto. The second transferee who is a holder in due course is
protected, and the equivalency of the value is immaterial. The
provision in the present Act placing the burden of proof on the
transferee, and presumably a person indebted to the debtor, a
depository, or bailee, is dropped. This rule is applicable only to
personal property, and it does not seem justifiable to place on
the transferee the burden of establishing good faith and reason-
ably equivalent value.30 5
It is far from clear why the Commission's decision not to make
a special exception for persons taking currency and negotiable in-
struments was regarded as "unnecessary." The subsequent holders
would prevail, even though the initial holder paying full value and
acting in good faith, would have lost to the trustee in cases where a
notice was on file. The Commission proposal in effect would have
required parties dealing with negotiable paper and currency to
conduct record searches before taking the paper, something com-
pletely alien to the concept of negotiability.0 6 In addition, a sharp
date of the plan" of the collateral securing the debt. The Chapter 13 debtor's plan provided
for no rate of interest in valuing the collateral and therefore failed to meet the section 1325
requirement.
304. See infra text accompanying notes 443-62.
305. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES,
H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, Part II, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 192 (1973).
306. U.C.C. § 3-304(5) provides that "the filing or recording of a document does not of
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distinction must be made between negotiable paper and currency.
Although it may be true that the protected status of a holder in
due course of negotiable paper has eroded considerably,"0 7 never-
theless there has been no movement to undermine the protection
given transferees of currency.
c. The 1978 Code
The 1978 code takes the drastic step of totally withdrawing
protection for those parties taking notes and currency from the
debtor after the filing of a voluntary petition in bankruptcy. The
1978 code does embrace the Commission proposal protecting par-
ties subsequently acquiring the paper, 08 but section 549(a)(1),
which is discussed above, governed the initial transferee's liabil-
ity. 09 The 1978 code gives no exception from the trustee's perva-
sive power to set aside postpetition transfers due to the good faith
of the transferee.
It is not clear from the legislative history whether the drafters
of the 1978 code intentionally chose to withdraw protection for
those parties relying upon currency and negotiable instruments.1 0
The Commission considered the negotiability problem and chose
to offer only limited protection, i.e. that a notice be filed. The leg-
islative history of the 1978 code makes no reference to negotiable
instruments at all, much less does it provide a detailed statement
as to why protection was denied and the Commission's proposal
rejected. It is possible that the failure to provide protection was a
mere oversight. This is conceivable due to the fact that the Com-
mission bill does not expressly mention "negotiable paper" or
itself constitute notice within the provisions of this Article to a person who would otherwise
be a holder in due course." See, e.g., Citizens Valley Bank v. Pacific Materials Co., 263 Or.
557, 503 P.2d 491 (1972) (filing of a security interest in accounts receivable does not defeat
rights of a holder in due course to enforce a note negotiated to it by the debtor); National
Sec. Fire & Casualty Co. v. Mazzara, 289 Ala. 542, 268 So. 2d 814 (1972) (recording of real
estate deed did not give notice to holder in due course of a check).
307. Federal Trade Commission Rule 433 virtually emasculates the holder-in-due
course doctrine in consumer transactions. 16 C.F.R. § 433 (1977); see Garner and Dunham,
FTC Rule 433 and The Uniform Commercial Code: An Analysis of Current Lender Status,
43 Mo. L. REv. 199 (1978).
308. The 1978 code provides that "any immediate or mediate good faith transferee" of
the initial transferee who initially received estate property from the debtor is protected
from an action against him by the trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 550(b)(2) (1982). For further discus-
sion, see infra text accompanying notes 473-82.
309. See supra text accompanying notes 241-46.
310. A search of the legislative history, principally the joint House and Senate report,
reveals no discussion of the negotiability problem. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess., 375 (1977); S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 90 (1978).
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"currency." One can look to the Commission's comments in order
to fully understand the Commission's intent regarding the treat-
ment of negotiable instruments and currency. Perhaps the drafters
of the code, in preparing section 549, overlooked the comments
and the attendant negotiability problem. The motive, or lack of
motive, for withdrawing protection is not stated.
5. SECTION 542(C)-THE Bank of Marin EXCEPTION
a. Review of the Chandler Act
In the Marin case, the Supreme Court held that the deposi-
tor's trustee in bankruptcy could not sue a depository bank for the
postpetition payment of checks drawn on the bankrupt's account.
The payee of the check in question was required to pay back the
funds he received.8 1'
The Supreme Court protected the bank by giving the Chan-
dler Act an "equitable" construction. 312 The Chandler Act pro-
vided protection for certain good-faith parties "holding property of
the bankrupt" under section 70d(2). 13 Section 70d(2), however, ac-
corded protection in cases where the transfer was made before ad-
judication. In cases where a voluntary petition was filed (and adju-
dication was therefore automatic31 4), no protection was available.
Hence, an "equitable" construction was needed to reach the de-
sired result.
b. The Commission Proposal
The Commission proposal, entitled "Protection of Debtors and
Bailees of the Debtor," read as follows:
A person who is indebted to the debtor or who is holding
money or property subject to withdrawal or order of the debtor
and who, in good faith and prior to knowledge of the filing of a
voluntary petition or an order directing relief pursuant to an in-
voluntary petition, pay (sic) such indebtedness or delivers or
transfers property of the debtor is not liable to the trustee if
such delivery or transfer would have been authorized but for the
filing of the petition." 5
311. Matin, 385 U.S. at 103.
312. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 16-25.
313. Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 70d(2), 52 Stat. 840, 881 (1938); see supra text accompa-
nying notes 131-34.
314. See Act of June 23, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-64, § 1, 73 Stat. 109.
315. REPORT OF COMMISSION OF THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R.
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This section was to apply after the "order for relief" and
therefore was to have a different application than section 70d(2)."1 6
The Commission recognized that undoubtedly the Supreme Court
would have invalidated any attempt to limit protection to transfers
before entry of the order of relief.31 7 Therefore, the Commission
reasoned that transfers made by banks and bailees after the order
of relief, but without knowledge of the petition, should be valid.
Under the Commission proposal, knowledge of the filing of an
involuntary petition would not have subjected the bank to liability.
Only knowledge that a voluntary petition had been filed or that
the order for relief in an involuntary case had been entered would
have subjected the bank to liability. The Commission also recom-
mended that protection be extended to other parties in addition to
banks. If the holding in Marin has any merit, the scope of protec-
tion should apply not only in favor of banks but also to other debt-
ors and bailees of the bankrupt. It certainly would be difficult to
defend a decision that limited protection only to banks because it
is known that bailees and other debtors are in similar positions.
The Commission's proposal did not protect the actual trans-
feree. For example, assume that farmer-bankrupt procured a nego-
tiable warehouse receipt by delivering grain to a warehouse. The
bankruptcy trustee then filed a constructive notice, and the farmer
made a postpetition transfer of the receipt to transferee "T." T in
turn, presented the receipt to the warehouse, which gave T the
grain.
In the above example, the warehouse would have been pro-
tected under the Commission proposal,""8 but the trustee would
have been able to recover against T.319 This mirrors the result
reached in Marin. In Marin, the drawee who honored checks
presented for collection by the payees was protected; the payees,
Doc. No. 93-137, Part II, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 162 (1973).
316. "Section 70d(2) protects a debtor of the bankrupt, e.g. a bank, insurance company,
or a bailee of his property who pays indebtedness or delivers property in good faith, but
only with respect to payments and deliveries prior to adjudication." Id. at 165.
317. "Despite the language in § 70d, the Supreme Court has extended protection to a
drawee bank after adjudication. Bank of Matin, v. England, 385 U.S. 99 (1966)." Id.
318. It seems clear that the warehouse was "holding money or property subject to with-
drawal or order of the debtor" and it paid "in good faith prior to knowledge of the filing of a
voluntary petition." Id. at 163.
319. The transfer of the receipt would have fallen under Commission section 4-605(a).
T would have been protected only if: 1) a public notice of bankruptcy had been filed; 2) T
did not know of the filing of the petition; and 3) T gave "reasonably equivalent value." Id.
at 162. For a complete text of the section and accompanying discussion, see supra notes
236-40 and accompanying text.
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however, were not.3 20
c. Section 542(c)
Section 542(c) reads:
[A]n entity that has neither actual notice nor actual knowledge
of the commencement of the case concerning the debtor may
transfer property of the estate, or pay a debt owing to the
debtor, in good faith . . . to an entity other than the trustee,
with the same effect as to the entity making such transfer or
payment as if the case under this title concerning the debtor
had not been commenced. 2
Section 542(c)'s language appears to broaden the number of
parties that are protected, at least more are protected than under
the Commission proposal. The code speaks in terms of "entities"
which "pay debts" or "transfer property of the estate." This lan-
guage is certainly broad enough to include banks 22 and bailees323
of the debtor's property.
The section protects only those parties holding "property" of
the estate. One case has held that the section does not cover a gov-
ernmental unit's transfer of a tax claim. A transfer of a claim
against the estate was held not to be the same as property of the
320. Marin, 385 U.S. at 102-03.
321. 11 U.S.C. § 542(c) (1982).
322. See Paralelo 42 Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Paralelo 42 Corp.), 18 Bankr. 433
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982). In Paralelo, a debtor in possession had opened two bank accounts
with a bank. One account had been closed prior to the filing of the petition. Nevertheless,
thirteen checks drawn on the closed account before the filing of the petition were honored
after the filing by the bank on the account that was still open. The bankruptcy court held
that, under the terms of the deposit contract, Florida law permitted the bank to honor
checks drawn on one account from funds in a separate account. Given the fact that the bank
had no knowledge of the filing of bankruptcy, the court held that the bank was protected
under section 542(c) as well.
Although the facts of the Paralelo case are somewhat unusual, the court correctly ap-
plied section 542(c). The bank was, in fact 1) an entity transfering property of the estate; 2)
with no notice or knowledge of the filing of bankruptcy; and 3) acting in good faith. The
thrust of the section is to permit banks to continue their usual banking practices until ac-
tual notice of bankruptcy. Assuming that the court correctly interpreted Florida law to the
effect that there was nothing irregular about honoring checks drawn on one account from
another account, the decision seems to support the goal of section 542(c). An opposite hold-
ing would have thwarted the bank's usual banking practice.
323. See, e.g., Larimore v. United States (In re Russell), 34 Bankr. 49 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1983) (indicating that section 542(c) could protect the I.R.S.'s return of an overpayment to
the debtors). Unfortunately for the I.R.S., however, the debtors had notified the I.R.S. in
writing of their bankruptcy, thereby giving the I.R.S. actual knowledge of bankruptcy and
taking it out of section 542(c)'s protection. The I.R.S.'s claim that it was entitled to formal
notice of the bankruptcy proceeding underwhelmed the court.
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estate. 24
Section 542(c) should not insulate parties who take estate
property after the petition. Only parties holding estate property at
the time of the petition are protected. Recently, the First Circuit
Court of Appeals appeared to hold that section 542(c) also protects
postpetition transferees of estate property.
In In re Smith Corset Shops, Inc.,32 the First Circuit applied
section 542(c) in a way that gave a postpetition transferee a de-
fense against a debtor-in-possession's conversion claim. In that
case, a tenant filed bankruptcy seeking relief under the reorganiza-
tion provisions of Chapter 11 of the 1978 code. Subsequent to the
petition, the debtor's landlord, who had no knowledge of the bank-
ruptcy, entered the premises and removed estate property pursu-
ant to a state statute allowing seizures in distress for nonpayment
of rent. The debtor sued the landlord for conversion and de-
manded that the property be returned. The landlord indicated
that he would return the goods if the conversion suit was dis-
missed, while at the same time he notified the bailee, to whom the
landlord had delivered the goods, to release them to the debtor.
The debtor contended that this refusal to unconditionally return
the property constituted a conversion.
The First Circuit drew an analogy between the landlord and
the Bank of Matin and held that the landlord had a defense to the
conversion suit under section 542(c). Moreover, the court deter-
mined that the policy ennunciated in section 542(c) provided a de-
fense, even though the landlord failed to unconditionally release
estate property after it learned of the petition. The court seemed
to be impressed with the landlord's good faith, so much so that it
notified the bailee of the goods to release them to the debtor. In
response to the insistence that the conversion suit be dropped, the
court stated that the landlord's attempt "to secure the termination
of the conversion action contemporaneously with release of the
goods was (not) sufficiently serious interference with the owner's
control to constitute a conversion .... 3
Whatever one thinks of the First Circuit's use of the Marin
precedent, it should be emphasized that there was no finding in
the case that the landlord was able to keep the property..One
would assume that the property was eventually returned. Regretta-
324. Young v. Critton (In re Young), 14 Bankr. 809 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1981).
325. 696 F.2d 971 (1st Cir. 1982).
326. Id. at 978.
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bly, the debtor's attorney stated in a letter that the debtor had in
fact never recovered the property.32 7 The original taking of the
goods was in violation of section 549(a)(1). At a minimum, the
landlord had a duty to return the property. Section 542(c) should
not be construed to reach a different result.
The 1978 code expressly rejects the assertion that the trans-
feree is immune from liability. Sections 549(a)(1) and 549(a)(2)(A)
make clear that the recipient of the section 542(c) transfer is liable
to the estate:
[T]he trustee may avoid a transfer of property of the estate-
(1) that occurs after the commencement of the case; and (2) (A)
that is authorized under section 542(c) of this title.3 28
Recall the example where a warehouse honored a warehouse re-
ceipt given to the warehouse without knowledge of bankruptcy and
transfered grain that was the subject of the receipt to its holder.
The warehouse would not be liable for conversion-section
542(c)-but the holder could be sued on a postpetition transfer
under section 549(a)(1) and 549(a)(2)(A). Under section 549(a)(1)
and(2), the trustee may avoid even those transfers authorized by
section 542(c). Section 542(c) only immunizes from liability banks
and other bailees who are the transferors of property. No immu-
nity is given to the transferee.
The case of In re Shepherd329 illustrates this relationship be-
tween section 542(c) and section 549. In Shepherd, the debtor had
authorized his employer to deduct funds from his salary and pay
those funds over to his credit union in order to reduce an out-
standing indebtedness. These deductions continued after the filing
of a bankruptcy petition. Both the employer and the creditor were
unaware of the filing of bankruptcy.
The bankruptcy judge ruled that section 542(c) protected the
employer, while the estate could recapture the transferred funds
from the credit union under section 549. The employer was clearly
a debtor of the bankrupt and therefore qualified for protection
under section 542(c). Although the transfer of funds to the credit
union was authorized under section 542(c), the estate under section
549(a)(1)(2)(A), could set aside transfers authorized under section
542(c).
327. Letter from Marshall F. Newnar, Esq. to Darrell Dunham, June 7, 1983.
328. 11 U.S.C. § 549(a) (1982) (amended 1984).
329. 12 Bankr. 151 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981).
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d. Section 542(d)
The insurance industry was apparently not satisfied with the
general protection afforded debtors and bailees of the bankrupt
under section 542(c). In certain cases, life insurance contracts or
state statutes require insurance companies to make a premium
payment or an automatic loan from the loan value of the policy in
order to prevent forfeiture due to a failure to make premium pay-
ments.330 As an example, assume a debtor misses a premium pay-
ment on his life insurance contract. Assume further that the policy
has an outstanding loan value that exceeds the amount of the
missed premium. This situation would place the policy in danger
of being forfeited. Some policies and statutes require the insurance
company to automatically loan the debtor funds from the policy's
loan value in order to make the premium payment and save the
policy from forfeiture." If such a loan is made after a bankruptcy
filing in order to keep the policy current, is the insurance company
protected?" 2
330. These automatic loan requirements may be created by contract or by statute. See,
e.g., Haut v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 430 Pa. 230, 241 A.2d 440 (1968) (cases construing an
automatic loan provision in the policy); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Tennen, 383 So. 2d 735 (Fla.
3d DCA 1980); Security Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Arenstein, 26 N.Y.2d 379, 258 N.E.2d 908, 310
N.Y.S.2d 491 (1970); see also Meyers v. State Farm Life Ins. Co., 416 S.W.2d 10, 18 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1967) (construing Missouri's non-forfeiture insurance statutes); Mo. REV. STAT. §§
376.630, 376.660 (1959). See generally COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D, §§ 32:157, 32:170 (1961).
331. Id.
332. In some cases, of course, the loan value or cash surrender value may be exempt
from the trustee's claim. Debtors may exempt insurance policies that are exempt under
"state law." See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) (1978). Although most state law insurance exemp-
tions are expansive in coverage, usually a blanket exemption is not available. Vukowich,
Debtors' Exemption Rights Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 58 N.C.L. REV. 769, 785-86
(1980). The Illinois exemption, for example, does not cover policies where the debtor's estate
is the beneficiary or cases where a non-spouse of independent means is the beneficiary. See
Schriar v. Mose (In re Schriar), 284 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1960); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 12-
1001(f) (1982). In addition to the state law exemptions, the drafters of the bankruptcy code
enacted a comprehensive list of federal exemptions that debtors can elect as an alternative
to the nonbankruptcy exemptions. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (1982). In particular, section
522(d)(8) provides that the debtor may exempt:
(8) The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed in value $4,000 less any
amount of property of the estate transferred in the manner specified in section
542(d) of this title, in any accrued dividend or interest under, or loan value of,
any unmatured life insurance contract owned by the debtor under which the
insured is the debtor or an individual or whom the debtor is a dependent.
11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(8) (1982) (emphasis added). Thus, if an automatic premium payment
protected by section 542(d) is made, the debtors insurance exemption is reduced by the
amount of the automatic loan.
The reader should also note that Congress empowered state legislatures to enact legisla-
tion preventing debtors domiciled in that state from electing the federal bankruptcy exemp-
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The 1978 code section 542(d) provides:
(d) A life insurance company may transfer property of the estate
or property of the debtor to such company in good faith, with
the same effect with respect to such company as if the case
under this title concerning the debtor had not been commenced,
if such transfer is to pay a premium or to carry out a nonforfeit-
ure insurance option, and is required to be made automatically,
under a life insurance contract with such company that was en-
tered into before the date of the filing of the petition and that is
property of the estate."' 3
Due to its component parts, the statute is limited in its effect.
First, only a "life insurance company" can be protected. Second, it
must be acting in "good faith." Third, the transfer must be made
to "pay a premium or to carry out a nonforfeiture option." Fourth,
the insurance company must be required to "automatically" make
the payment. Finally, the life insurance policy must be the "prop-
erty of the estate" and must have been "entered into before the
date of the filing of the petition."
One wonders why the insurance industry felt that it needed
the protection of section 542(d) at all. Cases such as Frederick v.
Fidelity Life Insurance Co.,334 for example, would fall within the
protection of section 542(c). In Frederick, the life insurance com-
pany made a postpetition transfer of the cash surrender value of a
life insurance contract to the debtor after bankruptcy was filed.
The Supreme Court held, given the company's lack of knowledge
of bankruptcy, the company should be protected from suit. A
Frederick-type case falls squarely within section 542(c). The com-
pany was a "debtor" of the bankrupt and would be paying the cash
surrender value in "good faith."
Typically, the legislative history 335 and other commentary s5 is
silent as to the need for a separate section. But two distinctions do
tions. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (1978). The constitutionality of state "opt out" legislation has
been questioned, but to date no court has ruled that the opt out provision is unconstitu-
tional. See, e.g., In re Sullivan, 680 F.2d 1131 (7th Cir. 1982); Rubenstein v. Sachs (In re
Locarno), 23 Bankr. 622 (Bankr. D. Md. 1982); Koffler, The Bankruptcy Clause and Ex-
emption Laws: A Re-examination of the Doctrine of Geographic Uniformity, 58 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 22 (1983); Comment, Bankruptcy Exemptions: Whether Illinois's Use of the Federal
'Opt Out' Provision is Constitutional, 1981 So. ILL. L.J. 65.
333. 11 U.S.C. § 542(d) (1982).
334. 256 U.S. 395 (1921); see supra text accompanying notes 83-86.
335. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 369-70 (1977); S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 84 (1978).
336. E.g., 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 542-15 (15th ed. 1982).
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exist in the forced premium loan case which may explain the insur-
ance industry's paranoia. First, in the technical sense, an insurance
company making a policy loan is not a "debtor" of the owner until
an election is affirmatively made to take the loan. Some cases ap-
plying state judicial enforcement statutes have held that there is
no indebtedness until the owner elects to borrow against the policy
or to cash it in.337 To be protected under section 542(c), the com-
pany must be a "debtor" of the bankrupt.
The second distinction is more convincing. The forced pre-
mium transaction is essentially a bookkeeping transfer of funds
within the insurance company itself. The books are changed to re-
flect that the premium has been paid and the loan values are re-
duced. A perceptive bankruptcy trustee might be tempted to argue
that the insurance company is nevertheless a "transferee" of the
funds. Thus, section 549 would permit the trustee to set aside
"transfers" that are nevertheless authorized under section 542(c).
Recall that under section 549(a)(1)(2)(A) the trustee may set aside
even those "transfers" that are authorized under section 542(c). 38
The trustee has no authority to set aside transfers authorized
under section 542(d). This argument would have placed the bank-
ruptcy court in a statutory quagmire, requiring the court to choose
between the policy of section 542(c) and that of section 549, a case
the insurance industry may have wished to avoid. Thus, the indus-
try may have insisted that a separate section 542(d) be created.
6. REAL PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS
a. Review of the Chandler Act
The law on real property transactions evolved quite differently
from personal property transactions. Case law prior to 1938 gener-
ally protected bona fide purchasers of realty who made the
purchase after the filing of bankruptcy,33 and this case law was
codified into the Chandler Act.140 The Chandler Amendment did,
however, require purchasers to check an additional record before
purchasing realty. If the realty was located in the county where a
petition in bankruptcy was filed, the filing of such a petition gave
337. E.g., Morphet v. Morphet, 19 Ill. App. 2d 304, 152 N.E.2d 492 (1958) (garnish-
ment); Fidelity Coal Co. v. Diamond, 322 Ill. App. 229, 54 N.E.2d 240 (1944) (creditor's bill).
338. See supra text accompanying notes 328-29.
339. See supra note 87.
340. Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 21g, 52 Stat. 840, 853 (1938). For the complete text of the
section, see supra note 148.
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constructive notice to purchasers of real property.34I Thus, pur-
chasers in those particular counties had to check, in addition to
state records, bankruptcy filings in the federal courthouse.
b. The Commission Bill
The Commission bill did not propose separate treatment for
different types of transferees. All were to be treated the same
whether they were transferees of tangible or intangible personality,
transferees of negotiable paper or currency, or transferees of realty.
The real property transferees, like the others, were to be pro-
tected if: 1) the transfer occurred before the filing of a notice; 2)
the transferee was unaware of the bankruptcy filing; and 3) "the
transferee gave a reasonably equivalent present value. '" 42 Even if
less than "reasonably equivalent value" was given, the transferees
were to be "reimbursed for the present value given, ' ' " assuming
that the transfers occurred before the filing of a notice and were
made without notice of bankruptcy.
As to realty, the Commission bill indicated that notice was to
be filed "in the office or offices designated by state law for the fil-
ing or recording of a document in order to perfect a security inter-
est in ... real property, or fixtures. 34 4 Thus, the Commission pro-
posal was a reaffirmation of the prior law that bona fide purchasers
should prevail against the trustee even if the transfer took place
after the filing of a bankruptcy petition.
There is one salient change; the filing of a petition would act
as constructive notice to purchasers of realty located in the county
where the petition was filed. The statute required filing as pro-
vided under "state law." If the Commission bill had been passed,
those who searched for records of realty transactions could have
limited their search to state records only. 4
5
c. The House Bill and the Senate Bill
Unlike the treatment of other postpetition issues, the House
bill3 46 and Senate bill3 47 introduced in 1977 contained significant
341. Id; see In re Kabbage, 93 F. Supp. 515 (N.D. Ohio 1950).
342. Supra note 298, at 162. For a complete text of the section, see supra note 240.
343. Id.
344. Id. at § 4-605(c)(1) (emphasis added).
345. Unless, of course, the mere rendition of a judgment operates as a lien in which case
record searchers must search for federal court judgments as well. See infra note 375.
346. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
347. S. 2266, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
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variations from the final product.
House bill section 342 (b) read:
(b) The filing of a copy of the petition in a case under this title
in the office where conveyances of real property are recorded in
a county in which is located real property in which the estate
has an interest is constructive notice of the commencement of
such case with respect to transfers of real property located in
such county. A judicial sale of real property in which the estate
has an interest, located other than in the county in which such
case is commenced, is not affected by the commencement of
such case unless such constructive notice has been given as pro-
vided in this subsection in the county in which such real prop-
erty is located. 4 s
Senate bill section 342(b), (c) read:
(b) The filing of a copy of the petition in a case under this title
in the office where conveyances of real property are recorded in
a county in which is located real property in which the estate
has an interest is constructive notice of the commencement of
such case with respect to transfers of real property located in
such county. A sale of real property to a purchaser without ei-
ther actual or constructive notice of the commencement of the
case is not affected by this title.
(c) A judicial sale of real property in which the estate has an
interest, located other than in the county in which such case is
commenced, is not affected by the commencement of such case
unless such constructive notice has been given as provided in
this subsection in the county in which such real property is
located.3 49
Both bills indicated that a filing in the county where the real
estate was located provided constructive notice. A bankruptcy fil-
ing in the county where the realty was located would not have
amounted to constructive notice under the Commission propo-
sal.360 Prior law specifically required title searches in the county
where the bankruptcy court was located in order to check the
bankruptcy filing.351
The approach suggested by the Senate and House also raised
two additional questions. First, would actual knowledge of a bank-
348. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 39-40 (1977).
349. S. 2266, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 38-39 (1977).
350. See supra text accompanying notes 344-45.
351. See supra text accompanying notes 154-55.
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ruptcy filing by a private purchaser of realty bar that purchaser
from protection? The House bill was silent on this question, but
the Senate bill affirmatively stated that sales would not be valid in
favor of purchasers having "actual or constructive notice of the
commencement of the case."
The second issue was even more perplexing: would actual no-
tice of the commencement of a bankruptcy case defeat the title of
a judicial purchaser? Both bills appeared to indicate that actual
knowledge would not have defeated the rights of the judicial pur-
chaser, only the filing of a notice giving constructive knowledge
would have defeated that purchaser's rights. The bills, in identical
language, provided that the judicial sale was valid "unless ... con-
structive notice has been given. '352 Given the Senate bill's provi-
sion that actual notice would defeat the purchaser of realty whose
claim to the property was from a private sale, the inference was
inescapable that the Senate and House intended that actual
knowledge of the commencement of a case would not have de-
feated a judicial sale purchaser. Neither bill affirmatively stated
that actual notice would defeat the judicial purchaser, unlike the
Senate bill, which did so in the case of a private purchaser.
The distinction between purchasers of realty from judicial and
private sales is based on the dubious rationale of a need to protect
the integrity of judicial sales and to encourage high bids in this
arena. This disparate treatment is discussed below.353
d. Section 549(c) of the 1978 Code
The 1978 code's treatment of real property transactions
marked a return to the format and policy of the Chandler Act. A
separate section for real property transactions was created. Simi-
larly, bankruptcy filings still gave rise to constructive notice for
purchasers of real property, when such property was located in the
county where the bankruptcy petition was filed. Section 549(c) of
the 1978 code read:
The trustee may not avoid under subsection (a) of this sec-
tion a transfer, to a good faith purchaser without knowledge of
the commencement of the case and for present fair equivalent
value or to a purchaser at a judicial sale, of real property located
352. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); S. 2266, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
353. See Rochelle, III & Feder, Unauthorized Sales of a Debtor's Property: The Rights
of a Purchaser Under Section 549 of the Bankruptcy Code, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 23, 34
(1983), discussed infra text accompanying notes 368-71.
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other than in the county in which the case is commenced, unless
a copy of the petition was filed in the office where conveyances
of real property in such county are recorded before such transfer
was so far perfected that a bona fide purchaser of such property
against whom applicable law permits such transfer to be per-
fected cannot acquire an interest that is superior to the interest
of such good faith or judicial sale purchaser. A good faith pur-
chaser, without knowledge of the commencement of the case and
for less than present fair equivalent value, of real property lo-
cated other than in the county in which the case is commenced,
under a transfer that the trustee may avoid under this section,
has a lien on the property transferred to the extent of any pre-
sent value given, unless a copy of the petition was so filed before
such transfer was so perfected. 54
Under the 1978 code, section 549 provided that the trustee
under section 549 could not avoid transfers of real property made
"to a good faith purchaser without knowledge of the commence-
ment of the case" where "present equivalent value" had been paid.
The trustee could set aside real estate transfers if a copy of the
petition was filed in the appropriate records for real estate. As was
true under the Commission bill, good faith transferees paying less
than "present equivalent value" were provided a lien355 on the
property to the extent of the value given.
The protection given the good faith transferee extended only
to "real property located other than in the county in which the
case is commenced." Record searchers in counties where bank-
ruptcy petitions were filed had to continue to check the bank-
ruptcy filings before title was approved. 356 The reason for rejecting
the provisions of both the House and Senate bills in this regard
was not stated.
The issues discussed above were clear-cut and basically old
hat. In addition, however, note that the drafters of the 1978 code
also chose to extend protection to a new type of transferee. Section
549(c), in addition to the good faith purchaser, also protected "a
354. 11 U.S.C. § 549(c) (1982) (amended 1984).
355. The Commission proposal suggested that transferees that give less than full value
be "reimbursed" to the extent of value given. See supra note 240 for the complete text of
the section. The 1978 code expressly provides for a "lien." In both instances, however, the
effect should be the giving of a lien on the property. See supra note 290.
356. See Mongiove v. Browne (In re Mongiove), 9 Bankr. 34 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980)
(holding that due to the fact that the debtor's Chapter 13 petition was filed in the county
where purchased real property was located, section 549(c) does not protect a judicial sale
purchaser).
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purchaser at a judicial sale." In this respect the 1978 version of
section 549(c) carried forward the suggestion of the House and
Senate bills. Allowing protection for judicial purchasers caused
problems for the bankruptcy courts which has apparently caused
Congress to rethink its position.3 57
A typical fact pattern that has confronted bankruptcy courts
can be described as follows: Secured party commences foreclosure
proceedings. Sometime prior to the judicial purchaser's receipt of a
judicial deed, the debtor files bankruptcy in order to secure the
benefits of the automatic stay provisions set out in section 362358 of
the 1978 code. The secured party (who may"' or may not be360
aware of the bankruptcy filing) presses forward with the foreclo-
sure, and the purchaser pays good value for the property while be-
ing completely unaware of the filing of bankruptcy." '
Some courts correctly relied upon section 549(c)'s unambigu-
ous language and ruled that the purchaser prevailed. 2  Problems
357. See infra text accompanying notes 372-81 (discussing Senate Bill 445).
358. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982). Specifically, section 362(a)(1) stays enforcement of judi-
cial proceedings against the debtor. Section (a)(2) stays the enforcement of judgments, sec-
tion (a)(3) stays acts to obtain possession of estate property, and section (a)(4) stays actions
to enforce liens.
359. E.g., Russell v. Equibank (In re Russell), 8 Bankr. 342 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1980); In
re Wheeler, 5 Bankr. 600 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980); see also In re Wilson, 19 Bankr. 45
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) (holding the sheriff in contempt of court for issuing a deed to the
property, where the unfortunate sheriff had relied upon the legal opinion of the secured
party's attorney that he might issue the deed and not violate the bankruptcy laws).
360. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. McGowan (In re McGowan), 19 Bankr. 952
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982); Advance Mortgage Corp. v. Dennis (In re Dennis), 14 Bankr. 125
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981).
361. Cf. Lugo v. De Jesus (In re De Jesus), 20 Bankr. 19 (Bankr. D.P.R. 1982) (holding
that a judicial purchaser who had been orally informed of the bankruptcy prior to the sale
was not protected under section 549(c)). The holding in De Jesus is questionable. The judi-
cial purchaser's knowledge of bankruptcy does not deprive him of protection. See infra text
accompanying notes 368-71.
362. E.g., Stone Mountain Acceptance Corp. v. Colevins (In re Colevins), 13 Bankr. 645
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981) (holding that a judicial purchaser who was unaware of the bank-
ruptcy filing prevails over the debtor); cf. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. McGowan (In re
McGowan), 19 Bankr. 952 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982). In McGowan, the mortgagee bid in its
debt at the foreclosure sale. The court held, without discussion, that the mortgagee qualified
for "judicial purchaser" protection under section 549(c). A distinction should be made be-
tween cases like Colevins and cases like McGowan. The purchaser in Colevins gave new
value and is more deserving of protection. The mortgagee in McGowan simply substituted
an antecedent debt for title to the property. See In re Penfil, 40 Bankr. 474, 477 (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. 1984) (holding that a mortgage bidding in the amount of the debt did not pay
"present fair equivalent value"). Secured parties can be amply protected by reinstating their
security on the property and requiring that they be "adequately protected" as required by
section 362(d)(1). See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (1978). See generally Price, Adequate Protec-
tion Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, 71 Ky. L. J. 727 (1982-83). The need for a distinc-
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arose, however, when the sheriff or secured party learned of the
bankruptcy and refused to tender a deed to a purchaser who had
nevertheless paid good value. In the meantime, the trustee re-
corded a copy of the petition in the state records. The statute
plainly indicated that a purchase from a judicial sale was not pro-
tected if a bona fide purchaser could have acquired "an interest
that is superior to the interest of [the] . . . judicial sale pur-
chaser '"363 as of the commencement of the case.
The case of In re Russells " demonstrates the problems section
tion is even more compelling in cases where the property sold at judicial sale is necessary to
successfully reorganize the debtor in a Chapter 11 or Chapter 13 case. The mortgagee should
not be able to defeat the reorganization plan by buying the property at its own foreclosure
sale.
A third group of cases may occur where the creditor buys the property and assigns its
rights to a third party. In Administrator of Veterans Affairs v. Bernard (In re Bernard), 9
BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 601, 21 Bankr. 287 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982), a judgment creditor bid-
in its judgment at execution sale and then assigned its bid to the Veteran's Administration.
The court held that the VA was entitled to the protection of section 549(c). Because the VA
was merely the assignee of the creditor's bid, it would seem that the VA ordinarily would be
in no better a position than the creditor. Thus, because the creditor should not be protected
as a "judicial purchaser," for it merely bid-in its old debt, the VA, arguably, should not have
been protected either. It does seem, however, that the VA, as a "subsequent transferee"
would be entitled to the more limited benefits of section 550(b), which immunizes subse-
quent transferees of estate property from the trustee's avoidance powers. For further discus-
sion concerning section 550(b), see infra text accompanying notes 473-82.
363. 11 U.S.C. § 549(c) (1982) (amended 1984). For a text of the section, see supra text
accompanying note 354; see also Advance Mortgage Corp. v. Dennis (In re Dennis), 14
Bankr. 125 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981), (The court held that the purchaser is not protected
under section 549(c) because a hypothetical bona fide purchaser under Pennsylvania law
could have defeated the purchaser's interest. The purchaser had not received a deed to the
property pursuant to the judicial sale, and the court ruled that the delivery of a properly
acknowledged deed was necessary to protect the purchaser against a subsequent bona fide
purchaser.).
Cf. In re Wheeler, 5 Bankr. 600 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980) (holding that a purchaser at a
judicial sale who had received a deed prior to actual knowledge of a bankruptcy filing was
not protected). The court reasoned that at the time of the filing of the petition the deed had
not been delivered; and therefore, the subsequent delivery was void in violation of the auto-
matic stay. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982). "That is, there was, at the time that the automatic stay
went into effect, property of the estate in the real estate in question." Wheeler, 5 Bankr. at
604. The court apparently overlooked the provision in the statute that required that the
rights of the judicial purchaser be tested against a hypothetical bona fide purchaser at the
time "a copy of the petition was filed in the office where conveyances ... in such county are
recorded." 11 U.S.C. 549(c) (1982) (amended 1984). In Wheeler, the purchaser received a
deed barely an hour after the filing of the petition. At that time, a copy of the petition
probably had not been filed in the county. The result in the Wheeler case could have been
achieved without ignoring the provisions of the statute by noting that the secured party
itself was the "purchaser" at the judicial sale. It is questionable that a secured party bid-
ding-in the value of its debt should be protected under section 549(c) in the same way that a
purchaser giving new value is. See supra discussion note 362.
364. Russell v. Equibank (In re Russell), 8 Bankr. 342 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1980).
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549(c) posed in cases of judicial foreclosure. In that case, a secured
party pressed forward with a mortgage foreclosure despite know-
ledge that the debtors had filed a bankruptcy petition. Calisti pur-
chased the property at the foreclosure sale for approximately one-
twentieth of the debtor's original purchase price.365 Nevertheless,
Calisti, unlike the mortgagee, was unaware of the bankruptcy fil-
ing. Before a sheriff's deed could be issued, the bankruptcy court
issued a rule to show cause why the sale could not be set aside.
The court held for the debtors and ruled that Calisti was not
protected by section 549(c). While the court conceded that, under
state law, Calisti had acquired an interest in real property, that
interest was not "so far perfected" that it could not have been de-
feated by a bona fide purchaser who made the purchase as of the
commencement of the case as required by the statute. Calisti had
not yet received a deed, and therefore his interest was in jeopardy.
Thus, Calisti's rights were subordinated to those of the debtors in
possession. The court's reasoning on this point is helpful in under-
standing the problem:
Accordingly, the innocent purchaser is not entitled to the pro-
tection of section 549(c). The Court is prevented under the
Bankruptcy Code in cases involving postpetition transfers from
assessing the relative equities of the parties. Section 549(c) out-
lines a method that arbitrarily chooses between the interests of
the innocent purchaser and the creditors of the debtor. The
debtor-in-possession, who is accorded the status of a bona fide
purchaser, takes priority over a purchaser at a judicial sale, if
the debtor-in-possession intervenes to vacate the sale prior to
the purchaser's compliance with the technical requirements of
state law. 11 U.S.C. § 549(c) (amended July 10, 1984).366
In the Russell case, Calisti was not even permitted to recover
his purchase price. Moreover, it appears that this was a correct in-
terpretation of section 549(c). Although the last sentence of that
section provided for a lien "to the extent of any present value
given," the lien was given only to "good faith purchasers," not to
judicial purchasers.
The Russell case also illustrated a gross inconsistency within
the Bankruptcy Code itself. In deciding to proceed with the fore-
closure sale, the secured party violated the Bankruptcy Code's au-
365. The debtors had purchased the property for approximately $77,000 in 1977. Calisti
was the high bidder for $3,200 at sale held on April 7, 1980. Id. at 343.
366. Id. at 345.
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tomatic stay provisions. Actions taken in violation of the stay are
"void. ' 36 7 Yet, section 549(c) provided that judicial purchasers
were given title to property purchased under a proceeding that was
void.
Section 549(c) of the 1978 code carried forward the original
1977 Senate proposal 68 that actual knowledge by a judicial pur-
chaser of a bankruptcy filing would not defeat his title. Further-
more, a literal reading of the statute indicated that a purchaser
having such knowledge needed only to pay a fraction of the true
value of the property and would still be protected. Section 549(c)
protected: 1) "a good faith purchaser without knowledge of the
commencement of the case" who paid "present fair equivalent
value" and 2) a "purchaser at a judicial sale." The requirements
that the purchase be made in good faith or that he pay value were
not imposed on the judicial purchaser. Thus, one court in dictum
observed that "it does not appear from a reading of section 549(c)
that knowledge of the filing of a bankruptcy case is a consideration
where the purchase is made in a judicial sale."3 9 Nor did it appear
that he had to pay any significant value. It only appeared that he
had to be a "purchaser," whatever that entailed.
However bizarre this result may appear to be, recall that it is
precisely the result proposed by the Senate in 1977. Thus, a pur-
chaser at a judicial sale paying only a fractional value should have
been protected under the 1978 section because this was precisely
the result that Congress intended.
The wisdom of making any distinction between the judicial
and non-judicial purchaser was based on a desire to protect the
integrity of judicial sales. Rumors abound at such sales and the
attendant fears that people will not bid. Mr. William Rochelle and
Ms. Gwen Feder observed:
If the rule were otherwise, bidding at judicial sales would be
chilled any time there was a rumor that the owner of the prop-
erty had filed a petition. Rumors about bankruptcy must be
taken seriously because petitions are often filed on the eve of a
foreclosure sale. If the bidding were chilled and the rumor
367. See generally Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Hall, 685 F.2d 1306, 1308 (11th
Cir. 1982) (actions taken in violation of automatic stay are void and without effect); In re
Johnson, 18 Bankr. 755 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982) (creditor's lack of "official" notification
from court of debtors' Chapter 7 case was no defense to finding that a violation of automatic
stay occurred); 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 362.11 (15th ed. 1983).
368. See supra text accompanying notes 346-53.
369. In re Edwards, 2 BANKR. CT. DEC. 2D (CRR) 1027 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1980).
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proved false, whoever purchased the property would enjoy a
windfall at the expense of the foreclosing mortgagee, the owner,
and the prospective bidders who had dropped out as a conse-
quence of the rumor. Indeed, to purchase the property at a bar-
gain price, an unscrupulous bidder at a foreclosure sale could
spread a false rumor that the property owner had filed a
petition.7 0
There Js a basic flaw in their analysis. It assumes that such
purchasers are currently protected. Caveat emptor, however, gov-
erns judicial sales, as the purchaser routinely assumes the risk of
failure of title or sale irregularity. 71 There is wisdom in this lack of
protection. Until non-bankruptcy law changes in this regard, there
is little need for protection where failure of title is due to a filing of
bankruptcy. This is especially true when the trustee can establish
that the purchaser had actual knowledge of the filing. Even less
sympathy can be mustered for a purchaser who not only has
knowledge of the bankruptcy filing, but based on this knowledge,
bids only a fraction of the property's actual worth.
e. The 1984 Amendment
On February 3, 1983, a bill was introduced in the Senate enti-
tled the "Omnibus Bankruptcy Improvements Act of 1983. ' '372
Most of the amendments are technical in nature3 73 but there are
also occasional changes in the substantive import of particular sec-
tions. In fact, a substantial amendment has been made to section
549(c). As amended July 10, 1985, section 549(c) reads:
(c) The trustee may not avoid under subsection (a) of this sec-
tion a transfer of real property to a good faith purchaser without
knowledge of the commencement of the case and for present fair
equivalent value unless a copy or notice of the petition was filed,
where a transfer of such real property may be recorded to per-
370. Rochelle, III & Feder, Unauthorized Sales of a Debtor's Property: The Rights of a
Purchaser Under Section 549 of the Bankruptcy Code, 57 Am. BANKR. L.J. 23, 34-35 (1983).
371. See infra authorities cited note 379.
372. S. 445, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), the text of which was incorporated into S.
1013, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
373. For example, the 1978 version of section 549(c) talked about the place where real
estate conveyances "are" recorded. The new amendment describes the place where convey-
ances "may" be recorded. The old section described transfers that were "so far perfected"
while the amendment substitutes "so perfected." The reader may also note that the second
sentence of section 549(c) used to give the transferee a lien under stated conditions for
transfers that "the trustee may avoid under this section." See supra text accompanying note
354. The amendment retains the lien but omits the quoted language.
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fect such transfer, before such transfer is so perfected that a
bona fide purchaser of such property, against whom applicable
law permits such transfer to be perfected, could not acquire an
interest that is superior to the interest of such good faith pur-
chaser. A good faith purchaser without knowledge of the com-
mencement of the case and for less than present fair equivalent
value has a lien on the property transferred to the extent of any
present value given, unless a copy or notice of the petition was
so filed before such transfer was so perfected. 74
There were two significant changes made in section 549(c). First,
the reference to "real property other than in the county in which
the case is commenced" was omitted. Secondly, and more impor-
tantly, the protection given judicial sale purchasers was withdrawn.
The problem regarding realty located in the county where
bankruptcy is filed has a curious history. Under the Chandler Act,
such a filing gave notice to purchasers. The Commission proposed
that such bankruptcy filings do not give notice, but the drafters of
the 1978 code refused to follow this recommendation and legislated
that such filings gave constructive notice. The 1984 amendment
once again reversed this position. It provides that bankruptcy fil-
ings do not give constructive notice to purchasers of real estate in
the county where the bankruptcy petition is filed.
It seems that the Commission's and Senate's position was
stronger. First, the rights of the purchaser who checks state real
estate records should not have to depend on the location of the
property. Second, the basic rationale for the real estate exception
is based on a desire to protect parties who rely upon state real
estate records in the same way as former purchasers have histori-
cally done. Requiring the check of an additional record seems to
defeat the purpose for the exception. In addition, the extra burden
involved in checking another record of the purchaser's agent far
outweighs the convenience to the estate of not having to make a
state real estate filing at all. Federal courthouses are not always
situated next to the office or courthouse where state filings are
made. Title searchers doing business in the county of the federal
courthouse must check those records that searchers in adjacent
counties are not required to check. Of course, in a few states the
mere recovery of a judgment has the effect of a lien on real es-
tate.3 75 There is no filing requirement. In those states, federal judg-
374. S. 445, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 93-94 (1983), the text of which was incorporated into
S. 1013, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 125-26 (1983).
375. IND. CODE § 34-1-45-2 (1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2202(a) (1983); see also In re
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ments operate as a lien as well."'0 Title searchers, while at the fed-
eral courthouse, can also check bankruptcy filings. But these states
are the exception, and a uniform bankruptcy policy suggests that
there be just one filing policy governing all bankruptcies.
The argument for removing the protection afforded to pur-
chasers at judicial sales is even more compelling. In many cases it
is the debtor's desire to stop a foreclosure sale that is the raison
d'etre for the bankruptcy filing. Therefore, Congress provided that
judicial creditors were stayed from foreclosing on the debtor's
property."' The 1984 amendment also removes the logical incon-
sistency that one can attain clear title from a sale that is void. Re-
call that sales in violation of the automatic stay are void.378
Purchasers at judicial sales are on notice that the rule of ca-
veat emptor applies to such sales.37 9 If the sale is declared void,
the purchaser is subrogated to the position of the foreclosing credi-
tor. 380 Although such a policy discourages high bids at judicial
sales, the law in this area is well established. Judicial purchasers
are therefore on notice that in case of sale irregularity, they may
have purchased nothing. Accordingly, they may be subordinated to
the foreclosing creditor's judgment, which may amount to a mere
right to file a bankruptcy claim.
At a minimum, if the protection given to judicial purchasers is
to continue, Congress should make clear that parties who bid the
value of their security are not necessarily "purchasers" as defined
in the section. Such secured parties should be protected by rein-
stating their lien. Section 549(c) should not permit secured party
Fornabai, 227 F. Supp. 928, 931 (D.N.J. 1964) (construing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:16-1 (West
1982) to accord a lien upon docketing of the judgment).
376. 28 U.S.C. § 1962 (1977) makes a federal court judgment a lien on property "in the
same manner, to the same extent and under the same conditions" as a state judgment. See,
e.g., Hamilton Steel Prod., Inc. v. Yorke, 376 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1967); Knapp v. McFarland,
462 F.2d 935 (2d Cir. 1972); Sun Bank v. Snell (In re Cone), 11 Bankr. 925 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1981).
377. Section 362(a)(2) stays "the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of
estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case." 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(2)
(1982).
378. See authorities cited supra note 365.
379. See Annot., 68 A.L.R. 659 (1930); FREEMAN, Freeman on Executions §§ 301, 335
(1878); see also, Dixon v. City Nat'l Bank, 81 Ill. 2d 429, 410 N.E.2d 843 (1980) (at an
execution sale, absent fraud, misrepresentation or mistake of fact, doctrine of caveat emptor
applies); Henry v. Slack, 86 Ga. App. 198, 71 S.E.2d 96 (1952) (a purchaser at a judicial sale
is bound to take notice of an excessive levy); Martens v. Martens, 234 Iowa 519, 12 N.W.2d
201 (1944) (maxim of "caveat emptor" applies to a sale under execution).
380. See Dixon v. City Nat'l Bank, 81 Ill. 2d 429, 433, 410 N.E.2d 843, 845 (1980). Note,
Real Property: Implied Warranty on Execution Sale, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 205 (1921).
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purchasers, who have not given new value, to defeat the purpose of
the automatic stay.38 1
7. IMPLIED REVOCATION OF AUTHORITY
Recall that the Court in Marin also suggested that the filing of
bankruptcy should not, in and of itself, revoke the bank's authority
to honor checks.3 2 In a prior section of this article that discussed
the Chandler Act, it was suggested that this concept could have
been extended to various agency relationships. 3 The doctrine that
the filing of bankruptcy does not automatically revoke the agent's
authority did enjoy a following in several lower federal court cases.
All of these cases, however, involved bank-checks and insurance
policies.3"4
With the promulgation of the 1978 code, is there anything left
of the defense that the agent may continue to act for the bankrupt
principal until the agent receives notice of bankruptcy? This de-
fense has possible application in cases not falling within the nar-
rowly drafted exceptions for banks, insurance companies, and
other bailees codified in sections 542(c) 3 88 and (d). 8' One clear case
where such an argument would be of value would be the classic
situation of the bankruptcy of an undisclosed principal who does
not bother to tell his agent of his bankruptcy. Does the agent con-
tinue to have authority, or is his authority automatically revoked
by the principal's bankruptcy?
What little evidence is available about Congressional intent
suggests that the agent's authority expires upon the filing of the
petition. Congress was acutely aware of the Marin case, to the ex-
tent that it drafted section 542(c) in 1978 to cover its precise facts.
Presumably, then, it must have also been aware of the alternative
rationale that the bank's authority to honor the checks should con-
tinue.3 87 It, nevertheless, chose to legislate a different solution by
giving the banks a carefully drafted exception that would fit its
precise needs. It certainly could be argued that in selecting a nar-
row solution to the problem, Congress thereby rejected any possi-
381. See infra note 476.
382. Marin, 385 U.S. at 102.
383. See supra text accompanying notes 156-66.
384. See cases cited supra note 162.
385. See supra text accompanying notes 321-29.
386. See supra text accompanying notes 330-38.
387. Recall that several cases held that the bank or insurance company's authority was
not revoked by the debtor's bankruptcy filing. See cases cited supra note 162.
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ble broader resolution. Congress could have provided that an
agent's authority continued until he received notice of the
bankruptcy.
The above rationale may well extend the sometimes artificial
process of determining Congressional "intent" beyond all bounds
of propriety. The suggested solution, however, may in fact further
existing policy. In regard to section 549(a), Congress has enunci-
ated a policy that favors the estate over the good faith postpetition
transferee. Innocent transferees who deal with the debtor's agent
have no additional equities that justify special treatment over
those transferees who deal with the debtor directly. Regardless of
an agent's participation, courts should be reluctant to carve out a
judicial exception to the intended results that are achieved by ap-
plication of section 549(a).
C. "Title"
Section 541(a)(1) marks a significant departure from the
Chandler Act's definition of estate property:
Such estate is comprised of all the following property, wherever
located: (1) . . . all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in
property as of the commencement of the case .... "I
Section 541(a) offers a significant departure in light of Con-
gress's decision to absorb all property of value into the estate,3 89
and because of its decision to abandon "title" as the point of de-
marcation. Under prior law, 390 the trustee had to establish that, at
388. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1982).
389. See, e.g., Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 24 Bankr. 305 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa
1982). In Graham, the estate was able to recover the debtor's $150,000 investment in a
pension fund that was tax exempt under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA). The court reached this result even though the pension fund could not be assigned
or alienated. Contra In re Harter, 10 Bankr. 272 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1981). The Harter case,
unfortunately, relied upon authority interpreting the Chandler Act and concluded that mili-
tary retirement benefits were not "property" of the estate because the funds were needed
for the bankrupt's "fresh start." The fresh start approach, however, is rejected in the new
code's legislative history. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 368 (1977); see also
Abney v. Hicks (In re Hicks), 22 Bankr. 243 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1982) (holding that a contin-
gent remainder in real estate is property of the estate); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v.
Morgan (In re Morgan), 23 Bankr. 700, 9 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 926 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982)
(holding that the bankrupt's equity of redemption in a repossessed automobile is property
of the bankruptcy estate).
390. The trustee usually employed section 70a(5) of the Chandler Act to bring property
into the estate. That provision generally required that the property in question be subject to
judicial powers, assignable, or transferable. Chandler Act ch. 575, § 70a(5), 52 Stat. 840, 880
(1938).
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the date of the filing of the petition, the property: 1) could have
been levied upon and sold under judicial process, or otherwise be
seized, impounded, or sequestered, 9' or 2) was assignable by the
debtor.39 1
Additionally, the Supreme Court in interpreting prior law had
developed a special bankruptcy definition of "property." Interests
that ordinarily would have been considered property were held not
to be "property" in bankruptcy. The statute was interpreted with
the aim of giving the bankrupt a "fresh start."' 93
The Court's decision in Lines v. Frederick94 exemplifies the
bankruptcy definition of "property." In Lines, the Court held that
accrued vacation pay accountable for prepetition work did not
come into the estate. The Court reasoned that these funds may
have been necessary to enable the bankrupt to start a new finan-
cial life. Both the House and Senate reports to new section
541(a)(1), however, leave no doubt as to how the 1978 code is to be
interpreted: "Paragraph (1) . . . has the effect of overruling Lines
v. Frederick.'"39
For our purposes, however, the 1978 code's disinclination to
accept the concept of "title" requires an even more thorough inves-
391. See Suskin & Berry, Inc. v. Rumley, 37 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1930), where the court
addressed the issue of whether a testamentary interest should pass to the trustee. The court
held that the bankrupt's interest did not pass to the trustee because it was merely a contin-
gent remainder and thus, under the law of the state, could not be levied upon or sold for the
debts of the remainderman. Further, the court found that the will created a valid spend-
thrift trust which could not be reached by the creditors of the beneficiary-bankrupt. See
also In re Berry, 247 F. 700 (E.D. Mich. 1917), where land acquired by the bankrupt
through contract of purchase by debtor and his wife was an interest by the entirety in real
property. As such, state law prohibited the interest from being levied upon and sold under
judicial process. Consequently, such interest could not pass to the trustee in the bankruptcy
proceeding.
392. See Chicago Board of Trade v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 1 (1924) (holding under a prede-
cessor statute to the Chandler Act, that a seat on the Chicago Board of Trade belonged to
the estate, even though an exchange rule permitted any exchange member to block the
transfer if an outstanding debt had not been paid). The Court noted that the statute pro-
vided that the estate took the property if transferable "by any means." Since the seat was
transferable, under stated conditions, it belonged to the estate. See also In re Quaker Room,
90 F. Supp. 758 (S.D. Cal. 1950) (holding that a liquor license which was transferable only
by permission of the state liquor authority belonged to the estate); cf. Christison v. Jones,
83 Ill. App. 3d 334, 405 N.E.2d 8 (1980) (holding that a claim for legal malpractice did not
belong to the estate because it was not assignable under state law).
393. Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U.S. 459, 473 (1913).
394. 400 U.S. 18 (1970); cf. Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642 (1974) (tax refund based
upon prepetition earnings constitutes "property"); Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375 (1966)
(loss carryback refund based upon prepetition losses is "property" of the estate).
395. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 367-68 (1978); S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th
Cong., 2nd Sess. 82-83 (1978).
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tigation. Certainly the drafters of the Bankruptcy Code were aware
of the reduced emphasis given "title" in the Uniform Commercial
Code,390 as well as the increased reliance upon "special property
interests. 39 7 Was the abandonment of "title" intended as a sign of
approval for the special property rights that are permitted under
the Uniform Commercial Code?
The present bankruptcy code was initially the product of the
Bankruptcy Reform Commission.3 9 8 The "Commission Bill" pro-
vided that the debtor's bankruptcy estate was to be comprised of
"all property of the debtor as of the date of the petition. 3 99
Although the reason for the changes in language from the
Commission Bill and present section 541(a)(1) is not set forth in
the legislative history, both bills are consistent in abandoning "ti-
tle" and bringing "all property" into the estate. The Commission
Report indicated that the word "title" was not employed "as a
matter of style."
As a matter of style, the concept of "vesting title by operation of
law" is replaced by the statement that certain property is "prop-
erty of the estate." Property of the estate is basically property
owned by the debtor at the date of the petition .... "'0
The legislative history does not specifically address the validity of
U.C.C. special property claims over goods that are property of the
estate. But, the Senate and House Reports do mention the cash
seller's "trust" interest under the federal Packer's and Stockyard's
Act:40
This section . . . also will not affect various statutory provisions
that give a creditor of the debtor a lien that is valid outside as
well as inside bankruptcy or that creates a trust fund for the
benefit of a creditor of the debtor. See Packers and Stockyards
396. For example, Professor Kennedy, thoroughly familiar with the U.C.C., served as
executive director for the Commission. See, e.g., Kennedy, The Trustee in Bankruptcy
Under The Uniform Commercial Code: Some Problems Suggested by Articles 2 and 9, 14
RUTGERS L. REV. 518 (1960).
397. See supra text accompanying notes 198-204.
398. See supra note 236.
399. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES,
HR. Doc. No. 93-137 Part II, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. § .4-601 (1973).
400. Id. at 149.
401. Packers and Stockyards Act § 206, 7 U.S.C. § 196 (1978); see In re Frosty Morn
Meats, Inc., 7 Bankr. 988, 996-97, 1005-07 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980) (upholding the validity
of the "trust" challenged by the stockyard's trustee in bankruptcy in a proceeding under the
Chandler Act, where the trustee claimed that the trust was void as a statutory lien under
section 67c(1) of the Chandler Act). See discussion at text accompanying notes 217-20. For
further discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 416-24.
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Act section 206, 7 U.S.C. § 196.02
If Congress can statutorily protect cattlemen who sell to insol-
vent stockyards, it would seem to follow that state legislation could
protect innocent buyers who have special property interests in
goods held by bankrupt sellers. Specifically, a prepaying buyer of
goods, who, upon learning of the seller's bankruptcy, retrieves
them from his insolvent-seller, may under the new code be immu-
nized from the trustee's postpetition transfer claim on the grounds
that he already had a "special property" claim. Thus, the trustee's
suit to set aside the transfer and reclaim the goods would be
useless.
Professor Countryman has observed that bankruptcy judges
will inevitably be forced to look to state law notions of "property"
to define the extent of the trustee's interest in that property. 03 He
also argued that under the Chandler Act the trustee's interest
should generally be subject to those claims and interests that state
law indicated was superior to the debtor's interest.4" The Commis-
sion, moreover, based its final product on the views of Professor
Countryman.0 5 Thus, it would seem to follow that, in looking to
section 541(a)(1) alone, a bankruptcy court should entertain a
buyer's reclamation petition based on section 2-502 of the Uniform
Commercial Code.
The trustee may nevertheless prevail based on the same argu-
ments discussed under the Chandler Act. First, the 1978 code re-
tains and strengthens the trustee's power concerning executory
contracts.0 6 Professor Countryman's definition of an executory
402. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 367-68 (1977); S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 82-83 (1978).
403. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979) (holding that a state law governed
the mortgagee's right to receive rents and profits when the mortgagee had filed bankruptcy
after the mortgagee foreclosed). "Uniform treatment of property interest by both state and
federal courts within a State serves to reduce uncertainty, to discourage forum shopping,
and to prevent a party from receiving 'a windfall merely by reason of the happenstance of
bankruptcy'." Id. at 55 (citing Lewis v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 364 U.S. 603, 608-09
(1961)). See generally Countryman, The Use of State Law in Bankruptcy Cases (Part I), 47
N.Y.U. L. REV. 407 (1972) (problems posed and recommendations aimed at dealing with in-
corporation of state law in bankruptcy cases).
404. "[The Chandler Act] only purports, at the most, to give the trustee the interest of
the bankrupt." Countryman, supra note 403, at 436.
405. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R.
Doc. No. 93-137, Part II, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 148-49 (1973).
406. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1982). Among the new sections are section 365 (b)(1) which per-
mits the trustee to cure defaults and assume contracts under which the debtor is in breach,
and section 365 (e)(1) which makes ipso facto clauses, i.e., clauses which provide that the
contract is void upon the filing of bankruptcy, invalid.
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contract: "contracts on which performance remains due to some
extent on both sides, is embraced in the legislative history.0 8
Thus, where a bankrupt seller has not completed the manufacture
of the goods in question and the buyer has paid only part of the
purchase price, the buyer's section 2-502 reclamation claim, if the
contract is rejected, is subject to defeasance. The contract would
be "executory" under Professor Countryman's definition.O'e
407. E.g., Hassett v. Revlon, Inc. (In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc.), 23 Bankr. 104
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); see supra notes 214-15.
408. H. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 347 (1977); S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th
Cong., 2nd Sess. 58 (1978).
409. The case law that is available for study on this question conforms to the position
that unperformed contracts for the sale of goods are executory. See Abbott v. Blackwelder
Furniture Co., 33 Bankr. 399, 404 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1983), stating that "the 'special prop-
erty interest' may also be classified as a voidable executory contract." In National Sugar
Refining Co. v. C. Czarnikow, Inc. (In re National Sugar Refining Co.), 27 Bankr. 565
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983), the court held that the right of a seller, under U.C.C. § 2-702(2), to
stop goods in transit, where the buyer was insolvent, did not conflict with section 365 on
executory contracts. The court reasoned that the section 2-702(2) right to stop goods in
transit merely "suspended" the contract and did not abrogate it. The case seemed to as-
sume, however, that, even though title to the goods had passed, under section 2-702(2), the
seller's claim to return of the goods would have prevailed over the debtor's ability to reject
the executory contract under section 365. The court's assumption probably was valid be-
cause the seller's section 2-702(2) special property claim was codified into the bankruptcy
code in new code section 546(c). 11 U.S.C. § 546(c) (1982); see infra text accompanying note
428. If, however, a prepaying buyer was attempting to claim goods identified to the contract
but the contract had been rejected, the National Sugar case would be easily distinguishable.
Section 2-502, giving the buyer, as opposed to the seller, a special property claim has not
been codified into the new bankruptcy code. See infra text accompanying note 424. Once a
contract is rejected the contracting party's consideration is not returned, rather the party is
given a claim in bankruptcy. Section 365(g) provides that "rejection of an executory con-
tract . . . constitutes a breach of such contract .... " 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (1982). The legis-
lative history indicates that the effect of the section is "to treat rejection claims as prepeti-
tion claims." H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 349 (1977); S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1978); see Investors Dev. Co. v. Forum Homes, Inc. (In re Investor's Dev.
Co.), 7 Bankr. 772, 6 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 1415 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1980).
One court has paid some attention to the potentially unjust result that can arise when
the estate rejects an executory contract at the same time it keeps the promisee's considera-
tion. See Tavormina v. Brake (In re Beverly Mfg. Corp.), 29 Bankr. 513 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1983). In that case the debtor's attorney had a lien on certain shares of stock to secure
performances rendered in the past and to be rendered in the future. The trustee noted that
when the contract was not assumed within the 60 day period required by statute that it was
automatically rejected. See also 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(1) (1982), providing that contracts not
affirmatively assumed within the 60 day period following the entry of the order for relief are
automatically rejected. Thus, the trustee argued that he was entitled to keep the stock while
not paying the debtor's attorney for his services. The court commented that the result sug-
gested by the trustee would be "completely inequitable." 29 Bankr. at 515.
Cases construing former section 70b, Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 70b, 52 Stat. 840, 880-81
(1938), generally hold that the unfortunate promisee is entitled only to a damage claim in
bankruptcy. See In re Mercury Homes Dev. Co., BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 837, 18 COLLIER
BANKR. CAS. (MB) 435, BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 669,72 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1978); Samuels v.
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Second, as the Tennecomp Systems case demonstrates,"1" the
section 2-502 property right is subject to defeat by a trustee exer-
cising his power as a lien creditor under the 1978 Bankruptcy
Code. Section 544(a)(1)" 11 of the Bankruptcy Code vests the estate
with the power of a lien creditor on all of the bankrupt's property
as of the date of the filing of the petition. The Tennecomp decision
held that in order to prevail against the trustee, the buyer must
comply with the attachment and notice requirement of Article 9 of
the Uniform Commercial Code. 12
Third, it was further suggested that the buyer's right under
section 2-502 was void as a statutory lien. Section 545(d)(1) of the
1978 code permits the trustee to invalidate "statutory lien[s] . . .
to the extent that such lien first becomes effective against the
debtor . . . when the debtor becomes insolvent."""3 Recall that sec-
tion 2-502 gives the buyer a right to review the goods "if the seller
becomes insolvent within ten days after receipt of the first install-
ment on their price.'"414 The seller's right to reclaim under section
2-702 has received perhaps the most attention of the courts and
commentators.1 5 Under the Chandler Act, two esteemed bank-
ruptcy experts took opposite positions as to the vulnerability of
section 2-502 regarding a statutory lien.416 Thus, the question
E.F. Drew & Co., 292 F. 734 (2d Cir. 1923). The Mercury Homes case held that the vendee
of a rejected land sale contract was limited to his damage claim in bankruptcy. This result
has been legislatively overruled by the new code. 11 U.S.C. § 365(i) (1978); Cf. In re
Brethern's Home, 5 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 658, 21 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. (MB) 166 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1979) (holding that the indigent residents of a retirement home were to be given
continued life care even though their contracts were rejected). See generally Countryman,
Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part II, 58 MINN. L. REV. 479, 533 (1974) (discussing
judicial analysis of the trustee's option with respect to employment contracts).
410. 12 Bankr. 729, (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981), see supra text accompanying notes 223-
27.
411. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) provides:
(a) The trustee shall have, as of the commencement of the case, and without
regard to any knowledge of the trustee or of any creditor, the rights and powers
of, or may avoid any transfer of property of the debtor or any obligation in-
curred by the debtor that is voidable by-
(1) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of the
commencement of the case, and that obtains, at such time and with
respect to such credit, a judicial lien on all property on which a cred-
itor on a simple contract could have obtained a judicial lien, whether
or not such a creditor exists . ...
11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (1982).
412. 12 Bankr. 429, 436-37, (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981); see supra note 225.
413. 11 U.S.C. § 545(1)(d) (1982).
414. U.C.C. § 2-501(1).
415. See supra note 219.
416. Compare Kennedy, supra note 219, at 839-45 (favoring the seller) with Country-
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might seem to be an open one under the 1978 code as well.
The House and Senate reports to section 541(a)(1) quoted ear-
lier do suggest, however, that certain kinds of trust claims are not
voidable as statutory liens:
Situations occasionally arise where property ostensibly belong-
ing to the debtor will actually not be property of the debtor but
will be held in trust for another. For example, if the debtor has
incurred medical bills that were covered by insurance, and the
insurance company had sent the payment of the bills to the
debtor before the debtor had paid the bill for which payment
was reimbursement, the payment would actually be held in a
constructive trust for the person to whom the bill was owed
... .[P]roposed [section] 11 U.S.C. § 545 ...will not affect
various statutory provisions that give a creditor of the debtor a
lien that is valid outside as well as inside bankruptcy, or that
creates a trust fund for the benefit of a creditor of the debtor.' 17
The case of In re Frosty Morn Meats, Inc.,418 recently upheld
the validity of the cattleman's trust fund, as provided in the Pack-
ers and Stockyards Act, against a claim that it was void as a statu-
tory lien under section 67c(1) of the Chandler Act. Former section
67c(1), like present section 545, voided a lien "which first becomes
effective upon the insolvency of the debtor."'41' The District Judge
incorporated all of Bankruptcy Judge Bare's opinion and held that
the cattlemen's trust was valid when tested against the trustee's
attack. The judge embraced Judge Bare's analysis that Congress
had not created a "lien" but instead had created a "trust.' 420 "Al-
though a person may become bankrupt, property which is held by
the person in trust belongs to the beneficiary of the trust.'' 4 2 1
Is the Uniform Commercial Code's "special property" interest
more like a lien or more like a trust? Under non-code law, the pre-
paying buyer is not entitled to a constructive trust on goods pur-
chased and identified in the contract.' 2 The medical bills example
man, Buyers and Sellers of Goods in Bankruptcy, 1 N.M.L. L. REV. 435, 451-59 (1971)
(favoring the trustee).
417. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 367-68 (1977); S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th
Cong., 2nd Sess. 82-83 (1978).
418. 7 Bankr. 988 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980).
419. Chandler Act., ch. 575, § 67c(1), 82 Stat. 840, 877 (1938).
420. In re Frosty Morn Meats, Inc., 7 Bankr. 988, 1006 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980).
421. Id.
422. It has been suggested that a prepaying buyer should recover against an insolvent
seller under a constructive trust theory. Consequently, failure on the part of the purchaser
to successfully advance a section 2-502 reclamation claim may not preclude the recovery of
the property still in the bankrupt's possession. See generally Schrag & Ratner, Caveat
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that Congress found persuasive, however, is very much like the
prepaying buyer's claim. The goods themselves, like the medical
payments, may very well have been manufactured or set aside es-
pecially for the buyer.42
Some significance should be attached, however, to the fact
that Congress chose to immunize only the seller's right to reclama-
tion in response to the trustee's attack. The 1978 version of section
546(c) permits, under stated conditions, the seller of goods to an
insolvent buyer to reclaim those goods. 424 It may well be that the
Emptor-Empty Coffer: The Bankruptcy Law Has Nothing to Offer, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1147
(1972) (victims of consumer abuse have miniscule hope of obtaining redress from bankrupt
retailer). If a constructive trust is recognized under nonbankruptcy law, then one can proba-
bly be imposed against specified assets and those assets would not become part of the bank-
ruptcy estate. See 4A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 70.25(2) (14th Ed. 1978). Something more
than a mere debtor-creditor relationship must be established, however. See Thunderbird
Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. Penn-Dixie Steel Corp. (In re Penn-Dixie Steel Corp.), 10
Bankr. 878 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (carrier not entitled to imposition of constructive trust
on an amount owed for freight charges, but rather must be treated as an ordinary unsecured
creditor); In re Faber's, Inc., 360 F. Supp. 946 (D. Conn. 1973) (a constructive trust will not
be imposed upon cash deposits for undelivered carpet which consumers had given to a bank-
rupt retail carpet dealer).
423. Cf. Abbott v. Blackwelder Furniture Co., 33 Bankr. 399 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1983),
holding that the prepaying buyer's 2-502 claim was voidable under section 545. The court
also gave a narrow construction to the "trust" theory requiring that it should be limited to
bailment, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and the unjust enrichment cases.
424. 11 U.S.C. § 546(c) (1982) provides:
(c) The rights and powers of the trustee . . . are subject to any statutory right or
common law right of a seller, in the ordinary course of such seller's business, of
goods to the debtor to reclaim such goods if the debtor has received such goods
while insolvent, but:
(1) such a seller may not reclaim any such goods unless such seller
demands in writing reclamation of such goods before ten days after
receipt of such goods by the debtor; and(2) the court may deny recla-
mation to a seller with such a right of reclamation that has made
such a demand only if the court:
(A) grants the claim of such a seller priority as an administra-
tive expense, or (B) secures such claim by a lien.
The section requires that: 1) seller sell in the "ordinary course of business;" 2) that the
debtor receive the goods "while insolvent;" and 3) that seller make a written demand for
reclamation within ten days after debtor's receipt of the goods. See Ateco Equip., Inc. v.
Columbia Gas of Pennsylvania (In re Ateco Equip., Inc.), 18 Bankr. 917 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
1982), holding that there was no right to reclamation where seller did not make the written
demand as required by section 546(c). The court rejected seller's argument that a written
demand was not necessary under U.C.C. § 2-702(2) and therefore was unnecessary upon
buyer's bankruptcy. See generally Mann & Phillips, Section 546(c) of the Bankruptcy Re-
form Act: An Imperfect Resolution of the Conflict Between the Reclaiming Seller and the
Bankruptcy Trustee, 54 AM. BANKR. L.J. 239 (1980); Weintraub & Resnick, A Seller's Right
to Reclaim Goods Under the Bankruptcy Code-A Look at Current Cases, 14 U.C.C. L.J.
376 (1982) (assessing the success of section 546(c) in resolving the issues raised by battle
between the reclaiming seller and the trustee).
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drafters gave no attention to the potential vulnerability of section
2-502 claimants, and therefore the failure to address the question
is of no consequence. It seems, however, that the effect of giving
special treatment to section 2-702(2) without providing similar
treatment to section 2-502, the companion section, is significant.
Having guided ourselves through section 2-502 and other rele-
vant sections of the 1978 code, we can now turn to section 550, the
remedial section. Recall that this digression was necessary due to
the fact that those parties dealing with the debtor after a petition
is filed may well resort to "title" and "special property" defenses
in order to defeat the trustee's claim that they have taken estate
property after the filing of a petition.
D. Liability of the Transferee
Section 550 is divided into two parts, the liability of the "ini-
tial transferee," and the potential liability, if any, of those trans-
ferees dealing with the initial transferees. These types of transfer-
ees are defined as "subsequent," "mediate," or "immediate"
transferees. For example, assume that a debtor makes a postpeti-
tion transfer to T-1 which is in violation of section 549(a). As de-
fined by the 1978 code and the Bankruptcy Commission, T-1
would be the "initial transferee." If T-1 in turn transfers to T-2, T-
2 would be a "subsequent"4 5 or "immediate" transferee. If T-2
transfers to T-3, T-3 is a "mediate" or again a "subsequent"
transferee.426
1. THE COMMISSION PROPOSAL
The Commission combined into one section, the treatment of
425. The Commission proposal defined those parties dealing with the initial transferee
as "subsequent transferees." REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE
UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137 Part II, 93 Cong., 1st Sess. § 4-609(b), 179 (1973).
426. The Commission proposal further defines a subsequent transferee as "a transferee
of the initial transferee of the debtor and . . . any immediate or mediate transferee of such
a transferee." Id. at § 4-609(b)(3). The 1978 code speaks in terms of "immediate" and "me-
diate" transferees of the initial transferee. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(2), (b)(2) (1982). The legisla-
tive history does not provide any rationale for dropping the adjective "subsequent." Senate
Bill 445 recently passed the Senate and was assigned to the House Judiciary Committee.
That bill amends sections 550(a)(2) and (b)(2) by striking out "immediate and mediate" and
returns to the Commission language of "subsequent." S. 445, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 94-95
(1983) (incorporated into S. 1013, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.). The legislative history of Senate
Bill 445 indicates that many of the amendments are introduced for purposes of "clarity." It
seems clear that the Commission and the 1978 code intended to accord different treatment
for those dealing with estate property after the initial transfer by the debtor.
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all transferees whose transfers were subject to attack under the
various avoidance provisions. Proposed section 4-609427 was to gov-
ern transferees receiving preferential transfers, fraudulent convey-
ances, postpetition transfers, and other transfers where the trans-
action was subject to avoidance."2" The discussion that follows
applies to transactions that could have been set aside as either
preferential, fraudulent, or by any other avoidance power approved
by the Commission.
427. Proposed section 4-609 read in its entirety as follows:
(a) Liability of Initial Transferee. Whenever under this Act property trans-
ferred by the debtor is recoverable for the benefit of the estate, the trustee is
entitled to a judgment against the initial transferee (subject to any provisions
giving such transferee a right to be reimbursed for the value paid by him) for
either (1) the return of the property in specie, or (2) damages equal to the value
thereof at the date of the judgment (or, if the property has been transferred or
destroyed prior to the date of the judgment, the value thereof at the date of such
transfer or destruction) plus, if the property transferred was money, interest at
the legal rate from the date of the transfer. The transferee shall have the right to
elect to pay the monetary judgment rather than return the property.
(b) Liability of Subsequent Transferees.
(1) The trustee may not recover property referred to in subdivision (a) from a
subsequent transferee of the initial transferee who purchases for value in good
faith without knowledge of the voidability of the initial transfer, or from a trans-
feree of such a transferee.
(2) Unless protected by paragraph (1) of this subdivision, a subsequent trans-
feree of property referred to in subdivision (a) is liable to the trustee as though
he were the initial transferee under subdivision (a).
(3) A subsequent transferee within this subdivision (b) means (A) a transferee of
the initial transferee of the debtor, including a purchaser at a judicial sale of
property of the debtor and (B) any immediate or mediate transferee of such a
transferee.
(c) Single Recovery. A trustee who recovers against more than one transferee
under subdivisions (a) and (b) shall be entitled only to a single satisfaction.
(d) Improvements.
(1) Notwithstanding subdivisions (a) and (b), a transferee of recoverable prop-
erty may retain the property as security for payment of the lesser of (A) the cost
of any improvements to the property by the transferee reduced by the amount of
any profits realized from the property and (B) the increase in value of the prop-
erty as a result of the improvements.
(2) For the purpose of this subdivision, improvements include physical additions
and changes, repairs, payment of taxes and other debits secured by and dis-
charging encumbrances against the recoverable property that are superior to the
rights of the trustee, and costs of preservation.
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No.
93-137, Part II, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4-609(a) at 178-79.
428. The initial clause of proposed section 4-609 stated: "Whenever under this Act
property transferred by the debtor is recoverable for the benefit of the estate .... " Id.
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a. Initial Transferees
Commission section 4-609(a) provided:
(a) Liability of Initial Transferee. Whenever under this Act
property transferred by the debtor is recoverable for the benefit
of the estate, the trustee is entitled to a judgment against the
initial transferee (subject to any provisions giving such trans-
feree a right to be reimbursed for the value paid by him) for
either (1) the return of the property in specie, or (2) damages
equal to the value thereof at the date of the judgment (or, if the
property has been transferred or destroyed prior to the date of
the judgment, the value thereof at the date of such transfer or
destruction) plus, if the property transferred was money, inter-
est at the legal rate from the date of the transfer. The transferee
shall have the right to elect to pay the monetary judgment
rather than return the property.2 9
Under this proposed section, the estate would have been able
to recover transferred property or collect damages equal to the
value of the property. The damages would have been computed as
of the date of judgment. If the property was destroyed prior to
judgment, then damages would have been calculated from the date
of the transfer. If money was transferred, then interest was to have
accrued as of the date of transfer. In cases that did not involve
money, the transferee had the choice of either returning the prop-
erty to the trustee or paying its monetary equivalent.
The Commission indicated that in some cases the transferee
would be reimbursed for the value paid. The Commission also rec-
ommended that the initial transferee be reimbursed for any "im-
provements."430 "Improvements" were to include "physical addi-
tions and changes, repairs, payment of taxes .. . and costs of
preservation. '4 31 Moreover, the Commission recommended that the
trustee could receive a judgment to the extent of any increase in
the value of the property after the voidable transfer. The trustee
could recover "damages equal to the value thereof at the date of
judgment." If, however, the initial transferee realized a profit while
in possession of the property, this profit was to be deducted from
any recoupment 32 granted the transferee for improvements.433
429. Id. at 178.
430. Id. at § 4-609(d). For a complete text of the section, see supra note 427.
431. Id. at § 4-609(d).
432. "Recoupment" was chosen as opposed to "set-off" or "credit" because it most ac-
curately described the remedy the Commission chose to give the transferee. Recoupment
generally means a right to reduce the plaintiff's recovery because of some claim arising out
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Three salient points invite attention. First, in most cases the
value of the property was to be computed as of the date of judg-
ment. Second, the transferee was given the choice of returning the
property or its money value. Third, the initial transferee was to
keep his profits, except in cases where the transferee was seeking a
recoupment for improvements.
In regard to the first point, the Commission notes stated that
section 4-605(a) was based on the provisions of former section
60b"'5 of the Chandler Act, which governed preferential trans-
fers.' $5 Section 60b, however, contained no express provision stat-
ing on which day damages were to be calculated. Neither was there
any mention of the date of the preferential transfer nor the date of
judgment.4 6 The Commission was candid in admitting that the
case law interpretation of section 60b provided an award for value
at the time of transfer and not at the time of judgment as
recommended.'37
As to the second point, usually the trustee has the right to
elect either conversion (a forced sale of the property) or trespass to
of the same transaction. A set-off usually means an independent right, liquidated in nature
arising out of an unrelated event. See J. COUND, J. FRIENDENTHAL & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCE-
DURE CASES AND MATERIALS 505-06 (2d ed. 1974); see also Household Fin. Corp. v. Hobbs,
387 A.2d 198 (Del. Super. Ct. 1978) (a recoupment is defensive in character, does not pro-
vide affirmative relief, and must generally arise out of the same transaction originally sued
upon); Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Swaggerty, 86 N.J. 602, 432 A.2d 512 (1981) (a recoupment may
be utilized only to reduce or extinguish the plaintiff's recovery, set-off may be awarded for
any amount to which the defendant is entitled).
433. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R.
Doc. No. 93-137, Part II, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 609(a)(2), 179 (1973).
434. Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 60b, 52 Stat. 840, 870 (1938).
435. "Subdivision (a) is derived from § 60b, but § 60b only expressly deals with initial
transferees who dispose of recoverable property." REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANK-
RUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, Part II, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 180
(1973).
436. Specifically, former section 60b provided: "[tihe trustee may recover the property,
or, if it has been converted, its value from any person who has received or converted such
property .. " Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 60b, 52 Stat. 840, 870 (1938).
437. "Subdivision (a) also varies from § 60b, which allows the recovery of the value
presumably at the date of transfer by the initial transferee, without qualification." REPORT
OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137
Part II, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 180 (1973); see Klein v. Tabatchnick, 459 F. Supp. 707
(S.D.N.Y. 1978), holding that damages should be calculated at the date of the preferential
transfer in a case where the property (corporate warrants) had been rendered worthless by
lapse of time. Cf. In re Hygrade Envelope Corp., 272 F. Supp. 451 (E.D.N.Y. 1967) (The
value of a preference may be determined either on the basis of the market value of the
assets at the moment of the assignment or the extent of the depletion of the bankrupt's
estate at that moment.); Virginia Nat'l Bank v. Woodson, 329 F.2d 836 (4th Cir. 1964)
(damages determined by the diminution of the bankrupt's estate at the time of the prefer-
ential transfer).
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chattels and return of the property.4 38 Former section 60b permit-
ted the trustee to elect between the recovery of the property or its
value.43 9 The Commission's granting the transferee the election was
somewhat novel.
The Commission made a curious distinction between profits
earned by the transferred property and the transferred property
itself. To illustrate, assume that Widget stock is conveyed to T-1
after the filing of a voluntary petition and the transfer is therefore
in violation of section 549. Assume further that Widget pays a 10%
dividend between the time of the petition and the trustee's action
for return of the stock or its value. The trustee takes the stock, but
who gets the dividend?
The Commission proposal mentioned "profits" only once in
connection with any recoupment given the transferee for improve-
ments. ° Specifically, the Commission recommended that the trus-
tee's recovery be offset by any improvements, but the transferee's
improvements were to be "reduced by the amount of any profits
realized from the property ... 441
According to the Commission's definition of "improvements,"
it is difficult to imagine a case where any improvements could be
made to the Widget stock. If a gold statue of King Tut was trans-
ferred instead of stock, however, a different situation would arise.
Storage fees and paid personal property taxes would be considered
"improvements. '442 Under the Commission proposal, T-1 would be
allowed to recoup the cost of his improvements but would be re-
quired to deduct from the cost of these improvements any accumu-
lated profits.
The Commission apparently intended that T-1 could keep his
profits in the event that he made no claim for improvements, but
438. See generally PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 80 (4th ed. 1971) (for a discussion of the
elements of trespass and conversion).
439. Irving Trust Co. v. Conte, 22 F. Supp. 94 (S.D.N.Y. 1937) (the trustee has the
election of whether to recover the property or to recover the value of the property at the
time of transfer). Former section 70e, which permitted the trustee to set aside transactions
which were voidable under nonbankruptcy law, provided that "[tihe trustee shall reclaim
and recover such property or collect its value. ... Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 70e(2), 52
Stat. 840, 882 (1938).
440. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R.
Doc. No. 93-137, Part II, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4-609(d)(1), 179 (1973). For a complete text
of the section, see supra note 427.
441. Id. at § 4-609(d)(1).
442. Id. Section 4-609(d)(2) specifically states that payment of taxes are improvements.
I generously place storage fees in the category of "costs of preservation." For a complete
text of the section, see supra note 427.
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the Commission specifically stated that he was not entitled to prof-
its where a claim for "improvements" was made. Thus, we can in-
fer that except in a case of "improvements," the transferee could
have kept his profits.
The wisdom behind letting a transferee who made no improve-
ments keep his profits, while requiring a deduction of profits for
those transferees who pay taxes, storage fees, or maintain the
property escapes imagination. Profits are unrelated to improve-
ments and vice versa. Neither should be tied to the other. The
Commission proposal unwisely discouraged parties from making
"improvements."
b. Subsequent Transferees
The governing language for subsequent transferees is found in
Commission section 4-609(b)(1):
(b) Liability of Subsequent Transferees. (1) The trustee may not
recover property referred to in subdivision (a) from a subse-
quent transferee of the initial transferee who purchases for value
in good faith without knowledge of the voidability of the initial
transfer, or from a transferee of such a transferee. '43
Subsection (b)(2) provided that subsequent transferees failing to
meet the tests of subsection 4-609(b)(1) would receive the same
treatment as an initial transferee under subsection (a).444 Subsec-
tion (b)(3) further defined "immediate" transferees as those who
first take from the initial transferee and "mediate" transferees as
those who take from the immediate transferee. The Commission
provided that both "mediate" and "immediate" transferees fall
into the general category of "subsequent" transferees. 445 Therefore,
subsection (b)(1) provided that subsequent transferees were to be
protected from the trustee's avoidance powers to set aside prefer-
ences, fraudulent conveyances, postpetition transfers and the like
if: (1) they purchased for value; (2) were acting in good faith; and
(3) were without knowledge that the transfer might be voidable.
The Commission chose not to elaborate on what was meant by
"value." Terms such as "full value" or "present equivalent value"
443. H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, Part II, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 179 (1973).
444. "Unless protected by paragraph (1) of this subdivision, a subsequent transferee of
property referred to in subdivision (a) is liable to the trustee as though he were the initial
transferee under subdivision (a)." H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, Part II, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4-
609(a), (b)(2), 179 (1973).
445. See supra note 426.
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were deliberately omitted, immunizing subsequent transferees who
paid less than full value from attack.
The Commission chose to rely on judicial interpretations in
defining "good faith. ' 14 6 Section 67d(1)(e)(1) of the Chandler Act,
which governed fraudulent conveyances, gave limited protection to
certain transferees who acted in "good faith. 44 7 The Commission
would not protect a transferee "if . . [he] knew facts that would
lead a reasonable person to believe that the property was recover-
able." ' It is suggested that "good faith" could not have been pre-
sent where the transferee was aware that he was paying a sum sig-
nificantly less than the full value of the property.""'
The third requirement of the Commission test, that the subse-
quent transferee be "without knowledge of the voidability of the
transfer," is more troubling. The Commission notes do not provide
any guidance. This language is susceptible to the interpretation
that the transferee must subjectively believe that the transfer is
subject to avoidance. Given the vagaries of the bankruptcy laws, it
is conceivable that a postpetition transferee could in fact know of
the prior bankruptcy but still believe that the transfer was valid
notwithstanding bankruptcy.
This suggested construction, however, appears to be inter-
twined with the prior requirement that the subsequent transferee
act in "good faith." It is difficult to imagine a transferee acting
with "knowledge of the voidability of the transfer" while at the
same time acting in "good faith." Thus, in order to give meaning to
the requirement that the postpetition transferee not be aware of
the voidability of the transfer, the Commission may have intended
that more than a mere knowledge of the filing of bankruptcy be
necessary.4 50 A transferee could be acting in good faith while at the
446. H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, Part II, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 180 (1973).
447. Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 67d(1)(e)(1), 52 Stat. 840, 877 (1938).
448. H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, Part II, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 180 (1973); see Chorost v.
Grand Rapids Factory Showrooms, 77 F. Supp. 276 (D.N.J. 1948), aff'd, 172 F.2d 327 (3rd
Cir. 1949) ("good faith" presupposes not only a lack of knowledge of the fraud but also a
lack of knowledge of such facts as would put a reasonably prudent person on inquiry).
449. See supra text accompanying notes 289-92.
450. The third point of the Commission test demonstrates a weakness of the amalga-
mation approach of combining the treatment of liability for various types of transferees.
Presumably, if it were a preferential transfer case, a subsequent transferee would not be
acting in good faith if he knew that the original transfer was made in anticipation of bank-
ruptcy in order to prefer a creditor. One court seems to have extended the "good faith"
definition to the old test under former section 60b of requiring that the immediate trans-
feree have reasonable cause to believe that the original transferor was insolvent. See Jones
v. Calhoun First Nat'l Bank (In re Greenbrook Carpet Co., Inc.), 22 Bankr. 86 (Bankr. N.D.
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same time aware that a petition in bankruptcy has been filed. A
transferee could not be acting in good faith while aware that the
transaction was voidable.
The most significant proposal with respect to postpetition
transfers was the one offered by the Commission that suggested
that subsequent good faith transferees who met the three point
test should enjoy immunity from the trustee's avoidance power.451
The Commission indicated that this policy was but an extension of
prior law under the Chandler Act." 2
Specifically, the Commission cited former section 21g,"53 which
provided that a bona fide purchaser of real property who was not
given constructive notice of bankruptcy could defeat a trustee." 4
Again the Commission, citing former section 60b of the Chandler
Act, 55 excepted from preference liability "a bona fide purchaser
from or a lienor of the debtor's transferee for a present fair
equivalent value."
The Commission also cited former section 67a, which gave the
trustee the power to set aside judicial liens acquired within four
months of bankruptcy."5 " Section 67a(3) provided that bona fide
purchasers of the property at judicial and non-judicial sales were
protected.457 And again, under section 67d, the trustee was empow-
Ga. 1982) (confusing "good faith" with having knowledge that the original transfer was in-
solvent). In fraudulent conveyance cases, good faith requires that the transferor be unaware
that the conveyance was made with intent to defraud creditors. In any event, "knowledge of
the voidability of the transaction" should imply a level of culpability on the part of the
subsequent transferee. It is hard to see why mere knowledge that a prior transferor had filed
bankruptcy implies the knowledge that subsequent transactions are voidable. Numerous
parties and many lawyers have failed to grasp the fundamental principle of loss shifting
occurring to the subsequent transferee if someone in the prior chain of title had no author-
ity to transfer title.
451. See infra text accompanying notes 525-42.
452. "This section is derived from §§ 21g, 60b, 67a(3), 67d(6), and 70d(1) and (5) of the
present Act. Those sections partially spell out the relative rights of the trustee and initial
and subsequent transferees. The treatment of initial and subsequent transferees varies in
each of the sections; some variation is justifiable as to initial transferees, but it is not as to
subsequent transferees." H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, Part II, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 179 (1973).
453. Id. For the text of the section 2 1g, see supra note 148.
454. See supra text accompanying notes 148-53.
455. Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 60b, 52 Stat. 840, 870 (1938); see Cross v. Wagenmaker,
329 Mich. 100, 44 N.W.2d 888 (1950).
456. Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 67a, 52 Stat. 840, 875-76 (1938).
457. "That the title of a bona fide purchaser of such property shall be valid, but if such
title is acquired otherwise than at a judicial sale held to enforce such lien, it shall be valid
only to the extent of the present consideration paid for such property." Id. at 876; see Bryan
v. Jackson, 178 Va. 123, 116 S.E.2d 366 (1941) (finding that a purchaser from the bankrupt's
wife, to whom the bankrupt had transferred property within the four months prior to bank-
ruptcy, was protected as a bona fide purchaser for a present fair equivalent value).
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ered to set aside certain fraudulent conveyances. The Commission
noted that while section 67d gave the trustee an action against the
debtor's transferee, any further transfer was immunized from at-
tack in cases that involved bona fide purchasers and lienors who
gave full value.458
In cases where real property, judicial liens acquired within
four months of bankruptcy and fraudulent conveyances were in-
volved, the Commission was correct. Subsequent transferees acting
in good faith were protected under prior law. But in order to sup-
port its position, the Commission also cited 70d(1) and 70d(5),
which governed postpetition transfers.459 Recall that section 70d(1)
protected good faith transferees dealing with the debtor between
the filing of a petition and the debtor's adjudication of bank-
ruptcy.460 Because with voluntary petitions, adjudication was auto-
matic,6 1 section 70d(1) was effectively limited to involuntary cases.
Section 70d(5) also provided that the Chandler Act was not to im-
pair the negotiability of currency or negotiable instruments. 62
Other than cases that involved negotiable instruments and
currency, there was nothing in section 70d(1) which immunized
subsequent transferees of personalty where the transfer occurred
after adjudication. The Commission proposal offered a significant
extension of protection for those parties not involved in the initial
postpetition transfer, but who were subsequent transferees of the
property.
2. BANKRUPTCY CODE
The most striking change from the Chandler Act was Con-
gress's acceptance of the Commission's recommendation to com-
bine the treatment of all transferees into one section. Section 550
of the 1978 code governs the liability of such transferees.6 3 Recall
458. If the conveyance was fraudulent, title was "void against the trustee, except as to a
bona fide purchaser, lienor, or obligee for a present fair equivalent value .... " Chandler
Act, ch. 575, § 67d(6), 52 Stat. 840, 878 (1938). And further, in cases where "consideration
was less than fair," transferors who took "without fraudulent intent" were given a lien to
the extent of payment. Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 67(d), (e), 52 Stat. 840, 877 (1938); see In re
Kentucky Book Mfg. Co., 30 F. Supp. 400 (W.D. Ky. 1939).
459. See supra note 452.
460. See supra text accompanying notes 120-30.
461. Supra note 11.
462. See supra text accompanying notes 135-47.
463. 11 U.S.C. § 550 (1982) provides:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent that a trans-
fer is avoided under section 544, 445, 547, 548, 549, or 724(a) of this title, the
trustee may recover, for the benefit of the estate, the property transferred, or, if
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that the Chandler Act, depending on the particular type of transfer
involved, appeared to give disparate treatment regarding liability.
The protection accorded a subsequent transferee, for example,
could well have depended on whether the original transfer was set
aside as a preference, fraudulent conveyance, or postpetition
transfer.
a. Initial Transferees
Bankruptcy Code section 550(a)(1) governs the liability of ini-
tial transferees where the transfer is found to amount to either a
preference, fraudulent conveyance, postpetition transfer, or the
like. It states:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent
that a transfer is avoided under . . . this title, the trustee may
the court so orders, the value of such property, from-
(1) the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose
benefit such transfer was made; or
(2) any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial
transferee.
(b) The trustee may not recover under section (a)(2) of this section from-
(1) a transferee that takes for value, including satisfaction or se-
curing of a present or antecedent debt, in good faith, and without
knowledge of the voidability of the transfer avoided; or
(2) any immediate or mediate good faith transferee of such
transferee.
(c) The trustee is entitled to only a single satisfaction under subsection (a)
of this section.
(d) (1) A good faith transferee from whom the trustee may recover under
subsection (a) of this section has a lien on the property recovered to secure the
lesser of-
(A) the cost, to such transferee, of any improvement made after
the transfer, less the amount of any profit realized by such transferee
from such property; and
(B) any increase in value as a result of such improvement, of the
property transferred.
(2) In this subsection, "improvement" includes -
(A) physical additions or changes to the property transferred;
(B) repairs to such property;
(C) payment of any tax on such property;
(D) payment of any debt secured by a lien on such property;
(E) discharge of any lien against such property that is superior
or equal to the rights of the trustee; and
(F) preservation of such property.
(e) An action or proceeding under this section may not be commenced after
the earlier of-
(1) one year after the avoidance of the transfer on account of
which recovery under this section is sought; and
(2) the time the case is closed or dismissed.
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recover, for the benefit of the estate, the property transferred,
or, if the court so orders, the value of such property, from-
(1) the initial transferee of such, transfer or the entity
for whose benefit such transfer was made ....
The drafters adopted the Commission's recommendation giv-
ing a lien to good faith transferees to the extent of any improve-
ments made in the property, along with any increase in value due
to the improvement. 4" 5 "Improvements" were defined as physical
additions, repairs, payment of taxes, payment of secured claims on
the property, and other efforts to preserve the property.466
Again, the drafters embraced the Commission's proposal that
the lien given the transferee for improvements be reduced by "the
amount of any profit realized by (the) transferee from (the) prop-
erty .... ,"vIt seems, by implication, that the transferee is able to
464. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1) (1982).
465. 11 U.S.C. § 550(d) (1982). Recently. the Senate passed Senate Bill 445 which offers
technical and clarifying amendments to the 1978 Code. Among the sections addressed were
sections 550(d)(1)(A) and (B). Subdivision (A) is discussed infra note 467. The amendment
struck the word "value" in subdivision (B) and the language "the value of such property"
was substituted. The bill was designed to clarify the original language by specific language
referring to inflation in value of the property transferred. S. 445, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 94-95
(1983). Thus, the amendment gives the transferee a lien "to secure the lessor of any increase
in the value of such property as a result of such improvement.
466. Section 550(d)(2)(D) provides that improvement shall include the "payment of
any debt secured by a lien on such property," and subsection (E) further defines improve-
ments as "discharge of any lien against such property that is superior or equal to the rights
of the trustee." 11 U.S.C. § 550(d)(2) (1982) (amended 1984). The question raised by these
two subdivisions is whether or not there is any difference between payment of a debt se-
cured by a lien and discharging the lien itself. The new amendment discussed supra at note
430, combines subsections (D) and (E) into one section worded as follows: "(D) Payment of
any debt secured by a lien on such property that is superior or equal to the rights of the
estate." 11 U.S.C.A. § 550(d) (Supp. 1984).
The discharge of a lien is an improvement. The case of Beck v. Amato (In re Amato), 10
Bankr. 120 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981), involved a case where a recoupment for an improvement
was clearly available. In that case, the debtors fraudulently conveyed, in violation of section
548, certain real estate to their daughter. The real estate conveyed was subject to a contract
for deed in which the debtors were the vendees. After the fraudulent conveyance, the
daughter took over the contract and made several payments on it. The court ruled that
while the trustee could recapture the property, since the daughter was acting in good faith,
she would have a lien for improvements to the extent that she made payments on the con-
tract. Cf. Home Life Ins. Co. v. Jones (In re Jones), 20 Bankr. 988 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982)
(noting that the payment of junior liens by a first mortgage could be recouped as an im-
provement increasing value).
467. 11 U.S.C. § 550(d)(1)(A) (1982) (amended 1984). For a complete text of this sec-
tion see supra note 463. By inserting the language "or accruing to" after "by," the new
amendment to section 550(d)(1)(A) gives the transferee a lien "to secure the lesser of (A)
the cost, to such transferee, of any improvement made after the transfer, less the amount of
profit by or accruing to such transferee from such property." It seems clear that this amend-
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keep any profit derived from the property when no improvements
are made, but when improvements are made, no profits can be
gained.
The drafters of the 1978 code gave the court the right to elect
whether the property or its value should be paid to the estate.
Thus, the drafters chose to ignore the traditional theory of giving
the plaintiff the election of remedies"68 and instead adopted the
Commission's theory of giving the transferee the election of
remedies.""9
It is generally assumed that the bankruptcy court is a court of
equity.470 Traditionally, the equity chancellor had the limited
power to grant only a "clean-up remedy.' 71 Section 550(a) departs
from historical solutions by giving the suitor the right to elect rem-
edies. In addition, the section is totally lacking in any standards
that guide the court in deciding which remedy to grant.472
b. Subsequent Transferees
Subsection 550(a)(2) appears to reject the Commission's rec-
ommendation of protecting subsequent transferees by permitting
the trustee to recover from "any immediate or mediate transferee
of such initial transferee. 4 73 Subsection (b) severely limits the
scope of subsection (a)(2), providing that:
ment was intended to cover cases involving stock dividends, interest, and the like, where the
profit was not earned "by" the transferee but nevertheless "accrued" to him by virtue of
ownership of the property.
468. See supra note 438.
469. See supra text accompanying notes 438-39.
470. Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 336 (1966); Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304
(1939); Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 240 (1934).
471. See Whitlock v. Hause, 694 F.2d 861, 863 (1st Cir. 1982); see also In re Newman,
14 Bankr. 1014 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that a jury is not available where the legal
relief falls within the "clean-up" doctrine). See generally MCCLINTOCK, McCLINTOCK ON EQ-
UITY § 52 (1948) (analyzing court's powers to retain jurisdiction to give complete relief).
472. "[Section 550(a)] changes the law under the old Act; there is no 'conversion' re-
quirement and the trustee may recover the value of the property transferred if the court so
orders: However, there are not guidelines for when the court may permit or order recovery
of the property's value." Chrystler v. Mersman Tables, Inc. (In re The Furniture Den, Inc.),
12 Bankr. 522, 526 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1981); cf. A & S Sales & Leasing, Inc. v. Belize
Airways Ltd. (In re Belize Airways Ltd.), 7 Bankr. 601 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980) (holding that
when the property had been transferred to a subsequent transferee, the court had no choice
but to award a judgment for the value of the property); Tavormina v. Brummer (In re
Centre De Tricots De Gaspe Ltee), 24 Bankr. 93, 96 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982); Klein v.
Tabatchnick, 459 F. Supp. 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding that the trustee may recover the
value of the property where the property has been converted in such a way that it cannot be
returned in substantially as good condition as when the bankrupt had it).
473. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(2) (1982).
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(b) The trustee may not recover under section (a)(2) of this sec-
tion from-
(1) a transferee that takes for value, including satisfac-
tion or securing of a present or antecedent debt, in
good faith, and without knowledge of the voidability of
the transfer avoided: or
(2) any immediate or mediate good faith transferee of
such transferee.17 4
Although section 550(a)(2) permits the estate to recover from
"immediate" or "mediate" transferees, subsection (b) makes sub-
section (a)(2) inapplicable to such transferees when they pay value
in good faith and are without knowledge of the voidability of the
transfer. Thus, in reality, the drafters embraced the Commission's
recommendation that subsequent transferees be protected where
they (1) paid value; (2) were acting in good faith; 475 and (3) were
without knowledge of the voidability of the original transfer.
Section 550(b) provides that the payment or securing of ante-
cedent indebtedness constitutes value. Recall that the Commission
did not attempt to further define value. The drafters of the 1978
code clarified the issue by including as "value" the satisfaction or
securing of present or antecedent debts.
The drafters' position, that cancellation of antecedent indebt-
edness constitutes value, is subject to criticism. Consider two cases.
In case one, T-2, a subsequent transferee, receives a postpetition
transfer of a widget from T-1, the initial transferee, by paying
$10,000 cash. If the subsequent transferee acts as an innocent third
party and without knowledge proceeds in good faith, he may well
be deserving of protection.
In case two, T-2 merely cancels an outstanding $10,000 debt in
474. 11 U.S.C. § 550(b) (1982).
475. See In re Jones v. Calhoun First Nat'l Bank (In re Greenbrook Carpet Co., Inc.),
22 Bankr. 86 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1982) wherein a bankruptcy court denied protection to a
subsequent transferee on the grounds that it was acting in bad faith. The court accepted a
New York state court's definition of "good faith" as "a failure to deal honestly, fairly and
openly." 22 Bankr. at 90 (quoting Southern Indus., Inc. v. Jeremias, 66 A.D.2d 178, 183, 411
N.Y.S.2d 945, 949 (1978)).
It seems that the Greenbrook opinion mistakenly equates bad faith with a "reasonable
cause to believe insolvency," which was a requirement to the establishment of a preference
under the old Act and remains a requirement in insider cases under the 1978 code. See 11
U.S.C. § 547(b) (1978). Under state law, the mere fact that one has notice that a transferor
is preferring him over the transferor's other creditors does not subject the transfer to attack.
"[Ilt is long-settled in commercial law that a debtor may voluntarily prefer one creditor over
another . Strickler v. Thomas (In re Thomas), 7 Bankr. 389, 392 (Bankr. W.D. Va.
1980).
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exchange for the widget. In this case, there has been no reliance on
the fact that T-1 had apparent authority to transfer the widget. 7 6
If T-2's title is defeated, he has an action for breach of warranty of
title against T-1 and his $10,000 claim would be reinstated, 77 leav-
ing T-2 in the same position that he occupied before the transfer.
The drafters' result gives T-2 a windfall at the expense of the
creditors of the bankruptcy estate. In rare instances, true reliance
(as opposed to cancelling an old debt) on the initial transferee's
authority to transfer may be established.7 Occasionally there may
be a change of circumstances, such as a change in financial condi-
tion of the initial transferee, making it inequitable to merely rein-
state the claim of a subsequent transferee.7 9 In most cases, it
476. A number of courts have considered the question of whether or not a judgment
lien creditor should be considered a bona fide purchaser. The courts dealing with the issue
are split. See Annot., 4 A.L.R. 434 (1919). Those holding against the judgment creditor are
based on the rationale that a party who merely cancels an antecedent indebtedness has not
relied on the record in reducing his claim to judgment and therefore is not entitled to
protection.
"A conveyance of real or personal property as security for an antecedent debt
does not, upon principle, render the transferee a bona fide purchaser, since the
creditor parts with no value, surrenders no right, and places himself in no worse
legal position than before. The rule has been settled, therefore, in very many of
the states, that such a transfer is not made upon a valuable consideration, within
the meaning of the doctrine of bona fide purchaser."
Sparrow v. Wilcox, 272 Ill. 632, 639, 112 N.E. 296, 298 (1916) (quoting POMEROY, 2 EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE § 749 (3d ed.). But see Wight v. Chandler, 264 F.2d 249 (10th Cir. 1959).
"[Ulnless a controlling statute provides otherwise, the cancellation of a pre-existing debt
constitutes sufficient consideration for the conveyance of property; and that one who cancels
and extinguishes a pre-existing debt as consideration for the conveyance to him of property
becomes a purchaser for value." 264 F.2d at 251.
477. U.C.C. § 2-312(1) provides for a breach of warranty of title in sale of goods cases.
Unless explicitly excluded, or the circumstances are such as to indicate otherwise, there is in
every contract for the sale of goods a warranty that the goods will be delivered free from
encumbrances. See Wright v. Vickaryous, 611 P.2d 20 (Alaska 1980). In real property cases,
where the transfer is by warranty deed, a warranty of title is given. See Maxwell v. Redd,
209 Kan. 264, 496 P.2d 1320 (1972).
478. A judgment creditor who goes to the trouble and expense of obtaining his
judgment, in view of the condition of the record, is generally in a different posi-
tion from one who obtains his judgment, but seeks to make the same out of
property subsequently acquired by the judgment debtor, in which case he has
neither gained nor lost anything or been misled in any way, either in obtaining
his judgment or by the action of the judgment debtor, hence he is not in the
position of a bona fide purchaser for value.
Sparrow, 272 Ill. at 641-42, 112 N.E. at 299 (1916). In the unusual case where a creditor can
establish that he took the trouble and expense of reducing the antecedent indebtedness to
judgment based upon a belief that the defendant owned the property in dispute, true reli-
ance may be established.
479. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 3-502(1)(b) governing the liability of a drawer on a check where
there has been a delay in notice of dishonor and presentment of the instrument. The section
provides that the drawer is excused from liability on the check only if the "drawee or payor
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seems like nothing would be lost by simply returning the parties to
their respective positions that they occupied before the second
transfer to the subsequent transferee.
The reader should also look at the potential liability of the
transferee when there are even further transfers. Such "immedi-
ate" and "mediate" transferees who take from the subsequent
transferee are protected under 550(b)(2) if they acted in good
faith.48 0 They need not have paid value and they may even be
aware of the filing of the petition. Thus, in the above example, if
the widget is again transferred to T-3, T-3 is protected if he acted
in good faith.
In reaching this result, the legislative history indicates that
Congress was applying the "shelter" principle 81 to subsequent
transferees and allowing T-3 to acquire whatever rights T-2 had. If
the Trustee could not defeat T-2, he should not be able to defeat
T-3. If, however, T-1 reacquires the widget from T-2, he may not
be acting in good faith.482
bank becomes insolvent during the delay is deprived of funds maintained with the drawee
or payee bank to cover the instrument. ... Cases could arise where a subsequent trans-
feree cancelled out an antecedent debt in exchange for the transfer of estate property. If in
the delay between the time of transfer and the trustee's action to recover the property, the
initial transferee becomes involvent, the subsequent transferee may be able to show that he
would have been able to collect the debt if he had not taken the property and cancelled the
debt.
480. "The trustee may not recover ... from . . . any immediate or mediate good faith
transferees of such transferee." 11 U.S.C. § 550(b)(2) (1982); see Coleman v. Home Savings
Assoc. (In re Coleman), 21 Bankr. 832, 836, 9 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 364 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
1982) (dictum); 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 550.03 (15th ed. 1981).
481. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 3-201 ("Transfer of an instrument vests in the transferee such
rights as the transferor has therein . . ").
482. The phrase 'good faith' in this paragraph is intended to prevent a transferee
from whom the trustee could recover from transfering the recoverable property
to an innocent transferee, and receiving retransfer from him, that is, 'washing'
the transaction through an innocent third party. In order for the transferee to be
excepted from liability under this paragraph, he himself must be a good faith
transferee.
H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 376 (1977); S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 90 (1978).
It is questionable whether or not the good faith requirement of section 550(b) will have
general applicability in postpetition transfer cases. Doubtless the drafters of the Code were
aware of the comments to U.C.C. § 3-201 when they expressed their concern about " 'wash-
ing' the transaction through an innocent third party." See U.C.C. § 3-201 comment 3. It is
interesting to note that two examples given by the U.C.C. drafters involve cases where a
party acquires negotiable instruments by fraud and then reacquires them from a holder in
due course, possibly avoiding a claim of fraud. Query, could an initial transferee who ac-
quires estate property in violation of section 549 be sheltered under section 550(b)(2)? Take
for example, the case of the initial transferee who was completely unaware of the bank-
ruptcy filing and was duped into taking the property by the debtor. If he subsequently
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c. Case Law Construction of Section 550
In In re Furniture Den, Inc.,'5 3 the court indicated that sec-
tion 550 would be given a strict construction. In that case T-1, a
judgment creditor, successfully recovered over $3,000 from the
debtor as the result of an execution proceeding arising within 90
days after the filing of bankruptcy. The court quickly determined
that the payment of the $3,000 was preferential and therefore void
under section 547.84 T-1, however, actually received only $2,200 in
funds. Approximately $800 was deducted for judicial expenses and
T-1's attorney fees. 8 5
T-1 argued that cases that construed former section 60b al-
lowed preferred creditors to deduct sales expenses from any recov-
ery up to the value of the property. He asserted that the trustee
should recover only $2,200. He reasoned that the trustee would
have had to employ his own attorney, and therefore sales expenses
would have been incurred anyway. These expenses then were de-
ducted from the trustee's recovery under the Chandler Act. The
court acknowledged that the status of the law under the Chandler
Act permitted credit for such expenses488 but failed to find such
authority in section 550.47
The court also rejected the transferee's claim that he had dis-
charged an attorney's lien on the property and therefore had "im-
proved" it as defined by that section. "It is hard to see how dis-
charge of the attorney's lien on the transferred funds would
improve their value when the attorney's lien would not have at-
tached but for the preferential transfer itself."4 88
In the Furniture Den case, the court could have reached the
same result without implying that authority for the recoupment or
credit must be found within section 550 itself. The transferee's re-
transfers the property to subsequent transferee and then reacquires it upon a threat from
the subsequent transferee, can it be said that the initial transferee was acting in bad faith?
Note that "good faith" is all that the section appears to require.
Perhaps the above is a needless exercise in the trivial. It seems clear that the initial
transferee could still be sued for the value of the property at the time of transfer. See supra
text accompanying notes 468-72. But the transferee may still have a defense as to the prop-
erty itself under section 550(b)(2) because he is acting in good faith.
483. 12 Bankr. 522 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1981).
484. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1982) (setting forth the elements needed to establish a
preferential transfer).
485. 12 Bankr. at 523.
486. The court relied on Wolcott v. Commercial Inv. Trust, Inc., 7 F. Supp. 809
(S.D.N.Y. 1934).
487. 12 Bankr. at 527.
488. Id.
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liance on cases under prior law that gave a credit for attorney fees
and other expenses expended for the sale of the property was obvi-
ously misplaced. In Furniture Den, the transferee paid the attor-
ney a one-third contingent fee for collecting the debt. It is difficult
to see how fees expended in the collection of monies that are sub-
sequently returned to the estate in any way benefits the estate or
saves any significant expenses.
The case of In re Curtina International Inc., s4 9 exemplifies a
more equitable construction of section 550. In that case, Bank-
ruptcy Judge Swartzberg ruled that under Article 6 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, a creditor could void a bulk sales transaction
that did not fully comply with state bulk sales law. It was also
voidable in its entirety by the trustee under section 544b49 ° of the
1978 code. The bulk sale brought $67,000 to the debtor-transferor,
but almost $45,000 of those funds were on deposit in the debtor's
account at the time of filing of bankruptcy.
Judge Swartzberg ruled that the trustee's recovery was to be
reduced by the $45,000. Although nothing in section 550 expressly
required this credit, to rule otherwise would have given the estate
a $45,000 windfall. Section 550(c) provides that the trustee is only
entitled to a "single satisfaction. ' 491 That provision was probably
intended to prevent the trustee from recovering judgments against
both T-1 and T-2.492 The Curtina case squarely fits section 550(c)'s
policy of preventing the estate from receiving a windfall. In any
event, however, perhaps a further amendment to section 550 would
be useful to codify the result in Curtina.9 3
489. Murdock v. Plymouth Enter., Inc. (In re Curtina Int'l, Inc.), 23 Bankr. 969 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1982).
490. 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (1982) generally provides that the trustee may recover from the
estate a transfer which is subject to avoidance by an actual creditor under applicable non-
bankruptcy law. In the Curtina case, the court applied the landmark case of Moore v. Bay,
284 U.S. 4 (1931) and set aside the entire bulk sales transfer. Subsequent cases construing
Moore hold that the trustee's avoidance power is not limited by the amount of the claim of
the creditor who is in a position to avoid the transfer. Once it is established that a creditor
can avoid the transaction, the entire transfer is set aside. The House and Senate Reports
make clear that the drafters of the new bankruptcy code intended to carry forward the
doctrine of Moore into present law. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 370 (1977); S.
REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 85 (1978).
491. 11 U.S.C. § 550(c) (1982). For a complete text of section 550, see supra note 463.
492. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 376 (1977). "Subsection (c) is a
further limitation on recovery. It specifies that the trustee is entitled to only one satisfac-
tion, under subsection (a), even if more than one transferee is liable." (emphasis added)
493. A simple amendment to section 550 permitting the transferee a credit to the ex-
tent that the bankruptcy estate retains the proceeds from the sale of estate property would
codify the result.
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IV. CRITIQUE OF THE 1978 ACT
This final section investigates the efforts made by the drafters
of the 1978 reform. This critique follows the order used above.
First, this critique addresses the code's substantive treatment of
postpetition transfers. Second, an examination is made of the re-
medial provision-section 550. After critiquing the work of the
1978 drafters, the author offers a solution to many of the problems
encountered above.
A. A Theory of Avoiding Postpetition Transfers
The bankruptcy law treatment of parties dealing with the
debtor after a petition has been filed reveals that, since the turn of
the century, Congress and the courts have been generally willing to
follow the principle of caveat emptor, i.e. upon the filing of a peti-
tion in bankruptcy, the debtor lacks authority to transfer any as-
sets of the bankruptcy estate. Given the transferor's lack of au-
thority, the transferee ordinarily does not take title. The buyer
assumes the risk of any problems in the seller's title or the genuine
lack of good faith in the entire transaction.9 4
After reaching this basic conclusion, however, we have seen
that the courts and Congress have riddled this general rule with
exceptions. Bona fide purchasers of real estate were protected. 95
Other parties dealing with the debtor who were truly innocent,
lacked knowledge of the bankruptcy, and did not have the means
of ascertaining such knowledge were also protected.496 The Su-
preme Court in Marin took the extraordinary step of protecting
the innocent and blameless bank despite the clear legislative intent
that no exception was to be given. Other courts, desiring to protect
innocent parties at the expense of bankruptcy creditors, have
reached similar results despite the clear intent of the bankruptcy
statutes.497
Two mutually exclusive concerns seem to control Congress and
the court's purpose in these exceptions. The first of these cases in-
volves situations where non-bankruptcy law (usually state law) has
created a system whereby buyers and other transferees are pro-
494. See supra authorities cited notes 27-28.
495. See supra authorities cited note 87.
496. E.g., Frederick v. Fidelity Mutual Life Ins. Co., 256 U.S. 395 (1921) discussed
supra at text accompanying notes 83-86.
497. E.g., In re Smith Corset Shops, Inc., 696 F.2d 9711 (1st Cir. 1982) discussed supra
at text accompanying notes 325-26; In re Yellow Cab Co., 4 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 382
(E.D. Pa. 1978), discussed supra note 133.
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tected from defects in the title and the authority of the transferor.
The most salient example of this is the bona fide purchaser of
real estate. The original Congressional treatment in this area sim-
ply gave the bankruptcy trustee title to all of the bankrupt's prop-
erty. 98 No exception was mentioned for real estate, although the
provision did permit the trustee to record evidence of title. The
courts would not tolerate a case where the rights of a bona fide
purchaser, who relied on the state real estate records, could be cut
off by the filing of bankruptcy by the purchaser's transferor. The
Chandler Act adopted this protection,4 9 and it has been carried
forward into present law.500 Even though Congress had nothing to
do with the creation of the now well-established system of real es-
tate conveyances, the reliance interest of such purchasers was
honored at the expense of the creditors of the bankruptcy estate.
It is possible to require title searchers of real property, prior to
closing real estate deals, to check the bankruptcy filings in the
nearest federal court. There would be no practical limit as to how
far back the purchaser would be required to check these bank-
ruptcy records. Moreover, bankrupts file their petitions only at the
place of their domicile. 01 If they own real estate in a district other
than that of their domicile, it would be impractical to require pur-
chasers to check the records of areas other than where the prop-
erty is located.
In the majority of cases, where the bankrupt's real property is
located in the district of his domicile, the practice of requiring
such a record search would be unwise. State law encourages pur-
chasers to check only one set of records-those located in the
county where the realty is domiciled. Drafting a new set of rules
for title searchers in order to accommodate the administration of
bankruptcy, while constitutional, would unfairly extend the bank-
ruptcy power to the detriment of the unwitting real property
purchaser.
The present bankruptcy code does not afford protection to any
498. 9 U.S. COMP. STAT. 1916 Ann. 11299, § 21e, discussed supra at text accompanying
notes 89-92.
499. Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 21g, 52 Stat. 840, 853 (1938), discussed supra at text
accompanying notes 148-55.
500. 11 U.S.C. § 549(c) (1982) (amended 1984), discussed supra at text accompanying
notes 354-71.
501. See 28 U.S.C. § 1472(1) (1982) providing that a case "may be commenced in the
bankruptcy court for a district - (1) in which the domicile, residence, principal place of
business . . . of the person or entity that is the subject of such case have been located for
the 180 days immediately preceding such commencement .... "
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other set of transferees who may have been encouraged by non-
bankruptcy laws to rely on the validity of the transaction. This is
unfortunate.502 If the present framework for postpetition transfers
remains, other transferees, equally deserving of the real estate, will
make a deal with the debtor, pay good value, and receive nothing.
For example, the exception for purchasers of negotiable in-
struments and the transferees of currency should have continued.
The protection should also have been extended to purchasers who
take negotiable documents by due negotiation .5 03 The same status
should be afforded to purchasers of securities.5 04 Recent authorities
502. Even the all-powerful IRS's secret lien, see 26 U.S.C. § 6321 (1982), for unpaid
taxes is subordinated to the rights of innocent parties. Unfiled tax liens are subordinate to
bona fide purchasers, 26 U.S.C. §§ 6523(a), (b)(6) (1982), secured parties, 26 U.S.C. §§
6323(a)(h)(1) (1982), judgment lien creditors, 26 U.S.C. § 6323(a) (1982), and mechanics
lienors, 26 U.S.C. §§ 6323(a), 6323(h)(2). Even a filed tax lien is invalid against purchasers
of investment securities, 26 U.S.C. § 6323(b)(1) (1982), purchasers of motor vehicles, 26
U.S.C. § 6323(b)(2), and buyers in ordinary course of business. 26 U.S.C. § 6323(b)(3)
(1982).
503. U.C.C. § 7-502 provides:
(1)[A] holder to whom a negotiable document of title has been duly negotiated
acquires thereby:
(a) title to the document;
(b) title to the goods;
(c) all rights accruing under the law of agency or estoppel, including rights to
goods delivered to the bailee after the document was issued; and
(d) the direct obligation of the issuer to hold or deliver the goods according to
the terms of the document free of any defense or claim by him except those
arising under the terms of the document or under this Article. In the case
of a delivery order the bailee's obligation accrues only upon acceptance and
the obligation acquired by the holder is that the issuer and any indorser
will procure the acceptance of the bailee.
(2) Subject to the following section, title and rights so acquired are not
defeated by any stoppage of the goods represented by the document or by
surrender of such goods by the bailee, and are not impaired even though
the negotiation or any prior negotiation constituted a breach of duty or
even though any person has been deprived of possession of the document
by misrepresentation, fraud, accident, mistake, duress, loss, theft or conver-
sion, or even though a previous sale or other transfer of the goods or docu-
ment has been made to a third person.
E.g., R.E. Huntley Cotton Co. v. Fields, 551 S.W.2d 472, 21 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1157 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1977).
504. U.C.C. § 8-302 provides in part:
(1) A "bona fide purchaser" is a purchaser for value in good faith and without
notice of any adverse claim:
(a) who takes delivery of a certificated security in bearer form or in
registered form, issued or indorsed to him or in blank;
(b) to whom the transfer, pledge, or release of an uncertificated se-
curity is registered on the books of the issuer;
(2) "Adverse claim" includes a claim that a transfer was or
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have suggested that the death-knell of the doctrine of the holder in
due course of the negotiable instrument has arrived. 0 5 Cases that
rely on the negotiability of such instruments are rare and in any
event are not of commercial necessity. There is some evidence that
the drafters were in fact aware of the full import of the Chandler
Act's treatment of the holder in due course and purposely chose to
discard it in the case of postpetition transfer case." 6
Even if one wishes to debate the continued validity of the
holder in due course doctrine, there is no justification for prevent-
ing a postpetition transferee from relying on the debtor's ability to
transfer currency.50 7 As the law presently exists, it is more than a
theoretical possibility that a trustee in bankruptcy may be able to
recover the cash that the debtor used to buy a widget or other item
after the petition was filed. Protection has been omitted from the
1978 code."' It may not be too long before some trustee attempts
would be wrongful or that a particular adverse person is the
owner of or has an interest in the security.
(3) A bona fide purchaser in addition to acquiring the rights of
a purchaser . . . also acquires his interest in the security free of
any adverse claim.
E.g., Ogilvie v. Idaho Bank & Trust Co., 99 Idaho 361, 582 P.2d 215, 24 U.C.C. REP. SERV.
1267 (1978).
505. E.g., Hansford, The Holder-In-Due-Course-An Endangered Species?, 37 ALA. L.
REV. 540 (1976) (detailing the demise of the doctrine in consumer transactions); Rosenthal,
Negotiability-Who Needs It?, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 375 (1971) (suggesting that holder-in-due-
course status for depository banks be severely curtailed).
506. Professor Frank Kennedy served as Executive Director for the Bankruptcy Com-
mission, described supra note 236. In response to an inquiry from this author on the Com-
mission's position on the holder-in-due-course question he stated:
You are also correct, I believe, in your reading of § 4-605 to withhold protection
of a post petition holder in due course if the notice authorized by § 4-605(c) had
been filed . . . . I think you are right that § 549 of the Bankruptcy Code does
not protect a holder in due course who has not given present value after the
filing of the petition. Notes 3 and 4 accompanying the Commission's proposed §
4-605 show that we thought a good deal about the holder in due course, but I do
not recall encountering any discussion in the legislative history of the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act, of the need to accord any particular protection to holders in
due course. Nor do I now recall any discussions with the staffs of the House and
Senate Judiciary Committees regarding such holders. There may have been an
oversight. On the other hand, the position of the holder in due course has under-
gone serious erosion, at least in academic circles in recent years.
Letter to Darrell Dunham from Professor Frank R. Kennedy, April 23, 1983. The Commis-
sion notes that Professor Kennedy refers to are discussed supra at text accompanying notes
304-07. Commission section 4-605 required, inter alia, that the trustee file a notice before he
could successfully set aside a postpetition transfer. See supra note 305.
507. Both the Commission and the drafters of the new code for some reason omitted
protection for transferees of currency. See supra text accompanying notes 298-310.
508. See supra text accompanying notes 308-310.
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to invalidate a cash transaction, and not long thereafter some court
may reach a Marin-type result.
Modern technology of automatic electronic tellers and the like
has created all the characteristics of a cash transaction. 09 As was
true with the credit card, certain transferees, principally retailers,
are more likely to enter into a deal if it is an electronic fund trans-
fer case because it takes on all of the aspects of a cash transaction.
Certificate of title transactions also belong in this category.
Numerous states have now created legislation, principally involv-
ing motor vehicles, encouraging transferees to look at certificates of
title prior to purchasing the vehicle. 510 If the title is clean, the
buyer usually can be assured that no third party will upset the
transaction.5 11 The universal acceptance of certificate of title trans-
actions would further the interests of the commercial community
by validating transfers that occur after a petition in bankruptcy is
filed.
One other party who relies on nonbankruptcy law deserves
protection. Buyers in the ordinary course of business are generally
509. Sections 902 through 920 of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693
(1978), and Federal Reserve Board Regulations promulgated under section 904, govern elec-
tronic fund transfers. These sections provide:
The term 'electronic fund transfer' means any transfer of funds . . . which is
initiated through an electronic terminal, telephonic instrument, or computer or
magnetic tape so as to order, instruct, or authorize a financial institution to
debit or credit an account. Such term includes, but is not limited to, point-of-
sale transfers, automated teller machine transactions, direct deposits or with-
drawals of funds, and transfers initiated by telephone.
C.C.P.A. § 903(a)(6); 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(6) (1978). Such transactions are treated alike be-
cause they all involve an automatic electronic debit of the consumer's account. The trans-
feree cannot be said to in any way rely on the credit of the consumer.
Federal regulation of the credit card industry has transformed many cash-like transac-
tions, where the transferee was able to rely on the credit card alone, into true credit transac-
tions. Under the Fair Credit Billing Act, specifically 15 U.S.C. § 1666(i) (1979), consumers
may refuse to pay the credit card issuer when the consumer is unsatisfied with the original
transaction. The card issuer, after investigation, usually will refuse payment to the trans-
feree and the consumer and transferee will be forced to resolve the dispute between
themselves.
510. Approximately 35 states have some form of certificate of title act. Of these, some
provide for notation on certificates of title on only a first lien, others on all liens, and still
others on no liens at all. About 13 states have no certificate of title act of any kind. The
following are a sampling of states which have substantially adopted the Uniform Certificate
of Title Act: ALA. CODE §§ 32-8-1 to 32-8-87 (1975); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29 §§ 2350-2477
(1973); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90D, §81 to 38 (West 1971); N.H. REV. STAT.,ANN. §§ 261:1
to 261:39 (1967); R.I. GEN. LAWS 1956, §8 31-3.1-1 to 31-3.1-38 (1971); see Uniform Motor
Vehicle Certificate of Title and Anti-Theft Act § 1, 11 U.L.A. 421 (1974 & Supp. 1983).
511. E.g., General Fin. Corp. v. Hester, 141 Ga. App. 28, 232 S.E.2d 375 (1977).
[Vol. 39:1
POSTPETITION TRANSFERS IN BANKRUPTCY
protected under the Uniform Commercial Code 512 from various
claimants to the purchased property. Thus, buyers who give new
value and purchase in the ordinary course of business will usually
take free of any claims against the goods. A buyer in ordinary
course of business may defeat the rights of owners who entrust
their property to merchants,513 goods that the owner has made the
object of a negotiable document, 51 ' and lenders who rely on inven-
tory as collateral.5 1 5 It is generally felt that in order to serve legiti-
mate commercial needs, protection for the buyer in the ordinary
course of business is required. 6
If there is a legitimate criticism of the reliance approach, it is
that Congress would be allowing state legislatures to weaken the
effect of the bankruptcy code. With each of the examples men-
tioned above, however, the balancing process between the rights of
the transferee and the party claiming the property has already
taken place. Each of these exceptions to the caveat emptor prin-
ciple was created in order to promote commerce by strengthening
the validity of protected transactions. To say, for example, that the
cash transaction would be valid except in the case of bankruptcy is
to defeat the very purpose for the cash transaction.
Congress may not agree with the conclusions reached for each
of the cases mentioned above. It is clear, however, after looking at
the legislative history supporting the 1978 Act, that Congress gave
no consideration whatsoever to the creation of further exceptions
beyond the bona fide purchaser of real estate exception. When an
512. U.C.C. § 1-201(9) defines a buyer in ordinary course of business:
"Buyer in ordinary course of business" means a person who in good faith and
without knowledge that the sale to him is in violation of the ownership rights or
security interest of a third party in the goods buys in ordinary course from a
person in the business of selling goods of that kind but does not include a pawn-
broker. All persons who sell minerals or the like (including oil and gas) at well-
head or minehead shall be deemed to be persons in the business of selling goods
of that kind. "Buying" may be for cash or by exchange of other property or on
secured or unsecured credit and includes receiving goods or documents of title
under a pre-existing contract for sale but does not include a transfer in bulk or
as security for or in total or partial satisfaction of a money debt.
See also Skilton, Buyer in Ordinary Course of Business under Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code (And Related Matters), 1974 Wis. L. REV. 1 (1974).
513. U.C.C. § 2-403(2).
514. U.C.C. § 7-503(1)(a).
515. U.C.C. § 9-307(1).
516. See Skilton, supra note 512, at 3-4.
517. One of the first recording statutes enacted in America was passed on October 7,
1640, by the General Court of the Massachusetts Bay Colony. MASS. COL. REC., I., 306-07.
However, as far back as 1535, English law, under the Statute of Enrollments compelled a
public registry of real property transactions. 27 Hen. VIII, c. 16 (1535).
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exception to the rule of caveat emptor is pervasive, Congress
should give serious consideration to the inclusion of that exception
into section 549.
Except for the reliance cases, the case law reveals that the
courts have been sympathetic to the inability of certain transferees
to check the bankruptcy records before entering into a transaction.
"Business necessity" appears to be the basis for the result in both
Marin and Frederick.5 18 Drawee banks are not in a position to call
the bankruptcy court and check files prior to making a decision as
to whether they should honor a check. Similarly, insurance compa-
nies, it is believed, are not in a position to check bankruptcy filings
prior to making a loan on the value of a debtor's insurance policy.
Congress saw merit in these arguments and codified the holdings of
both Marin and Frederick into the statute. 519
Although the arguments advanced by the banks and insurance
companies have some appeal, upon further reflection they do not
withstand scrutiny. For example, recall that in Marin the payee of
the check absorbed the total loss while the Bank of Marin was ex-
culpated from liability. Justice Douglas's opinion justified this dis-
tinction on the dubious rationale that the payee had received a
preferential payment.52 0
Compare, however, the case of the local supermarket that re-
ceives hundreds of checks daily. Is the local supermarket in any
better position to check the bankruptcy filings prior to its decision
to take a check in payment of goods? If a distinction can be made
between the supermarket and drawee bank-insurance company sit-
uation, it has to be on the ground that the supermarket is well
aware that a certain amount of all of its checks will "bounce." Nev-
ertheless, supermarkets, as a cost of doing business, allow their
customers to write checks. Therefore, they absorb the loss in those
few cases where the checks do in fact bounce.
The banks and insurance companies, however, will likely argue
that they should not be forced to factor into their business ex-
penses the possibility that a depositor will file bankruptcy. Never-
theless, nonbankruptcy law requires the banks to absorb the loss
518. Frederick v. Fidelity Mutual Life Ins. Co., 256 U.S. 395 (1921), discussed supra at
text accompanying notes 83-86.
519. 11 U.S.C. § 542(c) (1982), discussed supra at text accompanying note 321-29.
520. Marin, 385 U.S. at 103 (1966). Justice Douglas overlooks, of course, those postpeti-
tion transferees who pay new value instead of cancelling out an old debt. It is not clear from
the opinion whether he was intending to make a distinction between creditors receiving
preferential treatment and transferees giving new value. More likely, he was simply seeking
to justify preferred treatment for the Bank of Matin.
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where they innocently allow a midnight deadline to expire, 52 1 or
more importantly, where in good faith they pay a check where the
drawer's signature has been skillfully forged.2 Thus, even drawee
banks cannot be totally confident that in deciding to honor a
check, they will be free from liability when the check is not author-
ized. The banks can and do insure themselves against this kind of
loss in cases where the check represents a large sum.52 3 It seems
521. U.C.C. § 4-302(a) provides that "the bank is accountable for the amount of. . . a
demand item . . . in any case where it. . . does not pay or return the item or send notice of
dishonor until after its midnight deadline .... " "Midnight deadline" is defined as "mid-
night on its next banking day following the banking day on which it receives the relevant
item .... " See generally Blake v. Woodford Bank and Trust Co., 555 S.W.2d 589 (Ky.
1977) (bank's failure to return checks reserved on December 24, before midnight on Decem-
ber 26, was basis for liability).
522. U.C.C. § 3-418, codifying the holding of Price v. Neal, 3 Burr. 1354 (1762). Price v.
Neal held that a drawee that accepted an instrument and paid it when the drawer's signa-
ture was forged was bound by his acceptance and payment. The comments to section 3-418
justify this result on the grounds "that it is highly desirable to end the transaction on an
instrument when it is paid rather than reopen and upset a series of commercial transactions
at a later date when the forgery is discovered." U.C.C. § 3-418 comment 4.
523. The forgery provisions of the blanket bond insurance policy issued to some banks
in the southern Illinois area reads as follows:
Forgery and Unauthorized Signatures and Endorsements
Loss because of forgery or alteration of any check, draft, acceptance, with-
drawal order or receipt for the withdrawal of funds or property, certificate of
deposit, letter of credit, warrant, money order or order upon a public treasury;
and loss:
(a) by reason of the transfer, payment or delivery of any funds or property,
the establishment of any credit or the giving of anything of value on the faith of
any written instructions or advices directed to the insured and authorizing or
acknowledging such transfer, payment, delivery or receipt of funds or property,
which instructions or advices purport to have been signed or endorsed by any
customer of the insured or by any other banking institution but which instruc-
tions or advices either bear the forged signature or endorsement of, or have been
altered without the knowledge and consent of, such customer or banking institu-
tion (telegraphic, cable or teletype instructions or advices, as aforesaid, sent by a
person other than the insured's customer or banking institution represented as
having sent such instructions or advices shall be deemed to bear a forged signa-
ture); or
(b) by reason of the payment by the insured of any promissory note which is
payable at any office of the insured to which this bond applies, or which is or
purports to be a note payable at such office, under instructions of any depositor
thereof, and which is actually paid by the insured out of funds on deposit with
it, and which proves to be forged or altered or which bears a forged endorse-
ment; or
(c) by reason of having accepted, paid or cashed any check or withdrawal
order which bears an unauthorized signature or endorsement. It shall be a condi-
tion precedent to the insured's right of recovery for loss under this coverage that
the insured shall have on file signatures of all persons authorized to sign such
check or withdrawal order.
Any check or draft
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that insurance companies that lend against the loan value of a pol-
icy could insure themselves and do the same. It is questionable
whether there are any potential situations in which the loss suf-
fered as a result of the practical inability to check bankruptcy
records is so severe that the loss cannot be absorbed as a cost of
doing business, either by insurance or otherwise.
B. Section 550
We previously looked in some detail at section 550 of the 1978
code. Recall that in general, section 550(a) provided that the initial
transferee, whose transfer could be avoided by the trustee, would
suffer the loss. A lien was given to the extent of any improvements
that the transferee had made in the property. In certain instances
one could quibble with the solution offered by the 1978 drafters,2
but in general there was nothing in section 550 that was startling
or created severe problems.
The consolidation of the treatment accorded subsequent
transferees in section 550, however, is novel. The liability of all
transferees depends upon the particular avoidance power that was
in question under the Chandler Act. 25 Presently, all such subse-
quent transferees are protected if they pay value, act in good faith,
and are without notice of the voidability of the transfer.5 2 The
Commission notes blithely indicate that there was no basis for the
Chandler Act's approach to making the liability of the subsequent
transferee depend upon the particular avoidance power involved. 27
But by suggesting that all subsequent transferees be protected, it
is clear that the Commission had fraudulent conveyance cases in
mind. The mere use of the language "knowledge of the voidability
of the transaction 82 8 suggests that the Commission, and therefore
(1) made payable to a ficticious payee and endorsed in the name of such
ficticious payee, or (2) procured in a face to face transaction with the maker or
drawer thereof (or with one acting as agent of such maker or drawer) by anyone
impersonating another, and which is made or drawn payable to the one so im-
personated and endorsed by anyone other than the one impersonated, shall be
deemed to be forged as to such endorsement.
Mechanically reproduced facsimile signatures shall be deemed to be hand-
written signatures.
524. The 1978 code's treatment of the profits made by the initial transferee is question-
able. See supra text accompanying notes 465-67.
525. See supra text accompanying note 473.
526. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (1982), discussed supra at text accompanying notes 473-75.
527. H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, Part II, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 179, set out supra note 452.
528. 11 U.S.C. § 550(b)(1) (1982). It is interesting to note that the Commission rational-
ized the extension of protection for all subsequent transferees by citing a noted authority in
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Congress, had not fully thought through the results that would fol-
low. This language makes sense in the fraudulent conveyance cases
where, for example, the subsequent transferee, "T-2," was aware of
the facts and circumstances of the initial transfer, and therefore
was aware that the debtor made the transfer with actual intent to
defraud his creditors.
The language of one opinion under the 1978 code suggests that
if T-2 has knowledge that the initial transfer to T-1 was preferen-
tial, then no protection should be given to a subsequent trans-
feree. 29 Under nonbankruptcy law, however, debtors have a right
to prefer their creditors.5 30 It is generally felt that neither unethi-
cal conduct nor bad faith is necessarily present upon the receipt of
a preference. If the initial transferee is not acting in bad faith
when receiving a preference, it is difficult to see how a subsequent
transferee could be acting either in bad faith or with knowledge
that the initial transfer was voidable. Recall that to be preferential
with respect to bankruptcy, the transfer must occur before the fil-
ing of the bankruptcy petition.5 31 Thus, in many cases the subse-
quent transferee will receive the transferred property before bank-
ruptcy is filed by the initial transferee. In these cases, given the
status of non-bankruptcy law, it is difficult to see how any bad
faith or knowledge of voidability exists. Yet one court held that it
did.532
The trouble with the consolidation approach is that it forces
fraudulent conveyance principles into postpetition transfer and
other types of cases. Consider the following example: Debtor
makes a fraudulent conveyance to T-1 with actual intent to de-
fraud his creditors. T-1 in turn conveys the property to a bona fide
purchaser, who, by definition, is acting in good faith. In this hypo-
thetical, T-1 has in fact acquired actual title to the property.
Debtor's creditors must resort to a court of equity to disgorge T-1
of title and revest it in Debtor.133 Even in cases where T-1 is aware
the area of fraudulent conveyances: "The protection is extended, however, to all subsequent
transferees to avoid litigation and unfairness to innocent purchasers. See 1 GLENN, FRAUDU-
LENT CONVEYANCES AND VOIDABLE PREFERENCES § 259(a), at 444-45 (Rev. ed. 1940)." H.R.
Doc. No. 93-137, Part II, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 180.
529. In re Greenbrook Carpet Co., Inc., 22 Bankr. 86 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1982), discussed
supra note 475.
530. See supra note 475.
531. See supra note 226.
532. In re Greenbrook Carpet Co., Inc., 22 Bankr. 86 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1982) discussed
supra note 475.
533. "[Tlhe creditor, upon a finding of fraudulent conveyance, may set aside the trans-
fer and regain the property or cash value to the amount of the debt." Tcherepnin v. Franz,
1984]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
of the debtor's fraudulent intent, T-1 still has the power to give
good title to a bona fide purchaser, T-2.53 4 Only in cases where T-2
was acting in bad faith and was aware of the debtor's fraudulent
intent will the courts permit the debtor's creditors to recover the
property from T-2.1 5
The postpetition transfer case is in no way analogous to the
fraudulent conveyance hypothetical set out above. The law of
theft, or unauthorized transfers of property under a security inter-
est, is more to the point. If a debtor transfers property that is sub-
ject to a security interest in favor of a lender to T-1, usually T-1
has acquired only encumbered title to the property and can convey
only encumbered title to T-2."' This would be true regardless of
T-2's good faith or lack of knowledge as to the voidability of the
original transfer to T-1.5 s7 Additionally, this same result would in-
ure if T-1 were acting innocently and in good faith.538 The true
owner of the property or the lender would have a right to pursue
both T-1 and T-2 either for conversion or for the return of the
property.5 39
Perhaps Congress was justified in treating these cases alike for
the simple reason that one cannot justify the disparate results
reached under nonbankruptcy law. In the lender case, however, the
lender wins not becaus6 T-1 is in a better position to prevent the
489 F. Supp. 43, 45 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (emphasis added) (citing Levy v. Rendle Contracting &
Dock Bldg. Co., 9 F. Supp. 1009 (D. Mass. 1935); Bartel v. Zimmerman, 293 Ill. 154, 127
N.E. 373 (1920); Buffum v. Barceloux Co., 289 U.S. 227 (1932)). However, a creditor cannot
without the aid of legal process, appropriate to payment of his debt property fraudulently
conveyed by the debtor. Wagner v. Trout, 124 Cal. App. 2d 248, 268 P.2d 537 (1954).
534. See Love v. Elliot, 350 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). The fraudulent grantee of
mineral deed had no right to transfer the deed. Yet a bona fide purchaser for value without
notice from the fraudulent grantee received good title. See also Mathis v. Blanks, 212 Ga.
226, 91 S.E.2d 509 (1956) (bidder at alleged fraudulent sale had notice of fraud, but one who
purchased from the bidder without notice of the fraud was protected).
535. See Kantola v. Hendrickson, 52 Idaho 217, 12 P.2d 866 (1927) (purchaser for
value, who takes from fraudulent grantee with notice of fraud, acquires title subject to in-
firmaties); Clarkson v. McCoy, 215 Iowa 1008, 247 N.W. 270 (1933) (purchaser had sufficient
notice to prevent him from claiming as a bona fide purchaser when he purchases with notice
of proceedings to set aside the former conveyance as fraudulent).
536. See supra authorities cited notes 27-28.
537. E.g., U.C.C. § 9-306(2) generally provides that "a security interest continues in
collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange, or other disposition thereof .... "
538. See Exchange Bank of Osceola v. Jarrett, 180 Mont. 33, 588 P.2d 1006 (1979). In
the Jarrett case a debtor financed a farm tractor in Florida through the Exchange Bank of
Osceola. Debtor sold the tractor to an Iowa implement dealer (T-1) who in turn sold the
tractor to a Montana farmer (T-2). There were no facts to indicate that either T-1 or T-2
was aware of Exchange Bank's security interest. The court nevertheless held that the bank's
suit for conversion against T-2 must be sustained.
539. See supra notes 438-39.
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loss but simply because the law encourages lenders to make loans.
In order to encourage the lender to make the loan, the law guaran-
tees the lender that his security interest will remain in force not-
withstanding the sale of the collateral to a bona fide purchaser.
Furthermore, in cases involving personal property, buyers and
other transferees are traditionally aware of the fact that they take
no better title than that held by the transferor.
If the rationale is to encourage lenders, as opposed to punish-
ing the negligence or culpability of the initial transferee, it be-
comes apparent that T-2's position is no stronger than that of T-1.
Recall in the Jepstow case54 0 T-1 was not only unaware of the fact
that he was receiving estate property but took measures to insure
that he was receiving something other than estate property.51 Al-
though he acted innocently and in good faith, the initial transferee
lost against the estate. Under present law, if the initial transferee
had transferred the estate property to a subsequent transferee,
who was also acting in good faith, the subsequent transferee would
have prevailed. 2  Yet, there should be no distinction between the
liability of T-1 and T-2.
In the postpetition transfer cases we are dealing with the
bankruptcy of the debtor as opposed to the granting of a security
interest. In cases where a voluntary petition is filed, however, the
debtor is granting the trustee title to all of his property as opposed
to granting a mere security interest in particular property. Con-
gress has chosen to condition the debtor's right to relief upon the
estate receiving all of his non-exempt property. In exchange for
the right to seek relief under the bankruptcy laws, Congress de-
sired that unauthorized transactions made by the debtor not di-
minish the estate.
C. A Suggested Solution
How then is one to resolve the dilemma of the completely in-
nocent transferee like the one found in the Jepstow case? The
Uniform Commercial Code tolerates the result of secured creditors
who defeat the rights of good faith purchasers of secured property.
But by means of various filing and other perfection requirements,
it seeks to limit such results to those that are statistically
540. 15 Bankr. 122 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981), discussed supra at text accompanying notes
245-46.
541. Id. at 123.
542. 11 U.S.C. § 550(b) (1982), discussed supra at text accompanying notes 473-75.
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infrequent.5 3
In some states, a judgment creditor is given a lien on all of the
judgment debtor's assets merely by delivering a writ of execution
to a sheriff. 4 A subsequent levy placed on certain assets of the
judgment relates the lien back to the time of delivery of the writ.
Nevertheless, in those cases where a bona fide purchaser has pur-
chased property in the interim, the courts tend to protect the bona
fide purchaser.
543. U.C.C. § 9-302(1) generally requires that secured parties file a financing statement
to perfect a security interest in personal property. While Article 9 does make several excep-
tions to this requirement, those exceptions which permit the unfiled secured party to defeat
a subsequent purchaser of the goods in question are comparatively rare. See, e.g., section 9-
306(3)(a) (1972 version), providing that a secured party is automatically perfected for 10
days in collateral which was acquired with the cash proceeds of the original collateral. Sec-
tion 9-103(1)(d) generally provides that a security interest may be brought into a jurisdic-
tion and remain perfected for a period of four months if, when the goods came into the
jurisdiction, they were perfected under the law of the state from where they came. Thus,
since the goods are perfected, a buyer of the goods would be "subordinate to" the secured
party. U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(c). During the four month period, there would be no constructive
notice on file in the state where the goods are now located. Additionally, in those cases
where the secured party is to perfect by filing at the debtor's "residence," see generally
U.C.C. § 9-401(1), under the 1972 version of Article 9, a change in the debtor's residence
does not render the filing ineffective. U.C.C. § 9-401(3) (1972 version). In this case, a pur-
chaser of the collateral will likely make a record check at the place of the debtor's new
residence and find no notice of the secured party's security interest. See, e.g., International
Harvester Corp. v. VOS, 95 Mich. App. 45, 290 N.W.2d 401 (1980). Finally, section 9-402(7)
(1972 version) generally provides that in cases where the debtor so changes his name that
record searchers searching under the new name are given no notice of the secured party's
interest, the secured party is nevertheless still perfected as to the collateral. The secured
party is unperfected only as to collateral acquired by the debtor four months after the name
change. Cf. King v. Williams (In re Conger Printing Co., Inc.), 18 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 224
(Bankr. D. Or. 1975) (holding that a secured party, who at the time of filing is aware of the
debtor's impending name change, violated its duty under U.C.C. § 1-203 to act in "good
faith" and was therefore unperfected).
In the cases listed above, Article 9's provisions giving the secured party perfected sta-
tus, endanger the rights of one purchasing the collateral. Purchasers of such collateral defeat
only those secured partyies holding "unperfected" security interests. U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(c).
Nevertheless, cases involving the purchase of non-cash proceeds with cash proceeds, the
removal of collateral from one jurisdiction to another, and changes in residence or name so
that the original filing does not give notice, are sufficiently rare that in most cases parties
dealing with the debtor usually are given notice under Article 9's provisions.
544. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 10, § 5081 (1982); see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 12-111 (1982).
545. E.g., Flemming v. Thompson, 343 A.2d 599 (Del. 1975). In Flemming, a debtor
sold a mobile home to a mobile home dealer, who in turn sold it to a buyer in ordinary
course of business. See supra note 512, discussing the buyer in ordinary course of business.
In the meantime, debtor's judgment creditor delivered a writ of execution to the sheriff, but
the goods were sold before the sheriff could levy on them. The court held for the buyer of
the home, reasoning that the debtor held at least voidable title. Therefore, under section 2-
403 (1), the buyer cut off the rights of the judgment creditor.
U.C.C. § 2-403(1) provides:
(1) A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or had power
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Even the all-powerful Internal Revenue Service, which has
persuaded Congress to grant it a lien on all property of the tax-
payer upon mere assessment of the lien, 5 6 cannot enforce its lien
against most good faith purchasers of the property.5 47 Although the
Restatement of the Law of Agency continues to recognize the rule
that the authority of the agent is extinguished upon the unknown
and unascertainable death of the principal, 5 8 Commentators have
criticized the resulting injustices that it causes.54 9
Thus, although there is an obvious need to freeze the assets of
the estate to maximize the dividends for estate creditors, at a mini-
mum, bankruptcy laws should require that all available steps be
taken to reduce the number of such cases. Student writers who
have discussed the Marin decision have suggested that as a condi-
tion of filing bankruptcy, a voluntary bankrupt give notice to the
debtor's bank that bankruptcy has been filed.550 Recall that the
Bankruptcy Commission embraced this idea in part and suggested
that a notice be filed in the real estate records and U.C.C. filings in
order to defeat the rights of all initial and subsequent
transferees. 5
In voluntary cases, that comprise the vast majority of the
cases filed, Congress should consider placing the duty on the
debtor to notify third parties as a condition of seeking relief under
the bankruptcy code. State recording records are available to give
third parties notice. There is no reason why the bankruptcy laws
should not require the debtor to use them. For example, the debtor
should be required to file a notice in the real estate records, to
make a U.C.C. filing both centrally and locally, to send a written
to transfer except that a purchaser of a limited interest acquires rights only to
the extent of the interest purchased. A person with voidable title has power to
transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value.
Most of the "voidable title" cases involve cases of fraud or the like. The court, however, in
order to protect the purchaser, chose to emphasize the second sentence of subsection (1)
rather than the first. In the Flemming case, the Delaware statute gave the creditor a lien as
of time of delivery of the writ. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 5081 (1982). But the court could
not bring itself to rule against the bona fide purchaser.
546. 26 U.S.C. § 6321 (1982).
547. Section 6323(a) provides that the I.R.S.'s lien "shall not be valid as against any
purchaser, holder of a security, interest, mechanic's lienor, or judgment creditor until notice
thereof . . . has been filed." 26 U.S.C. § 6323(a) (1982). See supra note 502 for further
discussion.
548. RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY § 120 (1933).
549. See supra note 55.
550. See Note, Where Bank Acted Without Actual Knowledge, supra note 6, at 859;
Note, Trustee's Title, supra note 6, at 435.
551. See supra text accompanying note 240.
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notice of his bankruptcy to all banks and insurance companies
with which he has funds, to note the filing of bankruptcy on all
certificates of title, and to attach the original of those certificates
to his bankruptcy schedules.5 52 The court should be given assur-
ance that the debtor has complied with the bankruptcy laws by
insisting that the debtor certify in his schedules that notice has
been given.
Some cases will still need to be resolved under section 549.
Frequently, bankruptcy needs to be filed immediately in order to
secure the benefit of the automatic stay and thereby prevent se-
cured creditors from closing down the debtor. 5 Present rules per-
mit the debtor to file the petition and then, within the following
fifteen days, file the schedules, provided that the petition is accom-
panied with a creditor list and addresses.5
In that period, there is potential for mischief. Some may argue
that when many large and sophisticated business debtors are pre-
sent, the number of required notice filings may be exorbitant. Usu-
ally, however, large and sophisticated business debtors are repre-
sented by equally sophisticated bankruptcy lawyers, thoroughly
schooled in commercial law. If counsel for the major lending insti-
tutions know all of the various places to file in order to take a
blanket security interest, then Chapter 11 bankruptcy lawyers can
quickly acquire the same expertise if they do not already possess
it.
The present treatment of involuntary cases should continue. 5
The present bankruptcy code correctly continues the basic policy
of prior law, namely that the debtor should be allowed to continue
in business until his creditors are able to establish that they are
entitled to relief under the bankruptcy laws.
If, however, the debtor fails to defeat the petitioning creditors
and an "order for relief" is entered against him, the debtor will be
less than enthusiastic about giving and filing the notices suggested
552. Professor Nadler originally suggested this idea. See NADLER, THE LAW OF BANK-
RUPTCY § 171 (1948).
553. The automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections provided by the
bankruptcy laws. It gives the debtor a breathing spell from his creditors. It stops all collec-
tion efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions. It permits the debtor to attempt a
repayment or reorganization plan, or simply to be relieved of the financial pressures that
drove him into bankruptcy. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 340 (1977).
554. BANKR. RULE 1007(c).
555. My principle objection to present policy is that the estate has no claim for postpe-
tition transfer made after a general receiver is appointed but before the entry order of relief.
See supra discussion notes 281-83.
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above. A half-measure would be to permit the petitioning creditors
to make these filings after the order for relief is entered and then
to be reimbursed as an administrative expense of the bankruptcy
estate.5
56
Admittedly, the proposed solution in involuntary cases is only
a half-measure, and in some cases the unauthorized actions of the
debtor will victimize postpetition transferees. It is surprising, how-
ever, in reading the cases, how many of the postpetition transfer
situations involve transactions and transfers that did not occur im-
mediately after the filing of a petition. The majority of such cases,
then, should result in the transferees receiving at least some kind
of constructive notice.
V. CONCLUSION
The reader may not have fully agreed with the author's deci-
sion to analyze turn of the century cases and statutes as a prereq-
uisite to the discussion of the present law on postpetition transfers.
Modern decisions that reach incorrect conclusions, however, may
have been decided differently if courts were fully apprised of the
history of the postpetition transfer issue in bankruptcy law. 557
In conclusion, it now seems clear that Congress and the courts
have been attempting to grapple with an insoluble problem. There
is a compelling need to freeze the assets of the estate upon the
filing of a petition in bankruptcy to maximize the estate for the
benefit of the debtor's creditors. Parties who receive property while
paying value and acting on good faith, however, are obviously de-
serving of protection. In the postpetition transfer cases, one inter-
est cannot be accommodated without sacrificing the other.
In general, insofar as nonbankruptcy law protects the good
faith transferee, it seems that present bankruptcy laws should pro-
tect the transferee as well. But the courts and Congress should be
mindful of the fact that the basic rule of caveat emptor still gov-
erns transactions involving personal property, and therefore the
556. Section 503(b)(1)(A) permits reimbursement as an administrative expense "the ac-
tual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate . . . rendered after the com-
mencement of the case." 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(a) (1982). Administrative expenses are then
accorded first priority when the estate is distributed to creditors, 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1)
(1982).
557. The opinions in In re Smith Corset Shop, Inc., 696 F.2d 971 (1st Cir. 1982), dis-
cussed supra at text accompanying notes 323-27, and In re Yellow Cab Co., 4 BANKR. CT.
DEC. (CCR) 382 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1978), discussed supra note 133, may have been improved
by a more thorough understanding of the history of this problem.
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courts should not provide ad hoc relief to good faith transferees
and bailees dealing with the debtor. Thus, given the likelihood that
future transferees who deal with the debtor will be victimized by
his unauthorized behavior, the bankruptcy laws should provide the
debtor with every incentive, by coercion if necessary, to notify his
creditors and other parties that he has filed bankruptcy.
